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Abstract 
In 1991, following its defeat in the first Gulf War and out of fear of a humanitarian 
catastrophe, the Iraqi army and state-apparatus were forced to withdraw from the 
three Kurdish-population governorates in Northern Iraq. This left an administrative 
vacuum that was filled by the leadership of the Kurdish fragmented guerrilla 
movement – now a de facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, known as the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG). Instead of achieving their goal of an autonomous (and 
in the long-term even independent) Kurdistan through insurgency or guerrilla warfare, 
the Kurdish leadership came to see state- and institution-building as the most efficient 
path. 
De facto statehood has had a significant impact on the development of the 
KRG, its state-building, its interaction with the international community, and its 
policies. As demonstrated in the growing literature on de facto states, the pursuit of 
international legitimacy often plays a key role in shaping their conduct and identity, 
paving the way toward substantial, though fragile, achievements in state-building. The 
purpose of this research is to contribute to the study of de facto states by exploring the 
case of the KRG. It argues that the pursuit of legitimacy is essential for the 
understanding of de facto states, mainly due to its potential to generate interaction 
between the de facto state and different segments of the international community. 
Transnational advocacy is found to be particularly significant, including diaspora 
activism for conveying ideas and encouraging interaction.  
By examining the evolution of the Kurdish national liberation movement from 
1958 to 2010, this research aims to better explain the dynamics that shape de facto 
states in general, and to contribute to the study of the KRG as a de facto state in 
particular, including its development, and its domestic and foreign policies. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The subject of de facto states presents somewhat of a challenge to students in the field 
of International Relations (IR), since it does not settle well into the dichotomy 
between state and non-state actors to which they have become accustomed. Rather, 
the de facto state exists in a limbo of international definitions and regulations. In its 
most minimalist definition, the de facto state is a political entity whose leadership has 
wide autonomy in both its domestic and foreign policies, has established institutions 
that usually characterise independent states, and which perceives itself as deserving 
full legal and institutional independence. Establishing sovereignty through state-and 
institution-building is a top priority for such actors, and indeed many of the existing 
de facto states have actually been relatively successful in their state- and institution-
building projects. Yet, such entities have been denied one of the most important traits 
which actually make political and geographical entities into states – international 
legal/diplomatic recognition. More importantly, even their existence and actions as de 
facto states are considered to be illegitimate by most members of the international 
community. This is indeed a problematic existence; yet, it does not render it a subject 
unworthy of analysis. On the contrary, because of its unique circumstances, the de 
facto state can actually provide us with some important insight on IR. 
The benefits of studying such unchartered territories as de facto states have 
already been identified by various scholars, who have approached the subject from 
different perspectives. Most of the studies of the subject, however, tended to approach 
it from a systemic perspective, utilising the cases of de facto states and their contested 
existence to examine the state-system, whose members have mostly refused to 
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recognise the de facto states.
1
 Several other studies have diverged from this 
perspective, focusing on the development, identity and conduct (or policies) of de 
facto states.
2
 The latter studies have been particularly significant because they 
identified the link between the position of de facto statehood and the development and 
policy-making processes of de facto states. Particularly important has been the 
identification of the pursuit of legitimacy as a constituting factor in the development 
of de facto states.
3
 
This research joins the latter group of works, but with the aim of contributing a 
further dimension: by focusing on the case of the Kurdish national liberation 
movement in Northern Iraq and its transformation into the Kurdistan Regional 
Government. This research focuses not on the development of de facto states, but on 
the manner in which legitimacy actually facilitates changes in the conduct and policy 
of de facto states. As this dissertation argues, the de facto states’ need of international 
legitimacy is essential, but is not sufficient for their understanding. Rather, the pursuit 
of legitimacy creates opportunities for changes: as this thesis demonstrates, by 
constantly interacting with the international community in an effort to legitimise its 
existence and actions, the de facto state puts itself under further scrutiny and allows 
more transnational actors to take part in the process of state-building. This compels 
the de facto state at least to engage in some forms of deliberation and argumentation, 
which carry with them the possibility of change. 
                                                          
1
 Most notable examples for that are Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State 
(Brookfield: Ashgate, 1998); Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Pal Kolstø, “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-states,” 
Journal of Peace Research 46, 3 (2006), 723-740. 
2
 For most comprehensive projects see Nina Caspersen, Unrecognized States: the Struggle for 
Sovereignty in the Modern International System (Cambridge: Polity, 2012); Nina Caspersen and Gareth 
Stansfield (ed.), Unrecognized States in the International System (Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2011). 
3
 See Caspersen, Unrecognized States, especially chapter 4, “Internal Sources of Unrecognized State-
building,” 76-101. 
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The above hypothesis is inspired to a great extent by the Constructivist 
approach to international politics, according to which the identity of an actor is shaped 
by its position in international society, as well as by discourse, ideas and 
intersubjective meanings of reality.
4
 However, the idea that the Constructivist 
approach could be applied in order to gain a better understanding of the KRG in fact 
arose in a meeting conducted with a senior KRG official and a long time participant in 
the Kurdish national liberation struggle in northern Iraq.
5
 The purpose of the session 
was for the KRG representative to present data about the KRG’s progress in 
economic, social and political fields. The audience at the event, which was organised 
and hosted by a London-based non-governmental organisation (NGO), was comprised 
of members of the Kurdish diaspora community in Britain, representatives of other 
NGOs, academics, journalists, representatives of different diplomatic missions in 
London, potential investors and current and potential donors. During the Questions 
and Answers session at the end of the event, the speaker was addressed with a 
question by a representative of an NGO about the dire situation of women in the 
Kurdistan Region, concerning mainly the KRG’s incompetence in preventing such 
phenomena as “honour” killings, polygamy, domestic violence and female genital 
mutilation (FGM). To the surprise of those present, the speaker then side-lined the 
other questions addressed to him, and addressed this question in great detail, 
elaborating on the KRG’s (and particularly his own) dedication to countering such 
trends and bringing perpetrators to justice.
6
  
                                                          
4
 I elaborate on the social Constructivist approach below, as it has guided my ontological approach to 
international politics. 
5
 The meeting was held with no restrictions regarding the publication of contents. However, I prefer not 
to disclose the details of this meeting. 
6
 To emphasise his point, he actually reverted to speaking in English, rather than using a translator as 
he did throughout most of the event. 
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It was this meeting that provided me with the first explicit example of the 
manner in which the search for international legitimacy can put leadership of de facto 
states (or even recognised states) under scrutiny almost voluntarily. It led me to come 
up with two observations, which were heavily supported by existing literature on de 
facto states. First, de facto states are in a constant need to legitimise their existence, 
actions and aspirations. This position, in a limbo of non-recognition, has substantial 
negative implications for their existence and prospects of any progress. Therefore, the 
leaderships of de facto states are in a constant pursuit of international legitimacy and 
recognition. Second, the pursuit of international legitimacy by de facto states, or any 
other actor for this manner, cannot be independent from developments at their 
domestic level. In their pursuit of legitimacy, the representatives and supporters of de 
facto states often rely not on moral claims, but rather on the idea that they are de facto 
states, namely their autonomy and proven ability to function like a state. Anything 
that might demonstrate this ability will be highlighted by the leadership of the de facto 
state in its interaction with other states: control over the territory, general personal 
security in the region under their control, signs of economic viability, and even the 
ability to protect its border from invasions, especially by its former parent state. 
This second hypothesis paved the way to a third one. There is a tendency in 
literature on the subject of de facto states to stress their relative success in state-
building, and especially successes in democratisation. Most students of the subject 
tend to view such success as taking place in spite of the lack of recognition. However, 
as this research reveals, non-recognition or illegitimacy can actually play a positive 
role in facilitating such developments. One may argue, then, that it is because of their 
illegitimate status; it is the search for legitimacy that drives de facto states to go 
through such positive developments as successful institution-building, guaranteeing 
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the security of their people, or liberalisation of their political system. This is because 
the lack of legitimacy often drives the leadership of the de facto states to interact with 
the international community and engage directly with the norms and ideas that 
dominate the society of states and the standards that guide its recognition and 
“admission” of new members. This has entailed a process of learning, in which the 
elites of de facto states have been institutionalised to understand what it means to be a 
“good,” legitimate government. In most cases, de facto states will not face an explicit 
international demand to reform their political system, since this would necessarily 
mean some international recognition. However, through this interaction with the 
international community. the de facto state’s leadership often learns that meeting 
internationally-held standards of governance, or at least claiming to meet such 
standards, may pave the way toward recognition. More importantly, this constant 
interaction often puts the government of the de facto state under greater scrutiny. 
When its representatives make demands based on their ability to maintain statehood, 
sovereignty and security, there are at least some actors that might try to hold them 
accountable: not only those who object to their existence, but also those that aim to 
promote the same values that de facto states claim to meet. Thus, de facto states’ 
foreign policies often pave the way toward further domestic changes. 
What is important to note here is that this is, at the end of the day, a study of 
national liberation. The vast majority of de facto states emerged out of national 
liberation movements with ethnically, religiously, or socially-based separatist 
aspirations. They often transform into de facto states due to dramatic changes in their 
domestic and international environments. This transformation is bound to have 
important implications for the identity, policies, strategies and development of such 
movements. Yet, their final goals of national liberation and national self-
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determination usually remain unchanged. Therefore, and based upon the above 
presented hypotheses, the questions that this research answers are: how does this 
transformation shape the external and internal strategies of de facto states? How is the 
interaction between the de facto state and other actors shaped by this transformation? 
And how does this interaction, in turn, shape the development and evolution of the de 
facto state? 
The KRG serves as an insightful example of a de facto state. The history of the 
Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq dates back to the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire, with the spread of nationalist ideas among the different ethnic and religious 
groups constituting the Ottoman Empire. Yet, this research actually begins in 1958, 
with the return of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the now almost mythical leader of the 
Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq, to the country. This return marked a 
peak in the process of localisation of the Kurdish question in Iraq and the growing 
concentration of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Northern Iraq in liberation from 
Baghdad, at the expense of the idea of “Greater Kurdistan.” Up until 1991, dynamics 
in the relations between the Kurds in northern Iraq and Baghdad could be 
characterised as ones between a central government representing a certain sector of 
the population and a compact minority based in the periphery. However, following the 
defeat of the Iraqi army in the Desert Storm Operation in 1991, new dynamics 
emerged. Forced under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 688 to 
withdraw its armed forces from northern Iraq, the Ba’th government decided to 
withdraw its bureaucracy and state apparatus from the region as well. The removal of 
state bureaucracy from the region was a punitive measure, aimed to drive the Kurdish 
population to poverty and thus compel it to seek reunification with Iraq. But the 
unpredictable happened: the Kurdish leadership managed to establish its control over 
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the Kurdish regions under the protection of the allied forces, namely the US, Britain 
and France, consolidate its sovereignty, and eventually went through a relatively 
successful process of state- and institution-building. The initial process of state-
building also witnessed an initial democratic transition, with elections taking place in 
the region for the first time in its history. The process of state-building was severely 
interrupted during the mid-1990s, when a civil war erupted between the two main 
Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK). It was renewed and enhanced, however, following the 2003 
American-led invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the Ba’th regime. 
Throughout this period, the armed struggle against Baghdad was almost 
entirely abandoned, and state-building now became the main form of national 
liberation. To put it in different terms, guns and landmines were now replaced by 
legislation and bureaucracy. Since its establishment, international reaction to the 
development of a Kurdish de facto state shifted from open hostility, through a feeble 
objection and lip-service to Iraqi territorial integrity from all parties involved, to some 
legitimacy and acceptance by the international community. Full recognition has never 
been openly considered, and the Kurdish leadership has never declared independence. 
It has, nevertheless, striven to expand its autonomy and protect its constantly 
contested achievements. In a correlation, the interaction between the KRG and the 
international community gradually became based more on the KRG’s effort to exhibit 
its success, building upon it in an effort to legitimise its existence. This, in turn, 
further enhanced the same positive developments which were used by the KRG to 
support its de facto autonomy from Baghdad. This research stops in the year 2010; 
This is because between 2009 and 2010 the KRG experienced some of its more 
significant achievements, whether domestically, with the third regional election 
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campaign taking place; or diplomatically, in terms of its relations with other actors, 
and especially Turkey.  
At first glance, one may ask: should we really focus our intellectual effort on 
what might seem a marginal subject in international politics? After all, as revealed 
later in this research, the number of potential cases does not even reach twenty. 
Among them are: the three separatist entities in the Caucasus, namely Nagorno-
Karabakh (seceded from Azerbaijan), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (both seceded from 
Georgia); Transnistria (Moldova); Kosovo (Serbia); Somaliland (Somalia); the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC); the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA); the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (Morocco); the Republic of China 
(i.e. Taiwan);
7
 Biafra; Tamil Elam; Eritrea and South Sudan.
8
 Most of these entities 
are relatively small in territory and are usually insignificant economically. A similar 
question might be applied to the study of the KRG. Should so much energy be 
devoted to studying an entity whose existence seems so fragile, when there are other, 
seemingly more acute issues in this region of the Middle East that deserve our 
attention? 
True, de facto states are scarce in number and are relatively small in terms of 
their population and territory. Nonetheless, this does not mean that they do not carry 
weight in international politics. On the contrary, de facto states often play important 
                                                          
7
 All of these cases have been defined as de facto, contested or unrecognised states by the following 
authors: Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State; Geldenhuys, Contested States in World 
Politics; Pal Kolstø, “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-states”; Dov Lynch, 
Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflict and De Facto States (Washington DC: 
United States Institute for Peace, 2004); Tozun Bahceli, Barry Bartmann and Henry Srebnik (ed.), De 
Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty (Oxon: Routledge, 2004); Pal Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, 
“Living with Non-recognition: State- and Nation-building in South Caucasian Quasi-states,” Europe-
Asia Studies 60, 3 (2008), 483-509; Nina Caspersen, “Separatism and Democracy in the Caucasus”, 
Survival 50, 4 (2008), 113-136 
8
 The last four on the list no longer exist as de facto states. The latter two are now fully recognised and 
fully legitimate members of international society; the former have been defeated and re-annexed to the 
parent-states. 
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roles in the geopolitics of their region. Their persistent undermining of regional status-
quo means that de facto states can constitute a focal point for future developments in 
the region. Some view them as sources of chronic instability, while others as victims 
of harsh circumstances and historical injustice. But regardless of the observer’s 
approach or bias, they are undoubtedly important elements in a complex political 
fabric. Therefore, a better understanding of their motivations and of what guides their 
policy-making decisions is necessary if we seek to genuinely understand their impact 
on their regional (or even global) geopolitics. The KRG is an excellent example for 
that; one would find it hard to explain regional dynamics in the north-eastern part of 
the Middle East, and in the interaction between Iraq, Turkey Iran and Syria, without a 
thorough understanding of the changes in the Kurdish national liberation struggle. 
Indeed, several studies have been conducted about the impact of the Kurdish question 
on regional geopolitics since 1991,
9
 yet they have mostly failed to note the impact of 
the changing nature of the Kurdish national liberation struggle in Iraq on regional 
geopolitics. Other studies have taken into account the transformation of the Kurdish 
national liberation movement in Iraq, but their analysis focused mainly on Turkish 
foreign-policy making.
10
 
There is more, however, to the effort in thoroughly understanding the 
evolution and conduct of de facto states. International legitimacy, which is defined in 
this research as an important factor in the process of transformation that de facto 
states go through, is constituted of various norms and ideas. These norms and ideas, in 
turn, are constantly given to changes and transformations which are themselves the 
                                                          
9
 Robert Olson, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle 
East (Lexington, KY: Kentucky University Press, 1996). 
10
 Robert Olson, The Goat and the Butcher: Nationalism and State Formation in Kurdistan-Iraq Since 
the Iraqi War (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Pub., 2005); Åsa Lundgren, The Unwelcome Neighbour: 
Turkey's Kurdish policy (London: I.B Tauris, 2007). 
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products of international negotiations and deliberations. When de facto states interact 
with the international community they essentially engage with the norms and ideas 
that constitute legitimacy. Thus, de facto states provide us with yet one more example 
for the manner in which certain norms and ideas, and more generally globally-held 
perceptions of statehood and sovereignty, are conveyed from the global level into 
certain actors and under specific conditions. In this manner, this study follows other 
existing studies in the field of IR,
11
 by adding yet another perspective to the rich 
repertoire that already exists in the literature. 
With regard to the KRG, then, one can say that examining it in the framework 
of de facto statehood has a double benefit: not only that the case of the Kurdish 
national liberation movement and its transformation into the Kurdistan Regional 
Government serves this research in further enhancing our understanding of de facto 
states, but applying the framework of de facto statehood to the KRG can actually help 
us to better understand these actors, whose regional significance has been mostly on 
the increase. 
The pattern of research offered in this dissertation requires a methodology that 
necessarily pays attention to such issues as interaction, learning and communicative 
action, as well as to the reciprocal relations between the agent and the system (in this 
case the de facto state and the international community). The Social Constructivist 
approach to the IR (referred to henceforth as the Constructivist approach) carries in it 
the necessary tools for such an examination, and this research has been greatly 
influenced by this approach.  
                                                          
11
 Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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1.2 A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY AND THE USE OF THE TERM ‘DE 
FACTO STATE’ 
Here an important note must be made about the choice to use the term de facto state in 
reference to my unit of analysis. While seemingly an issue of semantics, the choice of 
such terminology has some implications over the way one approaches the subject. In 
fact, the manner in which students refer to the phenomenon discussed in this research 
has been a subject of some controversy and debate. While it was Scott Pegg who first 
defined de facto states,
12
 as those separatist entities that have gained autonomy and 
been successful in the processes of state-building, but failed in securing international 
legitimacy, following studies of the phenomenon came out against the use of this 
term. While accepting the criteria set by Pegg for identifying such actors, later studies 
preferred to refer to them as separatist,
13
 contested,
14
 unrecognised,
15
 or quasi-
unrecognised states.
16
 Explaining his objection to the use of the term ‘de facto’, Deon 
Geldenhuys, for instance, has argued that the above term is “problematic”, since it 
implies that “these entities are denied de jure recognition.” In reality he notes, some of 
them have actually managed to secure various degrees of recognition, starting from 
recognition by one state (Russia in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or Turkey 
in the case of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) or from numerous states (as 
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in the case of Kosovo and Taiwan).
17
 Pal Kolstø, in another instance, insisted on 
adding the term quasi as a prefix to the term ‘unrecognized states’, arguing that many 
of these entities, if gaining recognition and thus turning into de jure states, are bound 
to become failed states.
18
 
While both Geldenhuys and Kolstø bring up valid points which should be 
taken into account by any student of de facto states, in this research I chose to employ 
Pegg’s initial terminology of de facto statehood. This is because terms such 
“contested” or “unrecognised” states necessarily approach the actor from a structural 
perspective, defining it against the international community’s objection to legally and 
diplomatically recognise the actor as a full member state. The term de facto state, in 
contrast, directs the reader first and foremost to the agency of the de facto state, 
namely the autonomy and sovereignty it has achieved through its own actions, rather 
than to questions of recognition or non-recognition. In essence, the term de facto state 
sets the actor and its development as the focal point of analysis. 
In a more recent critique, James Harvey challenged the use of the word state in 
reference to those actors. As he suggests, political scientists have essentially applied 
traditional frameworks to the study of those actors, rather than coming up with “a new 
field of theoretical discourse and new analytical frameworks.”19 This terminology, 
Harvey suggests, not only perpetuates the state-centric tendencies of the field, but also 
implies that those entities are unitary or singular in nature. This, according to Harvey, 
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is particularly acute since the use of the term state might imply that such actors are to 
become recognised states at some stage, which in reality is rarely the case.
20
 
This is an important point, which again deserves careful attention from 
students of the phenomenon. Yet, by making such an argument Harvey essentially 
follows the line of his predecessors, as he as well clings to the structure-level at the 
expense of the agent. More importantly, Harvey misses a significant point – the power 
that the idea of statehood and the impact of the model of the nation-state has on the 
actors that fall into this category. A review of the discourse and conduct of de facto 
states, as done later in this research, reveals that most of these entities have viewed the 
state as the only model for any future solution of their problems, and as the ideal way 
to organise themselves in the contemporary international order. This has been true as 
well for de facto states that have never declared independence, such as the KRG for 
example. Though throughout its first two decades of existence its leadership 
constantly insisted that they did not intend to secede from Iraq in the near future, 
Almost from the moment it gained autonomy from Iraq, the Kurdish leadership began 
perceive itself and the Kurdistan Region in terms of statehood, establishing 
institutions that are inherently associated with statehood, such as parliament and 
judiciary. Harvey is right to point out that de facto states should not be viewed as 
singular units – but the same argument can be applied to most entities in the field of 
IR. And as I demonstrate later in this research, all de facto states do share certain 
characteristics that distinguish them from other forms of statelessness. 
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1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY: SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTIVISM IN IR 
The Constructivist school in IR is a natural theoretical framework for such an 
analysis, the primary reason being this school’s adherence to the idea that 
communicative action, discourse and ideas shape the identity and policies of states, 
and subsequently international relations. Constructivists have mostly accepted the 
assumption that state actors are self-interested and motivated by the desire to survive 
amid constant threats in an anarchical environment. Nonetheless, they are intrigued by 
what leads a certain actor, or a group of actors, to assume that taking a certain action 
might serve their interest best.
21
 By so doing, Constructivists have to challenge 
another dominant paradigm in IR theory – namely the assumption that states’ 
preferences and patterns of action are given, since they are based on rational 
calculations of the balance of power or threat at the structural level, as advocated by 
the Neorealist school that dominated IR during the Cold War era,
22
 or the Neoliberal 
approach to IR which challenged the Realist dominance during different stages of the 
Cold War.
23
 
The hypothesis guiding Constructivist scholars is that actors do not necessarily 
know what they want in advance, in the sense that they are not guided by a permanent 
set of aims and interests. Rather, they go through a cognitive process in which they 
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are socialised to accept certain values, which in turn shape their identity and, 
consequently, their behaviour.
24
 Constructivists essentially view identity as the key 
for understanding actors’ preferences, interests and behaviour toward other objects 
and actors.
25
 Identity, namely the actor’s self-perception of its nature and purpose, or 
its “role-specific understandings” and expectations about self and others, in turn, is 
shaped through interaction with other actors at the international level.
26
 In contrast to 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism, Constructivists promote the idea that “the security 
environments in which states are embedded are in important part cultural and 
institutional, rather than just material… [Those] cultural environments affect not only 
the incentives for different kinds of state behavior but also the basic character of 
states--what we call state ‘identity’.”27 
Of course, Constructivists were not the first to underline the impact of ideas on 
policy-making; Idealists, also referred to as “Reflectivists,” have often highlighted the 
importance of ideas in IR, or at least the potential of certain ideas to shape state 
policies. In some cases, as observed by Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, 
Reflectivists sometimes marginalise material interests and capabilities, and give 
primacy to ideals over other considerations.
28
 But much like other prevailing 
traditions in IR, Reflectivists often accept the existence of ideas as given and assume 
that it is in the actor’s interests to “pick up” such an  idea. Again, the mainstream of 
Constructivists has never challenged the idea that material incentives and capabilities 
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are important; but most Constructivists have asserted that such interests are important 
because of the meaning that actors relate to them.
29
 And, just as meanings may 
change, state preferences are also malleable. Hence, if one seeks to better understand 
changes in actors’ policies and conduct, one should trace changes in the identities of 
actors. And if one aspires to do that, one should pay careful attention to two important 
factors: normative shifts in the international society of states, and the interaction 
between actors and the international society, which often involves the sharing of inter-
subjective knowledge between different actors. 
Communicative action is a pivotal concept for understanding processes of 
change. To put it very simply, whereas Neorealists and Neoliberals, due to their 
utilitarian perception of international politics, hold the view that “words are cheap” 
and used mainly to screen actors’ real intentions, the constructivist approach assumes 
from the outset the importance of communication between actors to their conduct. 
Inspired by critical theories of social sciences, and particularly Jürgen Habermas’s 
conception of deliberation as the foundation for political change, constructivists often 
employ the concept of the public sphere and apply it to international politics. For 
Habermas, the public sphere is the metaphysical or virtual arena where deliberation, 
argumentation, and persuasion about preferences and identity constantly take place 
between actors.
30
 While for Habermas, the public sphere was confined to the domestic 
level  and its main actors were the individuals within human societies (such as the 
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bourgeoisie and the government),
31
 Constructivists’ main task has been to apply it to 
the international sphere. 
Preoccupied with tracing sources of ideational and behavioural changes, 
Constructivists have identified constant deliberation between actors at the 
international level, as an important source of normative change. When actors engage 
in deliberation about “good” and “bad” conduct, they are necessarily engaged in truth-
seeking behaviour, which compels them to “be prepared to change their own views of 
the world, their interests, and sometimes even their identities.”32 As Risse has 
asserted, communicative action is possible in the state-system because it consists of 
the two main elements that enable communicative action at the domestic level: a 
common lifeworld, i.e. an environment of shared norms, practices and attitudes that 
serve as a cognitive background for most people; and a “truth-seeking behaviour,” 
which can lead to a reasoned consensus.
33
 Based on that, Marc Lynch argues, even 
cynical actors formulate their policies and their aims in ideational frameworks and 
global institutions. Most actors find it necessary, even occasionally, to justify their 
decisions and policies in a certain public sphere. The expectation from an actor to 
justify its actions eventually has implications over its behaviour. This is true 
especially in frameworks where there is an endeavour toward consensus and 
coordinated action, i.e. in a more institutionalised framework, and when interests and 
identities become the “focal point for public debate.”34 Globalisation, the 
decentralisation of communication and the growth of transnational civil society have 
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allowed the creation of new spaces for dialogue. International public spheres can take 
various forms, whether these are international conferences, media debates, and 
various virtual forums.
35
 The participation in a public sphere, maintains Lynch, 
“carries a constitutive as well as a strategic dimension,” as the transformations that 
actors may go through when taking part in a deliberation are patterned to a lot of 
extent by the public spheres in which they take place.
36
 
As Risse asserts, however, ideas “do not float freely.”37 The (re)emergence of 
the literature on ideas and the Constructivist tendency to focus on the construction of 
policies and ideas eventually gave birth to a rich literature about agents of change, 
providing us with a comprehensive review of the nature of these actors, their 
expectations and their strategies. Inspired by theories taken from sociology and 
comparative politics, Constructivists began emphasising the role of NGOs, IOs and 
other transnationally-based groups as essential elements of socialisation, and mainly 
as conveyer belts of ideas from the international environment into the “target-actors” 
(mainly states, but also non-state actors such as international corporations), instigators 
of change and mediators between domestic political elites and global actors. As 
Martha Finnemore has put it, “states are socialized to accept new norms, values, and 
perceptions of interest by international organizations.”38 Direct intervention has never 
been described as a necessary mechanism for prompting changes; often the power of 
such actors has lain in their utility as public spheres which enable that deliberation 
and argumentation take place and in which new norms emerge and old values are 
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being contested.
39
 As Emanuel Adler puts it “international organizations are related to 
power, because they can be sites of identity and interest formation and because states 
and sometimes individuals and other social actors can draw on their material and 
symbolic resources.”40 
The idea that certain actors can serve as conveyer belts of new ideas has 
encouraged students to delve further into the subject of transnationalism. Margaret 
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink for example, reviewed cases in which transnational 
coalitions between international NGOs (INGOs), IOs and domestic-level activists and 
NGOs, to which they have referred to transnational advocacy networks (TANs), were 
successful in pressuring norm-violating governments to reform, mainly by serving as 
networks between citizens in the target actors to communicate with citizens of other 
regions.
41
 Such networks have been able to persuade powerful and often reluctant 
governments to internalise the norms which they have been advocating not by 
coercion, but rather by referring to higher values and norms and by convincing those 
governments that such actions may garner more international legitimacy. Building 
upon such initial research, Sikkink and Risse have developed a more complex model 
of TANs intervention and prospects of success in promoting specific norms and 
persuading norm-violating governments to meet them. They identified a tripartite 
pattern of action taken by such actors: putting norm-violating states on the 
international agenda in terms of moral consciousness-raising, reminding liberal states 
of their own identity as promoters of human rights; empowering and legitimating the 
claims of domestic opposition groups against norm-violating governments, thus 
partially protecting the physical integrity of such groups from government repression; 
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and challenging norm-violating governments by creating a transnational structure 
pressuring such governments simultaneously “from above” and “from below,” thus 
minimising options for repression.
42
 
Their focus on norms, interaction and learning and on ideational changes has 
also driven Constructivists to pay greater attention to the issue of legitimacy in 
international relations. Led by the assumption that the state-system is inherently 
anarchic, in the sense that there is no central leadership, Neorealists and Neoliberals in 
IR have tended to treat legitimacy as an irrelevant concept in international politics. In 
such a system actors obey rules either because they are coerced to do so by more 
powerful actors, or because of pure self-interest. For Realists the latter condition 
implies that an actor would abandon its commitment as soon as the rule does not 
seem, any longer, to serve its interests, while Neoliberals accept that coercion or self-
interest may lead to gradual internalisation. In contrast, Ian Hurd has argued that that 
legitimacy in fact facilitates the internalisation of norms by actors. Actors may obey 
certain rules and decrees because they perceive them, or the forums in which they 
were formulated, as legitimate and appropriate. This is not to argue that interests do 
not play a role in an actor’s decision to obey a rule or follow a norm – but it is to 
argue that interests can also be defined as affiliation with a certain society, rather than 
fearing, let us say, punishment.
43
 A similar assumption is brought up by Christian 
Reus-Smit. For Reus-Smit, international legitimacy should not be seen as a constraint 
over power, as neo-realists have tended to assume. Rather, it is a source of power for 
rulers and governments, at the international and the domestic levels alike. Without it, 
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governments would have to garner consent for their actions mainly by interacting with 
purely self-interested actors and based on constant bribery or coercion. It is doubtful 
whether such actors truly exist, or whether actors can sustain a policy of bribery and 
coercion over a long-period.
44
 The attainment of legitimacy is relevant not only for 
states, but also for International Organisations (IOs),
45
 or even norms and political 
orders.
46
 
Another important feature of the Constructivist approach to international 
politics is its inclination toward a multilevel explanation of social behaviour. This has 
been yet another central component of the challenge that Constructivism has set to 
traditionally dominant schools in the field of IR. Debates within realism, liberalism 
and their neo-versions with regard to the source of state-actions created something of 
a dichotomy. Some, especially classical realists, have identified foreign policies as 
having mainly domestic sources.
47
 Others, namely Neorealists and Neoliberals, have 
identified the structure as the main source of foreign policy-making and state 
actions.
48
 For Constructivists, changes in actors’ conduct could be explained better if 
we take into account simultaneous developments at both levels. Internationally-held 
norms and ideas often emerge at a certain domestic level, among different societies 
and states. When those states are considered powerful and influential, their ideas may 
be absorbed by other states and eventually become international. Now dominating 
social perceptions at the global level, they might be transferred into other actors which 
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may have objected to them initially.
49
 Transnational actors play important part in this 
process serving as public spheres in which various actors “negotiate… the social, 
cultural, and political meanings of their joint enterprise.”50 But the domestic structure 
of the target actor, namely “the nature of political institutions, state society relations, 
and the values and norms embedded in its political culture,” is also essential for the 
understanding of the manner in which ideas are conveyed. Different levels of 
government centralisation, for instance, can determine the channels that transnational 
actors might get to the elites in a certain country. Stressing the intertwined nature of 
international and domestic public spheres, Lynch has argued that if the international 
sphere in which a state is embedded is viewed as hostile and challenging, it is likely to 
produce “defensive argumentation” and might even lead the state to repress the 
domestic sphere. In contrast, if the international public sphere is viewed as a 
“legitimate site for deliberation over collective identity and interests” then a state may 
be persuaded to change its preferences and behaviour.
51
  
The above paragraphs have provided a very brief review of the Constructivist 
school in IR. The question then, is why is Constructivism relevant to the subject of de 
facto states? In fact, each one of the aspects of Constructivism mentioned above can 
better serve our understanding of de facto states in general, and of the KRG in 
particular, than any other approach in IR. Primarily, the attention given by 
Constructivists to interaction, socialisation and identity transformations, buttresses the 
hypotheses raised in this research. At first glance, it might be seen as if the concept of 
de facto statehood is irrelevant for understanding the domestic level of an actor; after 
all, this status is imposed on de facto states by international society that refuses to 
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recognise these actors. Nevertheless, the transition of oppressed compact minorities 
into de facto statehood is likely to entail changes in the identities of such actors: 
within a relatively short period, the leaderships of such groups become autonomous 
actors, in charge of running the civilian affairs of its own subjects and representing 
their new entity at the international level. Naturally, this may also have impact on the 
nature of interaction between the de facto state and the international community. 
Socialisation and learning are inherent to this process; as de facto states are 
preoccupied with legitimising their status, they also endeavour to learn the meaning of 
statehood or the expectations of international society from potential members. As the 
case of the KRG reflects, this applies as well to de facto states that do not seek 
outright independence. This interaction, in turn, has the potential of altering de facto 
states’ decision-making processes not only at the international level, but also at the 
domestic level. Above it is stated that the lack of legitimacy has the potential to serve 
as an instigator of changes at the de facto states’ domestic level. This is particularly 
true for processes such as democratic transitions and the liberalisation of the political 
and economic systems, since they have dominated international society during the last 
two decades. 
The Constructivist focus on transnationalism is relevant as well to the 
examination of de facto states. This is because the interaction between de facto states 
and the international community actually facilitates the intervention of transnational 
actors in the process of state-building in de facto states. Since this interaction revolves 
mainly around the pursuit of legitimacy, and because legitimation of states has come 
to revolve around the nature and the achievements of de facto states, they become 
accountable for their own commitments. TANs consisting of NGOs, international 
agencies and members of the diaspora can use any public statements made by the 
24 
 
leadership of a de facto state to hold it accountable. When TANs are perceived as true 
representatives of what international society stands for, and if they are viewed as 
friendly toward the causes of the de facto state, or conducive to the survival of the de 
facto state, they may gain some access to, and leverage on, its leadership. This is 
particularly true for cases in which the de facto state has a large diaspora community 
which becomes an integral part of the TAN active in the region.   
Due to its nature, Constructivism offers a pluralistic methodology to IR 
students. In an excellent review of Constructivist methodology, Amir Lupovici traces 
a combination of methods often used by Constructivists: reliance on case studies, the 
employment of discourse analysis, process tracing, and the use of counterfactuals to 
prove certain points.
52
 To that Lupovici also adds the interpretive method. As he 
notes, such methods have often been used by scholars of different traditions, but these 
are Constructivists who have been successful in combining these methods in their 
research. By process tracing, Lupovici refers to “the study of causal processes – 
causal chains or causal mechanisms that connect the independent and the dependent 
‘variables’. Further, this method is used to identify and study complex relations 
between variables, as well as focal points, the influence of expectations, and agent-
structure relations.” Therefore, this method “provides a way of studying not only the 
proposed theoretical concepts and of testing research hypotheses, but also of studying 
ideational factors, the evolution of social phenomena, and the influence of these 
phenomena on actors’ behaviour.”53 By setting the pursuit of international legitimacy 
as an independent variable, this thesis basically establishes the pursuit of legitimacy as 
a starting point for the process of transformation that actors such as de facto states 
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have gone through. Changes in policies and decision-making processes are variables 
which are shaped following the pursuit of international legitimacy. 
By the study of counterfactuals Lupovici refers to “evaluating theories 
through the exploration of events that did not happen.” As Lupovici maintains, such a 
method enhances our “ability to study causal relations,” but also “improves the 
analysis of mutual relations between variables and the exploration of constitutive 
relations.”54 My analysis of de facto states relies on an important counterfactual: the 
assumption that the actors that fall into the category of de facto states would have 
acted differently if they had had a different status, namely recognised states or 
guerrilla movements. Taking the case of the KRG as an example, had the Kurdish 
national liberation movement gained some of its demands by the end of the First 
World War, or had the Kurds had a state in northern Iraq during the 1990s, its 
development would have been greatly different. It is impossible to clearly determine 
how different; but as this research suggests, searching legitimacy as a de facto state 
during the post-Cold War era, rather than during the era of decolonisation, for 
example, probably contributed to the KRG’s desire to demonstrate success in state-
building and democratisation, because such standards came to dominate the process of 
recognition of states in this era, at least theoretically.  
This research is structured in a manner that reflects the process that the 
Kurdish national liberation movement has gone through, while emphasising the 
importance of the wider theoretical framework of de facto statehood and the themes of 
interaction and socialisation.  
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1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
The first chapter presents the theoretical framework of this research. First, it defines 
the concept of international legitimacy. It then demonstrates how crises of 
international legitimacy and its pursuit serve as important factors that shape the 
identity, behaviour and policy-making of actors. The second part of this chapter 
presents the dependent variable – namely the de facto state. Building upon existing 
scholarship on the subject, it provides clear criteria for defining an actor as a de facto 
state and reviews studies which have already been done in the field. It elaborates on 
the implications of the status of de facto statehood on the evolution of the de facto 
state. It elucidates the crises of legitimacy that de facto states face, and stresses the 
importance of the pursuit of legitimacy for the understanding of de facto states. More 
importantly, it provides a model which takes into account interaction, communicative 
action and the role of transnational actors in the process. 
The second chapter moves on to discuss the case study, namely the Kurdish 
national liberation movement. It focuses primarily on the Kurdish national liberation 
movement in Iraq, beginning in 1958 and until 1991, although it does give substantial 
attention to the subject of the emergence of the pan-Kurdish nationalist movement 
early in the twentieth century. It demonstrates that throughout this period, the Kurdish 
national liberation movement, representing an oppressed minority in Iraq, came to 
define its identity and its aims as an anti-colonialist movement that struggled against 
Arab colonialism in Iraq (and for this manner in other parts of Kurdistan). The 
importance of interaction and learning becomes clear already in this chapter: this was 
the era of decolonisation, where states were carved out of former colonies based 
mainly on the dominant ethnic or religious majority in the territory. As the chapter 
shows, this understanding as well was the result of increasing interaction between 
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Kurdish activists and exiles with other similar movements. Aspiring to gain 
international legitimacy for their claims, portraying their movement in such terms was 
seen as the right path for justifying the Kurdish actions and aims.    
Chapter 3 moves on to discuss the transformation of the Kurdish national 
liberation movement into a de facto state, spanning the first decade of de facto 
statehood between 1991 and 2001. It argues that the transformation of the national 
liberation movement into a de facto government (KRG) had some important political 
and ideational implications. During the first years of its existence, the Kurdistan 
Region experienced the initial stages of democratic transition, with the first 
comprehensive election campaign in the history of Iraq taking place in the region. The 
process itself was to a large extent enabled by transnational intervention and members 
of the diaspora. This success, in turn, was integrated into the KRG’s interaction with 
the international community, with the Kurdish leadership now referring to Kurdistan 
as the “democratic experiment.” It also marked the beginning of a limited process of 
state- and institution-building, supported by aid from INGOs. Yet, this chapter also 
shows that the civil war, which erupted in 1994 and lasted till 1997, and which 
resulted in the division of the autonomous administration, in fact temporarily made 
the concept of de facto statehood irrelevant for the region. 
Chapter 4 examines the second decade of de facto statehood, focusing 
particularly on the post-invasion era, which also marked the reunification of the KRG. 
It demonstrates how this new decade allowed the KRG to renew its foreign policy of 
legitimation, based on its established domestic sovereignty, success in state-building, 
securitisation and stabilisation of the region, self-proclaimed democratisation and 
respect for minority rights. Even if those were only limited, the chapter argues that the 
Kurdish achievements were amplified due to the situation in the rest of Iraq. This 
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chapter also argues that understanding the importance of proving domestic or earned 
sovereignty by the KRG can also shed light on some of the decisions made by the 
Kurdish leadership, such as its enthusiastic participation in the regional flank of the 
United States-led global war on terror, or Kurdish attempts to secure control over oil 
in the region in spite of earlier agreements with the new government in Baghdad. 
While the previous chapter focuses mainly on the interaction between the 
KRG and the international community, the final chapter of this research focuses on 
the impact of the KRG’s interaction with the international community on its 
development. It argues that this interaction allowed an increased transnational 
intervention, which combined the activities of INGOs, IOs (and especially UN 
Agencies such as the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq) and members of the diaspora. 
This intervention, in turn, further advanced the same processes that the KRG has been 
using to legitimise its existence and action, namely meeting the international 
standards of democratisation and political liberalisation. This interaction, this chapter 
maintains, can explain some of the successes of the KRG in terms of state-building. 
The research relies on a number of primary sources, including pamphlets, 
journals, newspapers and magazines published by the Kurdish parties and other 
independent Kurdish organisations, such as Kurdish student unions in Europe and 
North America; diplomatic correspondence between the Kurdish leadership and 
foreign representatives, when relevant; books and memoires written by Kurdish 
activists; various reports in international newspapers and information agencies; and 
the KRG’s official website, referred here as KRG.org. Most of the primary sources 
are in English and Arabic, with some Turkish sources being used as well. Although 
since 1991 Kurdish has been the language used mainly for regional administration 
purposes, Arabic and English have also been widely used by the Kurdish 
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administrations and by the Kurdish national liberation movement. And since 
interaction and communication with other actors stand at the core of this research, 
items in the language of interaction have been more relevant for the purpose of this 
research. In addition, the research relies on several formal and informal interviews. 
Most of these interviews are not cited directly in this research, but they have greatly 
contributed to the understanding of different processes within the KRG. Most of the 
primary sources were gathered in archives such as the British Library of Political and 
Economic Science at the London School of Economics and Political Science, the 
School of Oriental and African Studies archives, the Middle East Documentation Unit 
at Durham University, and the media archives at the Institut Kurde de Paris and Tel 
Aviv University’s Dayan Centre. 
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CHAPTER 2. DE FACTO STATES: EARNED 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGITIMACY 
Defining the KRG as a de facto state in this research has two purposes: first, using the 
term can help us to better understand the KRG; and second, using the KRG as a case 
study aims to help us to better understand the concept of de facto statehood. The 
centrality of the term in this research requires a clear and careful definition of the 
concept of de facto statehood.  The literature on the subject in the field of IR has 
become richer and more thought-provoking during the previous decade, but it has still 
missed an important opportunity to clearly explain how this status of de facto 
statehood, which is a product of international as much as it is of domestic factors, 
actually shapes the conduct, development and decision-making processes of de facto 
states. The status of de facto statehood is a powerful one, since it puts great 
constraints on the de facto state at both the domestic and the international levels. It is 
also powerful because it is necessarily associated with temporality; de facto states do 
not wish to be such, but are rather in the midst of a process of changing their status 
and gaining legal independence – although this process is reversible and might end in 
failure. Due to predominant norms of statehood, however, they often face fierce 
challenges to these endeavours from other members of the international community. 
The chapter identifies two key terms for the understanding of a de facto state: 
transition and international legitimacy. The de facto state is an entity that experiences 
a transition, but often views it only as a step toward a greater transition. The term de 
facto states refers generally to separatist movements which have managed to 
“liberate” some parts of their claimed territories by driving the central government’s 
forces and state apparatus from those territories. Thus the term de facto state denotes a 
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transition from insurgency or rebellion into state-building. This transition affects the 
de facto state’s identity and the manner in which it interacts with the international 
community. International legitimacy, or more precisely the de facto states’ pursuit of 
it, stands at the core of the interaction between de facto states and the international 
community. Having secured domestic legitimacy, the de facto state’s main challenge 
is to now obtain international legitimacy, for both its existence as such and for its 
future aspirations. An important task of this chapter, therefore, is to clearly define the 
concept of legitimacy by deconstructing and presenting the various norms that 
constitute international legitimacy. It also focuses on the manner in which such norms 
are actually conveyed to the actors that aspire to become legitimate, a task often 
marginalised by those who study the subject of legitimacy in international relations. 
This is followed by a thorough presentation of the concept of a de facto state and this 
research’s approach to the subject. 
 
2.1 CRISES OF LEGITIMACY AND ITS PURSUIT: DEFINING THE CAUSE 
OF CHANGES 
2.1.1 THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY AND ITS IMPACT 
ON ACTORS ASPIRING FOR LEGITIMACY  
The concept of legitimacy has become in itself a valid subject of analysis and debate 
in the field of IR. It is, nevertheless, an elusive concept that requires a clear definition 
when used.
1
 The examination of legitimacy in the IR literature is not an obvious one. 
The preliminary efforts to introduce legitimacy as a key concept in international 
politics diverged from the realist assumption that legitimacy is a direct derivative of 
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power, namely that certain actions are legitimised due to the material power and 
hegemony of the actor that takes these actions.
2
 More recent studies of international 
legitimacy, particularly in the English School and Constructivist traditions, have 
accepted the connection between power and legitimacy, but rather than viewing 
power as a source of legitimacy, they have actually come to see legitimacy as a source 
of power. 
Relying on Mark Suchman’s definition of legitimacy as “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions,”3 Christian Reus-Smit argues that although actors in the state-system can 
exist without international legitimacy, such existence is bound to be short-lived.
4
 
Without legitimacy, an actor would necessarily have to interact solely with self-
interested actors, constantly bribing them in order to maintain its position, or even to 
survive. Even if purely self-interested actors do exist in the international system, not 
too many actors can actually afford such bribing. Hence, most actors do find it an 
existential necessity to obtain some degree of legitimacy. Based on that, Reus-Smit 
maintains, legitimacy should actually be seen as a source of power in the system: 
actors considered to be generally legitimate can rely on the active support of other 
actors that would invest “their resources and energies in the project that lies behind 
them”; they could also “draw on simple compliance, the behaviour of other actors in 
accordance with their rules, decisions, or commands”; as well as “benefit from low 
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levels of opposition, which reduces the costs of coercion and bribery.”5 Reus-Smit’s 
assertion about the link between international legitimacy and power is also shared by 
Mlada Bukovansky, who argues that “sovereignty is conditioned by legitimacy, and 
this has international as well as domestic implications.”6 Tracing the rise of 
democracy as an international legitimating norm, Bukovansky argues that “The 
existence in the system of a form of rule considered to be the most powerful and 
legitimate involves not only material but also cultural conditions… cultural conditions 
help facilitate the accumulation of material preponderance; legitimacy is not reducible 
to material power but is in fact a crucial aspect of power.
7
 
The argument that international legitimacy is essential in international politics 
dates back to the work of Martin Wight, who associated the concept with the 
recognition of an actor as a member of international society by its other members, 
thus defining international legitimacy as “[T]he collective judgement of international 
society about rightful membership of the family of nations.” Such judgement is 
expressed not only through legal mechanisms such as admission to international 
organisations, but also through other collective actions of other members of the 
international society. The great powers’ intervention in the affairs of the Ottoman 
Empire and China during the nineteenth century, or their partition of Poland “on the 
ground of its incurable misgovernment and disorders,” constitute examples for 
international society’s collective judgement.8 Whereas during the Cold War the field 
of IR was dominated largely by materialist theories, which associated power mainly 
with material capabilities, the post-Cold War scholarship witnessed a renewed interest 
in international legitimacy. One of the most notable students of international 
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legitimacy during the era was the legal theorist Thomas Franck, who became 
preoccupied with understanding the manner in which seemingly powerless 
international institutions, lacking mechanisms of (direct) coercion, managed to 
compel great powers to follow their resolutions. As Franck manifested, 
“Teleologically speaking, one might hypothesize that nations obey rules of the 
community of states because they thereby manifest their membership in that 
community, which, in turn, validates their statehood.”9 In other words, then, states, 
and even the most powerful among them, often make efforts to meet the demands of 
seemingly powerless IOs because compliance with such norms is tantamount to 
statehood. He therefore defined international legitimacy as “a property of a rule or 
rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those 
addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has 
come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of a 
right process.”10 The existence of a community, and the sense of obligation which it 
generates, is central to such a process. 
The question remains, though: what actually constitutes international 
legitimacy? Franck’s hypothesis has served as a platform for studying both the power 
of institutions,
11
 as well as to examine the legitimating power of certain norms at the 
global level, and especially the increasing validity of democracy as a legitimating 
norm. During the first decade of the post-Cold War era, and largely based on Franck’s 
theory, international legal and IR theorists embraced either the idea that parliamentary 
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democracy should become a condition for recognition,
12
 or that it actually became 
one.
13
 These ideas were inspired to a great extent by the post-Cold War reality and the 
emergence of the new post-Soviet states. Such association, nevertheless, should be 
made with some caution. Most of the studies that identified democratisation and 
liberalisation of politics as sources of legitimate membership in international society 
have failed to trace the evolutionary nature of international legitimacy and the 
changes in its constituent principles and values. The idea that principles of 
international legitimacy change throughout history has already been highlighted by 
Wight. According to Wight’s historical review, in post-Westphalian Europe (1648) 
the legitimate state was one governed by an absolute monarch; in the era of the great 
revolutions during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the norm shifted toward 
popular rule and self-determination; self-determination continued to serve as a 
foundation for recognition well into the inter-war era, although parliamentarism and 
respect for minority rights were now introduced as new “standards of civilization.” 
During the post-War era, recognition came to be based mainly on the principle of 
decolonisation, that is, the recognition of new states based on the boundaries drawn by 
the colonialist powers, often based on the existence, and demands, of the majority 
ethnic community in the newly created units.
14
 
Whereas Wight recognised that norms change throughout history, he failed to 
explain the causes of such changes, a task which was taken by other students of the 
English School. Examining transformations in international legitimacy through the 
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collapse of Yugoslavia, John Williams argues that there is one fundamental norm in 
international society that shapes the shifts in international society’s perception of 
international legitimacy: the need for order and stability.
15
 Ian Clark further develops 
this idea in his study of international legitimacy, contending that to understand 
legitimacy means to understand international society. This is because international 
society is in fact a “set of historically changing principles of legitimacy… not 
necessarily expressed in institutions… And too informal to be classed as rules.”16 
Much like Williams, Clark traces normative changes in international society’s desire 
to maintain international stability and order. Such normative changes are gradual and 
protracted, and they usually reach fruition at the end of major wars, during the signing 
of peace agreements. This is because “at these periods the impetus for speculation is 
strongest, and appeal to broad principles most likely. On the other [hand], the spirit of 
pragmatism is equally prominent when the international order has collapsed, and the 
imperative is to rebuild consensus, usually in the most inauspicious of 
circumstances.”17 
The end of the Cold War, Clark suggests, should be seen as one such peace 
agreement, which in fact concluded also the Second World War.
18
 With the surrender 
of the Soviet Union and the communist world, its constituent parts gradually 
embraced the norms common in the victorious West. Western states, in turn, were 
keen on promoting these norms guided by the idea that democratisation and 
liberalisation of both politics and the economy would guarantee international 
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stability.
19
 As Clark maintains, “These democratic ideals now lie deeply embedded in 
contemporary international policies on economic development, on post-conflict 
reconstruction and nation-building, and also explicitly in those actual admissions that 
have taken place, to such ‘mini-international societies’ as NATO and the European 
Union,” as well as the Act of African Union and Inter-American Democratic 
Charter.
20
 The argument that Clark is making is not an easy one to digest: it is 
essentially Western-centric, in the sense that it reflects mainly ideas that have been 
promoted by Western actors. Indeed, many members of the international community 
do not adhere to the standards set by the West in the latter stages of the Cold War and 
are still considered part of this “society of states.” Yet, several important notes redeem 
this argument from essentialism. First, it applies mainly to the process of recognition 
of new states, thus accepting that already established actors had the dubious privilege 
of being protected from external impositions. Second, Clark also indicates that such 
principles were at least theoretically embraced as ideals even in regions where there is 
(or was) a large number of states that do not actually follow these terms, namely in 
Africa and Latin America. Finally, Christian Reus-Smit has also indicated how 
decolonisation movements during the era of decolonisation, including those that have 
turned into non-democratic governments, actually embraced the discourse of human 
rights and democratisation to establish their right to sovereignty.
21
 
Notwithstanding their significant contribution to the general understanding of 
constitution of international legitimacy, most studies of the subject have fallen short 
of explaining an important aspect of international legitimacy: the manner in which 
actors concerned with international legitimacy actually come to understand, embrace 
                                                          
19
 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 173-175. 
20
 Ibid, 175.  
21
 Christian Reus-Smit, “Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty,” 519-538. 
38 
 
and internalise the norms of international legitimacy. Rather, current focus remains on 
the manner in which norms develop at the international society and are used by it to 
include (or exclude) new members.
22
 Clark does make one exception, when he 
highlights socialisation as the manner in which actors in international society 
understand the meaning of membership in international society. As he suggests, 
socialisation is not merely absorbing “what they see around them,” but rather can take 
“more self-conscious forms. The leading, and more successful, states set an example 
that may then be purposefully emulated by others.”23 Even in this case, nonetheless, 
Clark eventually confines his theory to the structural level, focusing more on 
international society’s choice of whether to accept or reject a certain actor as a 
member of international society. 
The concept of crisis of legitimacy provides an essential platform for avoiding 
this tendency to marginalise the actors who are in a pursuit of legitimacy. As Reus-
Smit suggests, crises are “critical turning points in which the imperative to adapt is 
heightened by the immanent possibility of death, collapse, demise, disempowerment, 
or decline into irrelevance.” An actor or an institution is facing a crisis of legitimacy 
when “the decline in its legitimacy or its failure to cultivate sufficient legitimacy, has 
reached a critical turning point.”24 Under such circumstances, “[in order] To 
reconstitute its legitimacy, an actor or institution must, first, recalibrate the 
relationship between its social identity, purposes, and practices, and the prevailing 
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social norms that define the parameters of rightful agency and action; and, second, 
realign its realm of political action with its social constituency of legitimation.”25 
The idea of crises of legitimacy underlines the importance of communicative 
action to the process of legitimation and the pursuit of international legitimacy. 
Adaptation to a certain society’s expectation requires not only socialisation, but also 
interaction and communication with the members of society. As Risse has argued, the 
manner in which actors come to judge which norm applies and what values constitute 
a “good” behaviour, is through argumentation and deliberation. 
When actors deliberate about the truth, they try to figure out in a collective 
communicative process (1) whether their assumptions about the world and 
about cause-and-effect relationships in the world are correct (the realm of 
theoretical discourses); or (2) whether norms of appropriate behavior can be 
justified, and which norms apply under given circumstances (the realm of 
practical discourse).
26
 
Hence, through argumentation, actors challenge common assumptions and normative 
beliefs, seek consensus about their claims, but also justify them. “In arguing mode, 
actors try to convince each other to change their causal or principled beliefs in order 
to reach a reasoned consensus about validity claims.”27 Bukovansky describes 
legitimacy as a discursive and cultural phenomenon. Focusing on the role of 
revolutions in shaping international society’s normative perception, she holds that 
revolutions did not change political systems, but were rather the tools through which 
challenges to the systems were percolated and transferred, through transnational 
interaction.
28
 Bukovansky’s idea is also echoed in Reus-Smit’s argument that 
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Actors establish their legitimacy, and the legitimacy of their actions, through the 
rhetorical construction of self-images and the public justification of priorities 
and practices, and other actors contest or endorse these representations through 
similar rhetorical processes… Establishing and maintaining legitimacy is thus a 
discursive phenomenon, and the nature of this discursive phenomenon will 
depend heavily upon the prevailing architecture of social norms, upon the 
cultural mores that govern appropriate forms of rhetoric, argument, and 
justification, and upon available technologies of communication.
29
 
In short, then, applying the idea of a communicative action is important if we indeed 
accept the argument that actors may change their identity and conduct through the 
pursuit of international legitimacy. 
The idea that students of IR should pay more attention to the manner in which 
actors engage with the concept of international legitimacy, does not mean ignoring the 
process of transformation of norms and ideas at the international level. On the 
contrary, as the examination of de facto states might reveal, actors’ understanding of 
international legitimacy and its principles often changes according to transformations 
at the global level. The consolidation of democratisation and respect for human rights 
as legitimating norms in the post-Cold War era has had important implications for 
other states, and especially states aspiring to achieve international legitimacy. This is 
actually inevitable if we accept the idea that socialisation and communicative action 
are important for the evolution of de facto states and their understanding of 
international expectations. Such an assertion of course necessitates a thorough 
understanding of the evolution of such norms at the international level. 
 
                                                          
29
 Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy,” 163. 
41 
 
2.1.2 INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: 
DEMOCRATISATION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATEHOOD 
The emergence of democracy and the protection of human right as theoretical 
standards of recognition toward the end of the Cold War marked a strong shift from 
the preceding period. As noted earlier, during the Cold War era, the main mechanism 
of self-determination was decolonisation. State capacity, prospects of some economic 
independence, or even general public support for the newly established state were 
rendered irrelevant. Self-determination came to be based on the perceived national 
aspirations of the dominant ethnic or religious group in a certain colony, in what was 
defined by Wight as the “majoritarian principle” and by Ali Mazrui as “racial 
sovereignty.”30 This resulted in the creation of numerous weak quasi-states that have 
suffered from chronic economic and political stability, and which have often survived 
mainly because of their recognition as states.
31
 It is interesting to note here the 
association made between human rights and national sovereignty during the era of 
decolonisation. Decolonisation, in turn, gave birth to the norm of territorial integrity 
i.e. the “presumption of international society in favour of a state trying to maintain its 
territorial integrity in the teeth of centrifugal forces, as a presumption against 
minorities seeking to establish a position which will enable them to claim 
international legitimacy.”32 
The immediate post-Cold War era opened a window of opportunities for 
certain regions to secede from their central governments and still be recognised by 
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international society, the most notable examples being the former Soviet and 
Yugoslav republics. The emergence of democratic legitimacy meant something of a 
return to the phases of history where the “relationship between those who govern and 
those governed” was actually significant for recognition, as was the case after the 
treaty of Westphalia.
33
 Nonetheless, this was a narrow window with very limited 
opportunities. With the outburst of domestic violence in the former Yugoslavia, 
international community’s aversion of secession was further enhanced. This turned 
out to be disastrous for many of the separatist movements which would eventually 
become de facto states. 
Although scholars trace the origins of modern democratic legitimacy in the era 
of great revolutions,
34
 Ian Clark identifies a first explicit effort to establish democracy 
as a de facto standard of recognition in the idea of defining the League of Nations as 
the “League of Democracies.” This idea was embraced by both the American 
President Woodrow Wilson and the French government, but was rejected eventually 
by other members of the League.
35
 Murphy identifies two main factors in the early 
twentieth century which eventually led international society to accept democracy as a 
legitimating norm: the first was the perception among members of the League of 
Nations that states’ failure to protect their minorities may destabilise international 
peace and order. Consequently, during the interwar era, the League made membership 
(though not recognition) of new states conditional on their guaranteeing the cultural 
and political rights of ethnic and religious minorities in their territory, which applied 
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particularly to the new republics emerging in Central and Eastern Europe.
36
 The 
second key development, Murphy suggests, was “the emergence of global 
international human rights instruments,” and particularly the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which called for “the right to take part in the 
government of [one's] country”; and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which called for the rights to “participate in public affairs and to free 
elections.” Although those did not legally bind the practices of state-formation with 
democracy and the maintenance of human rights, they came to serve as “important 
benchmarks when States weighed recognition of a new State,” such as the case of 
international non-recognition of the apartheid-governed Rhodesia in 1965.
37
 In 
contrast to the common dissociation of decolonisation from democratisation and good 
governance, Mayall points out the fact that some signs for the future importance of 
democratisation could actually be traced during this era. He counts two reasons for 
that: first, the leaders of the decolonisation movements used the increasing importance 
of democracy to undermine the legitimacy of the colonial empires to control the 
colonies;
38
 and second, democratisation became to be associated for many of the anti-
colonialist activists with modernisation.
39
 
More direct efforts by the West to bind legal recognition and international 
legitimacy with democratisation and the liberalisation of the political system began 
during the later stages of the Cold War. One of the first milestones in this process was 
the Helsinki Final Act, signed at the end of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe which hosted both Western European states and members of the 
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Eastern Bloc for negotiations about security cooperation in Europe. The Act stated 
that, 
The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion… The participating States on 
whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons 
belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full 
opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere. They 
will constantly respect these rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and 
will endeavour jointly and separately, including in co-operation with the United 
Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them.
40
 
Even though not immediately implemented by the communist states that 
participated in the conference, such as Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, the conference and the Final Act laid the foundations for the 1990 
Charter of Paris. The signatories of this charter, defined by Ian Clark as one of these 
major, norm-changing peace agreements,
41
 declared their “steadfast commitment to 
democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through 
economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries,” adding 
that “We will build consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of 
government of our nations.”42 The Charter also set a clear mechanism for such 
process of democratisation and political change to take place, namely free elections.
43
 
The Charter of Paris was followed by the Vienna Declaration of 1993, which built 
upon its preceding declarations in establishing democracy as a formal standard of 
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recognition.  Reviewing these conventions and declarations, Clark contends that they 
“suggested transmutation of a principle of domestic legitimacy into a principle of 
international legitimacy: it is because of the individual’s right to democracy that 
international society has a duty to prescribe and monitor its implementation.”44 
The above declarations did not remain confined to the discourse of 
international lawyers and diplomats. The initial secession attempts of Soviet and 
Yugoslav republics provided the victorious West with the first opportunity to apply 
these principles, and the process of recognition of new states served as a laboratory 
for their implementation. In its Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of 
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union and the Declaration on 
Yugoslavia, both published on December 16, 1991, the European Community (EC) 
stated its “readiness to recognise subject to the normal standards of international 
practice and the political realities in each case, those new States which have 
constituted themselves on a democratic basis.” Such constitution was to be 
demonstrated through a “respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the 
Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human 
rights”, and the “guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities 
in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE.”45 
The US followed the EC’s lead, conditioning its recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, 
the first two Yugoslav republics to declare their desire for secession, by their 
governments’ ability to demonstrate “Support for democracy and the rule of law, 
emphasizing the key role of elections in the democratic process; Safeguarding of 
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human rights, based on full respect for the individual and including equal treatment of 
minorities; and respect for international law and obligations, especially adherence to 
the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.”46 
That democratisation (mainly demonstrated through elections) and protection 
of minority rights were embraced as the new norms of international society and as 
preconditions for legal recognition, was most clearly demonstrated by the efforts 
made by the new candidates for recognition to prove their ability to meet them. 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the Soviet Baltic republics which were also the first to 
declare their desire to secede from the Soviet Union, were quick to exhibit the 
democratic nature of their decision to withdraw from the union, by highlighting the 
use of plebiscites to support their declarations, or by underscoring the fact that the 
governments that declared independence were elected democratically (following the 
perestroika in the Soviet Union).
47
 A plebiscite also served Slovenia when its 
government applied for recognition of its right to secede from Yugoslavia. 
Macedonia, in turn, “did not request but responded to the EC’s proposal of 
recognition on a conditional basis and was deemed to have met the criteria. Leading 
political parties… acknowledged that secession had to occur according to certain 
principles, including a plebiscite.”48 In contrast to these cases, the Badinter 
Arbitration Commission, which was formed in order to advise the EC about 
developments in the Balkans, had some misgivings about recognising Croatia, since 
its newly established government failed to protect the rights of the Serb minority in its 
territory. The Croatian government, nonetheless, did not reject the Commissions’ right 
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to intervene in its affairs or its guidelines. Rather, it justified its behaviour by pointing 
out to the threat the Serb minority constituted to the integrity of Croatia.
49
 
The earlier stages of the process of recognition of the new states in the post-
communist space disclose a form of communicative action taking place between the 
parties involved. The conventions, conferences and negotiations have in fact become 
international public spheres in which the norms of international society, through the 
debate about the preconditions for recognition, were being moulded and formulated. 
The directly concerned parties were of course those aspiring for recognition and those 
that bestowed it, but the debate had important implications for other actors, e.g. 
emerging and potential separatist movements within the newly established states. The 
process of democratisation was not straightforward and many of the newly recognised 
states (such as Croatia) did not fully meet the standards set by the Western 
international society. Yet, the deliberations around the subject have also contributed to 
the consolidation of the link between democratisation and statehood, which is 
particularly important for the analysis of de facto states. 
Even more important in this regard has been the Standards-before-Status 
policy (SBS) applied to the recognition of Kosovo. Much like other de facto states, 
Kosovo declared its secession from its parent-state Serbia without the central 
government’s consent. But unlike the other post-Yugoslav states, Kosovo was an 
autonomous region before Yugoslavia’s dissolution, rather than an autonomous 
republic. As such, it did not have the constitutional right to secede. Thus, any decision 
taken with regard to Kosovo’s status and future status has been carefully viewed and 
studied by other separatist movements and de facto states. The question of Kosovo’s 
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status became particularly acute after the Kosovo war in 1998-1999 and the revelation 
of war crimes perpetrated by Serbian forces, such as the Račak operation, and the 
subsequent NATO intervention in the war. The UN Security Council (UNSC) and the 
other actors involved initially eschewed the idea of an independent Kosovo, and the 
UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established by the UNSC in 1999, focused more 
on building autonomy within Serbia. To do so, the UN founded, in 2001, the 
Provisional Institution of Self-Government (PISG), a collection of local 
administrative bodies, including an executive authority, national assembly and 
regional presidency, which held “a full range of powers governing a wide range of 
areas.”50 While the UNMIK representatives insisted that the formation of the PISG 
did not mean acceptance of Kosovo’s secession from federal Yugoslavia, the 
leadership of the Albanian majority viewed the formation of the PISG as an indication 
in that direction. Therefore, they enhanced their pressure on the UN to reconsider 
Kosovo’s status. The SBS policy, according to James Ker-Lindsay, in fact meant to 
ease the pressure off UNMIK and earn it more time in establishing a policy for 
Kosovo.
51
 Indeed, the EU and the US had already realised at this stage that the 
integration of Kosovo into Yugoslavia was impossible, due to the bloody past of 
Kosovo’s struggle for independence; nonetheless, Kosovar secession meant a clash 
not only with Yugoslavia, but also with Russia. 
The most noticeable distinction between the process of recognising Kosovo 
and the other post-Yugoslav and post-Soviet states was the fact that Kosovo was 
presented with clear standards of recognition. Rather than basing its right for 
statehood by applying to certain, maybe vague, international norms, the Kosovar 
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government had to meet the preconditions set by those who could bestow it with 
recognition. The first standard in the document is “Functioning Democratic 
Institutions,” which basically referred to the conduct of “regular, transparent, free, and 
fair” elections for the provisional government institutions, representing the whole 
range of Kosovars, including refugees and internally displaced people, and of political 
parties.
52
 The term Kosovars referred to all linguistic, ethnic and religious groups, as 
well as to “effective action to eliminate violence against women and children, 
trafficking and other forms of exploitation, including preventative education and 
provision of legal and social services to victims.”53 In addition, the SBS, as expressed 
in the UNMIK’s “Standards for Kosovo” document, called for the establishment of a 
“range of private, independent print and broadcast media exists, providing access to 
information for all communities throughout Kosovo… Publicly-funded media devotes 
a full and proportionate share of its resources and output to all ethnic communities.”54 
Other standards included the implementation of the rule of law; freedom of 
movement, which included the “free use of language”; sustainable returns and the 
rights of communities and their members, including the guarantee of the safe return of 
refugees and their integration in the economy; the establishment of a competitive 
market economy; the “fair enforcement of property rights” which is “essential to 
encourage returns and the equal treatment of all ethnic communities”; regional and 
national dialogue between the various groups within Kosovo; and the establishment of 
the Kosovo Protection Corps.
55
 What the SBS was aiming to do, therefore, was not 
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only to support the efforts of an aspiring state, but in fact to regulate statehood,
56
 or to 
create a “member state.”57 
Initially the PISG failed to meet some of the standards set by the SBS, 
particularly those relating to protection of the rights, property and in some cases, such 
as the March 2004 clashes between Albanian and Serb Kosovars, the lives of the Serb 
minority.
58
 In spite of that, the discussions on Kosovo’s status were renewed in 2005, 
leading eventually to the Kosovo Status Settlement (KSS), which treated Kosovo as a 
state in all but name.
59
 The KSS still kept using the discourse of democratisation, 
further expressing the relevant parties’ commitment to guarantee the rights of the 
ethnic minorities in Kosovo which it defined as “the provisions necessary for a future 
Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable.”60 Thus, Regardless of UNAMI’s 
declared intentions, the SBS came to serve as a base for discussing Kosovo’s status – 
and the nature of the future state in Kosovo. 
The case of Kosovo and the KSS underlines the international community’s 
inconsistency with regard to bestowing legitimacy based on its own norms of 
governance. This was also noticeable in the case of Croatia, which was recognised in 
spite of its government’s violation of the rights of the Serb minority in the country. 
And it became painfully clear when Macedonia was denied recognition, because the 
Greek government, fearing territorial disputes with the newly established country, 
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pressured the EC to reconsider its recognition of Macedonia as long as the latter does 
not change its name into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Such 
discrepancies between the international community’s declarations and its policies on 
ground have led some to argue that democracy could never become a standard of 
recognition in a world of power politics.
61
 Others have gone further to describe the 
Western democracy promotion as an imperialistic project aimed mainly to protect 
Western interests and hegemony in other parts of the world,
62
 an idea which gained 
even more popularity in the aftermath of the US-led invasion of Iraq and the 
overthrow of the Ba’th regime in 2003.63 Such perceptions of democracy promotion, 
nevertheless, miss the long-term impact that such discourse have had on the 
international society and its norms of statehood and recognition. Fawn and Mayall 
phrase it vividly when arguing that 
despite the continued predominance of power political over legal or ethical 
considerations, one cannot discount altogether the impact of liberal ideas of the 
state and international society. The positing of democratic criteria for self-
determination is not just a rhetorical veneer masking the real interests of the 
powers. It also reflects the fact that there is no longer any alternative macro 
political and economic scheme which can legitimise the exercise of state power. 
To this extent the establishing of criteria for democratic statehood represents a 
genuine attempt to bring practice into line with the only available principle.
64
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In other words, then, one does not need to render power politics irrelevant in order to 
accept the idea that post-Cold War democracy promotion has been significant for the 
debate about the nature of statehood and international legitimacy. 
 
2.1.3 IDENTIFYING THE AGENTS OF CHANGE: TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS 
AND THE CONVEYANCE OF NEW IDEAS TO THE DE FACTO STATES 
The concepts of communicative action, interaction and learning help to further 
explain, and consequently support, the idea that democratisation and political 
liberalisation have indeed become the predominantly legitimating norms in 
international society. Ideas do not emerge in an empty void and are not just picked up 
by actors randomly.
65
 Rather, ideas are developed, contained and then conveyed by 
actors committed to such ideas. Sometimes such actors convey different ideas by 
merely reflecting them in their “literature, official documents, theology, curricula, and 
organizational culture.”66 In other cases, such actors have done so by directly 
intervening in the affairs of their target actors (mainly states). Reviewing the process 
of decolonisation in the British Empire, Philpott hinges it to a large extent on the 
eruption of nationalist sentiments among residents of the colonies. Such ideas, 
Philpott argues, were imported into the colonies by different actors which have been 
in constant interaction with the international society. As he indicates, nationalism as a 
solution to the problems of the colonised communities was initially an alien concept 
to many in Africa and Asia.
67
 But it was through their participation in three wider 
institutions, namely religion, education and war, that several groups and individuals 
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from within the colonised communities came to embrace nationalism, and convey it to 
their own communities. The first to bring ideas into the British colonies were those 
educated in the West – such as slaves from the US who got education in black 
colleges of the period and returned to Africa as part of the “back to Africa 
movement.” The church was one forum in which members of the colonised 
communities came to be exposed to European ideas about nationalism and self-
determination. Such ideas were amplified by the inability of the members of the 
colonised communities to reach the higher ranks in the church. Finally, soldiers who 
served in the metropolitan armies during the two world wars were also exposed to 
ideas about nationalism and self-determination, which they conveyed to their colonies 
upon their return from the wars. The writings, speeches and activism of those 
individuals played a crucial role in shaping the protest movement in the colonies, 
which eventually drove the Empires to view the colonies as a burden.
68
 
The link between the role of ideas at the international level, advocacy 
networks and domestic changes has been applied enthusiastically to cases of reforms, 
democratic transitions and liberalisation, especially when such cases experienced a 
relatively brief or a rather sharp transition. Transnationalism has been a repetitive 
theme in the studies of global normative changes and their impact on domestic 
transitions. Particularly the study of TANs has marked an important shift within the 
study of democratisation and liberalisation. A pioneer in this field was Thomas Risse. 
In one of the earlier post-Cold War studies of transnational activism, Risse argued that 
the impact of transnational actors and coalitions on state policies is likely to 
vary according to: 1) differences in domestic structures, i.e. the normative and 
organizational arrangements which form the ‘state’, structure society, and link 
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the two in the polity; and 2) degrees of international institutionalization, i.e., the 
extent to which the specific issue-area is regulated by bilateral agreements, 
multilateral regimes, and/or international organizations.
69
 
In other words, domestic transformations inspired by global normative shifts are 
contingent upon two factors: the nature of the norm; and the nature of the target actor. 
The domestic structures “are likely to determine both the availability of channels for 
transnational actors into the political systems and the requirements for ‘winning 
coalitions’ to change policies.” The key here is the level of government centralisation: 
On the one hand, the more state dominates the domestic structure, the more 
difficult it should be for transnational actors to penetrate the social and political 
systems of the ‘target’ country. Once they overcome this hurdle in state-
dominated systems, though, their policy impact might be profound, since 
coalition-building with rather small groups of governmental actors appears to be 
comparatively straightforward. On the other hand, the more fragmented the state 
and the better organized civil society, the easier should be the access for 
transnational actors. But the requirements for successful coalition-building are 
likely to be quite staggering in such systems.
70
 
A similar argument is made by Jeffrey Checkel, who argues that “From an 
institutionalist perspective, an important factor affecting the ideology-organization 
nexus is the broader structure of the state.” In centralised states, in which 
“bureaucratic units and elites are insulated from the broader societal forces… there is 
a greater probability that organizational ideologies will become embedded [than in 
less centralised states].”71 Checkel, nevertheless, adds one more dimension to this 
argument, relevant to the case of de facto states: “a changing international 
environment creates windows of opportunity [for policy entrepreneurs] by fostering a 
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sense of crisis or uncertainty… which can open policy windows that allow decision 
makers to engage in an information search as they define preferences and state 
interests; decision makers will be in the market for new ideas.”72 In other words, a 
sense of crisis may provide an opportunity for agents of change (to which Checkel 
refers to as policy entrepreneurs) to affect government policies. 
The link between globally-held norms, TANs and domestic structures has 
served several studies concerned with globally-inspired democratic and liberal 
transitions. In their study of domestic transformation and human rights-violating 
governments’ willingness to embrace international norms, Thomas Risse and Kathryn 
Sikkink build upon Risse’s earlier studies of transnational activism. Nonetheless, they 
identify one more element: the manner in which actors view themselves and the 
international society. As they suggest, 
The very idea of “proper” behaviour presupposes a community able to pass 
judgement on appropriateness… People sometimes follow norms because they 
want others to think well of them, and because they want to think well of 
themselves… People’s ability to think well of themselves is influenced by 
norms held by relevant community of actors… Human rights norms have a 
special status because they both prescribe rules for appropriate behaviour, and 
help define identities of liberal states. Human rights norms have constitutive 
effects because good human rights performance is one crucial signals t others to 
identify a member of the community of liberal states.
73
 
Coalition-building is an important aspect of the success of such change generated by 
intervention of TANs. Upon gaining access to the target actor, it is the ability to 
establish coalitions with local actors that will determine the level of impact the 
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network would have domestically. The power of these coalitions/TANs stems from 
their purposes which “constitute necessary conditions for sustainable domestic change 
in the human rights area”: Putting norm violating states on the international agenda, 
i.e. “shaming” both these states and international society into taking action; 
empowering, protecting, and hence mobilising, domestic opposition, social 
movements and NGOs; challenging governments from above and below;
74
 to that one 
can add the exposure of actors to international ideas, norms and practices. Strategies 
often used by human rights TANs include the careful documentation of abuses, 
making states aware of their accountability for those abuses under international law, 
and developing mechanisms for exposing abuses of human rights.
75
 
The debate about the nature of international legitimacy in the post-Cold War 
era is essential for an analysis of de facto states. The de facto states are mostly a 
product of this period in international history and their conduct and evolution have 
been highly affected by this process. This is especially true because of the de facto 
states’ constant crises of legitimacy and their pursuit of it. The following sections 
move on to discuss the de facto state and its definition, justify the use of the term and 
the examination of the unit and demonstrate how paying attention to the 
understanding of the pursuit of international legitimacy by the de facto states would 
help us in better understanding both such actors, as well as the concept. 
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2.2 THE DE FACTO STATE: CONTESTED SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
PURSUIT OF LEGITIMACY 
2.2.1 DEFINING THE DE FACTO STATE: THE PARADOXES OF SOVEREIGNTY 
AND RECOGNITION 
Not unlike other questions on sovereignty and domestic conflicts, the de facto state 
has emerged as an explicit subject of interest in the IR discipline following the end of 
the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. But it was in the 
post-Cold War era that the term became a distinct subject of study in the field of IR. 
The dissolution of the multi-ethnic Soviet and Yugoslav federations witnessed the 
emergence and recognition of about twenty new states, most of them with 
heterogeneous populations as well, but with much less resources and territory. Many 
of the minority groups in those states constitute a compact minority, concentrated in 
certain parts of the state, and often in proximity to their communities across the 
border.
76
 Furthermore, the rise of nationalist sentiments which played crucial roles in 
the state-building processes in the newly established states, had an immense impact on 
their minority communities. Anxious about their own future in the new nation-states, 
but also inspired themselves by the nationalist wave, some of those ethno-religious or 
linguistic minority communities began to claim their rights for self-determination in 
their territory. Claiming historical rights over their lands, their distinct ethno-linguistic 
identity, and history of persecution, many of these groups launched a separatist 
conflict against their central governments (often referred to in the literature as their 
“parent-states”). Launching guerrilla wars against government security forces and 
civilian administration, several of those separatist movements succeeded in bringing 
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the collapse of state authority in some parts of their claimed territory. This left an 
administrative vacuum, which was soon filled by the leaders of the national liberation 
movements. Out of necessity, and sometimes even unexpectedly, those leaders 
transformed rather rapidly from rebel movements, often led by guerrilla militias, into 
de facto governments. Such developments took place in Nagorno-Karabakh (seceding 
from Azerbaijan), Abkhazia and South-Ossetia (Georgia), Transdniestria (Moldova), 
Kosovo (Serbia) and Republika Srpska (Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
The de facto state, subsequently, can be seen as a more advanced stage of 
secessionist struggles, an interim stage between the violent armed struggle and the 
establishment of an independent state (which may never emerge). In other words, de 
facto states are still national liberation movements. Most often, their aims remain 
unchanged upon their transition; but their strategies change dramatically. Such 
strategy is now based more on state-building than the use of violence against the 
central authorities. As Charles King contends, “the territorial separatists of the early 
1990s have become the state builders of the early 2000s, creating de facto countries 
whose ability to field armed forces, control their own territory, educate their children, 
and maintain local economies is about as well developed as that of the recognized 
states of which they are still notionally a part.”77 Similar events of state-collapse and 
exploitation of this vacuum took place in northern Iraq, with the autonomy gained by 
the Kurds in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991; Somaliland in Somalia; Eritrea in 
Ethiopia during the early 1990s; the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC); 
Biafra in Nigeria; and the Republic of China (Taiwan). In almost all of these cases, 
with the exception of Taiwan, it was a combination of the collapse of the central 
government and the infiltration of ideas about nationalism that led to the creation of 
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these de facto states. In some cases, such as the KRG or the TRNC, external 
intervention also played a part in the emergence of a de facto state. Yet, the intensity 
and rapidity of the unfolding events in Eurasia and Balkans, their proximity to Europe 
and the prospects of violence in these often heavily armed regions prompted a wider 
scholarly curiosity. 
The first to introduce the concept of de facto statehood into the IR literature as 
a legitimate theoretical framework for analysis was Scott Pegg. With the aim of 
distinguishing between this status of de facto statehood and other forms of 
statelessness, namely bandits, territories controlled by warlords, peaceful secessionist 
movements or even puppet-states established by imperialist powers, Pegg defined the 
de facto state as an 
[O]rganized political leadership which has risen to power through some degree 
of indigenous capability; receives popular support; and has achieved sufficient 
capacity to provide government services to a given population in a specific 
territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant 
period of time. The de facto state views itself as capable of entering into 
relations with other states and it seeks full constitutional independence and 
widespread international recognition as a sovereign state. It is, however, unable 
to achieve any degree of substantive recognition and therefore remains 
illegitimate in the eyes of international society.
78
 
A reader informed about the history of statehood and recognition would probably 
identify a clear reference here to the basic principles of statehood set in the 1933 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: a functioning 
government, territorial boundaries, a permanent population and capacity to enter 
relations with other actors in international society. The term functioning government 
refers to the de facto state’s Weberian monopoly over coercion in a specific territory, 
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ability to collect taxes, and the ability to provide at least rudimentary services to its 
population. Domestic legitimacy, namely the notion that the idea of de facto statehood 
and autonomy are supported by the population it aims to represent, is central as well 
to Pegg’s definition. Another criterion that Pegg set was that of longevity or 
perseverance; Pegg sets two years of survival as a criterion for de facto statehood.
79
 
Initially, Pegg had also defined a formal declaration of independence as a criterion for 
defining an entity as a de facto state. However, he later revoked it, accepting the idea 
that an actor can be defined as a de facto state without officially declaring 
independence.
80
 The latter point is significant, because it further shifts the weight 
from external recognition to domestic capacities in the examination of de facto states. 
To sharpen his analysis, Pegg associates the concept of de facto statehood with 
Robert Jackson’s distinction between positive and negative sovereignty. The former 
term refers to the 
capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters. It is a 
substantive rather than a formal condition. A positively sovereign government is 
one… which possesses the wherewithal to provide political goods for its 
citizens. Positive sovereignty… is not a legal but a political attribute if by 
political is understood the sociological, economic, technological and 
psychological wherewithal to declare, implement and enforce public policy both 
domestically and internationally.
81
 
Negative sovereignty, thus, is the opposite, namely a political act which involves the 
“act of general recognition,” which at least theoretically protects states of external 
intervention in domestic affairs.
82
 De facto states, according to Pegg’s definition, have 
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established positive sovereignty. What they lack, nevertheless, is a negative one. The 
international community has generally refused to formally recognise de facto states 
emerging out of a separatist struggle.
83
 One reason for that is the international 
community’s antipathy toward secession, and particularly non-consensual secession. 
Especially when the aspirations for secession are considered to be based on ethnic 
affiliation, they are bound to be seen by international society as a source of 
international and regional instability. As many of the existing states are ethnically 
heterogeneous, the idea of ethnically-based secession is associated with an endless 
cycle of violence around the globe.
84
 In addition, de facto states are generally 
perceived by international society as law-breaking entities, whose leadership is 
engaged with smuggling and other illicit activities, as well as with ethnic cleansing. In 
other instances, they are perceived as puppet-states, serving the interests of external 
powers.
85
 Deon Geldenhuys has further refined this definition, suggesting that 
unrecognised de facto states face a double non-recognition: First, the international 
community objects to these entities’ right to secede and become independent states. 
Likewise, the de facto states’ statehood, that is, their positive sovereignty, is denied by 
international society. Hence, “For all contested states their interaction with the outside 
world is highly contentious, with attempts to keep them outside the international 
mainstream.”86 
Perhaps it is Stephen Krasner’s definition of sovereignty that helps to better 
illustrate the position of de facto statehood. According to Krasner, the concept of 
sovereignty has different meanings and dimensions: domestic, international-legal, 
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Westphalian and interdependence sovereignty. Domestic sovereignty refers to 
“effective political authority [actors have] within their own borders.”87 International 
legal sovereignty, on the other hand, refers to legal recognition of an entity as a state 
by other states and IOs, and the institution of diplomatic relations. Westphalian 
sovereignty refers to actors’ right to exclude external actors from their territory.88 And 
interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of states to practically control (with 
an emphasis on control rather than have authority over) their borders and regulate the 
passage of people, goods or even economic activities with their territory.
89
 As Krasner 
notes, an entity might possess some of the dimensions of sovereignty, but lack the 
others.
90
 De facto states, one can argue, are entities that had achieved Westphaliann 
sovereignty, which then facilitated the achievement of domestic sovereignty, but have 
failed to secure international legal, and subsequently maybe interdependence 
sovereignty. 
By so-defining the de facto state, Pegg did not merely try to explain a certain 
phenomenon. Rather, he formulated a model of de facto statehood in world politics, 
thus urging IR scholars to pay more attention to this phenomenon. He did so by 
relying on a relatively small number of case-studies: Eritrea between 1991 and 1993 
(before independence), Tamil-Elam in northern Sri Lanka, Somaliland in the horn of 
Africa and the TRNC. Pegg’s model of de facto statehood has been mostly embraced 
by subsequent students of the phenomenon, and has been applied to other case-
studies, such as the Palestinian National Authority, Kosovo, Chechnya and the three 
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de facto states in the Caucasus, namely Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.
91
 
Notwithstanding its wide acceptance, Pegg’s model has been the subject of 
some critique. Ian Spears, for example, accepts the idea that non-recognised entities 
with empirical attributes of statehood deserve scholarly attention. He rejects, 
nevertheless, most of Pegg’s criteria of de facto statehood and uses only the Weberian 
monopoly over power in a certain territory to isolate his actors, which he prefers to 
define as states-within-states.
92
 At least some of the cases reviewed in this volume, 
edited jointly with Paul Kingston, overlap with cases which have been defined as de 
facto states by Pegg and his followers, e.g. Somaliland, which indicates at least some 
controversy around the use of the term. In another case, Geldenhuys has rejected the 
use of the term de facto state. As he noted, even if most of those entities defined as de 
facto states are not recognised by the UN, most of them are recognised by at least one 
actor (TRNC by Turkey, Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia by Russia), and in some cases by a relatively large number of states (Taiwan 
recognised by more than 20 states; Kosovo by almost 70 states, including the US, 
Japan, Canada and most EU members). Moreover Geldenhuys stresses that although 
not recognised, most of the de facto states are not isolated from the rest of 
international society. Rather, de facto states are in a constant interaction with 
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international society, through trade, international aid and more channels.
93
 The de 
facto state, hence, is not entirely illegitimate. 
A more recent critique of the study of de facto statehood is presented by 
Gareth Stansfield and James Harvey. Paying more attention to the complex nature of 
sovereignty, they highlight the limitations that existing studies have faced in 
theorising the concept of unrecognised statehood. They indicate various factors that 
have hindered such theorisation: first, they assert, unrecognised states are often 
schizophrenic in nature, since they depend on patronage systems and are often 
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian in nature, but they aspire to be seen as “embracing 
democratization strategies” in their pursuit of international legitimacy.94 Another 
difficulty, they add, lies in the fact that unrecognised states have been shaped by their 
regional and domestic context as well historical circumstances.
95
 Moreover, as they 
rightfully point out, most unrecognised states are juxtaposed near, above or below the 
state, but this is in spite of the fact that most chances are that they will never become 
sovereign states. The question, they ask, is whether this concept of de facto statehood 
contains enough “flexibility and robustness” to encompass very different entities in 
many respects. They identify a key to this problem, namely the tendency of most 
existing studies to view secession as the key motivation driving the leaderships of de 
facto states. Secession, they argue, might serve as an initial factor in the emergence of 
de facto states, but it cannot explain later stages of their development.
96
 
Harvey and Stansfield are justified in highlighting the schizophrenic nature of 
de facto states, reminding students that arguments brought up by de facto states 
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should not be taken at face value. Yet, as the study of the KRG, as other cases of de 
facto states, shows, this schizophrenia can be “treated”; and the key to this treatment 
lies in the pursuit of international legitimacy itself and the interaction which it entails. 
Moreover, although unrecognised states are certainly diverse actors whose 
developments are shaped to a great extent by historical and political circumstances, 
this is also true for most recognised, de jure states. This does imply that the students 
of de facto states should be aware of the different circumstances and highlight the 
similarities between such actors. 
Perhaps the most important point that Harvey and Stansfield make is to 
emphasise the fact that the act of secession itself is less relevant for understanding the 
development of such actors. Nonetheless, that formal secession might not play a role 
in the development of de facto states does not render the concept of statehood 
irrelevant for the study of such entities. Emerging in an international society in which 
the nation-state is perceived the most effective institution in protecting the rights of 
nations, is as vague as the concept may be. Even if secession remains a remote 
possibility, the model of the state and its institutions and the logic of sovereignty play 
an important in the way in which de facto states view themselves and the way to 
maintain their sovereignty. Here, as Harvey and Stansfield acknowledge as well, 
Krasner’s definition of sovereignty as a multidimensional concept comes in handy in 
the analysis of de facto states and their development. 
The Yet, the existing study of de facto statehood suffers from some major and 
notable weaknesses. Current approach to the subject is still rather limited. Starting 
from Pegg, most studies of de facto states have approached the subject from a 
structural perspective. To put it simply, scholars mainly tend to utilise de facto states 
to examine and explain international society, its practices of recognition (or non-
66 
 
recognition) and its concern with regional stability. A minimal effort has been made 
to actually understand the de facto state, its leadership, its conduct and its 
development. No real effort has been taken to assess the manner in which this status 
of de facto statehood has actually shaped the development of the entities that fall 
under this category, their identity, their perception of security and their interaction 
with other states and organisations. Subsequently, students of de facto statehood as a 
phenomenon, and of de facto states, could better understand them if they focus more 
on the agent level, namely the de facto state itself, its policies, conduct and 
developments. The term de facto statehood should not serve solely to describe a 
certain entity; it should serve to understand and explain it. As detailed below, most de 
facto states share several traits – the most important of which is their need for and 
pursuit of international legitimacy. The following paragraphs stress the need to put the 
de facto state at the centre of research and the importance of isolating the pursuit of 
international legitimacy as an independent variable. 
 
2.2.2 PUTTING THE DE FACTO STATE IN THE CENTRE 
A good starting point for the understanding of the above argument is the 
Constructivist approach to security as developed by Buzan et. al. According to this 
approach, actors in international politics are comprised of several different sectors: the 
military, social, economic, and environmental. Each sector faces different kinds of 
threats – whereas the armed forces are preoccupied with “traditional security 
threats,”97 the main threat to the political sector, or to the political organisation, relates 
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to legitimacy and recognition.
98
 In other words, the main threat to the political sector 
is to be delegitimised, domestically and internationally. As argued above, most de 
facto states emerge out of guerrilla militias, engaged with fighting the central 
authorities. Under such circumstances, the military sector is often the dominant one in 
such movements; the political sector may often be minimal. The development of state-
institutions and civil governance that characterises the emergence of a de facto state 
necessarily entails growing dominance of a political sector. Therefore, the 
establishment of a de facto state unavoidably means a greater concern with 
legitimation and the pursuit of international legitimacy. 
At this stage, a question should be asked: what are the implications of lacking 
international legitimacy for de facto states? In other words, why are state-actors so 
concerned with securing international legitimacy? The de facto states provide the best 
example of why international legitimacy is so significant. Not being legally 
recognised means that de facto states are blocked from access to international aid, 
have limited ability to enter into formal trade contracts with other states, or even 
export their products. Moreover, not being protected by codes and practices that at 
least theoretically guide international community, de facto states are constantly 
exposed to encroachment of their sovereignty by other states and cannot even protest 
against it in international forums. At the domestic level as well, decisions taken by de 
facto states are often portrayed as illegitimate and even as harmful to the residents of 
the de facto states.
99
 Again, it should be noted that even if not legally recognised, de 
facto states are not completely ostracised by the international community. As 
Geldenhuys argues, in spite of international society’s bias against secession, the de 
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facto state still constantly engages with international society. Whether through (a 
limited) trade, the provision of international aid (through NGOs and UN agencies), or 
even allowing the representatives of de facto states some platform to present their 
grievances (usually as representatives of subnational groups, e.g. minorities and never 
in forums which are exclusively for states), international society practically 
acknowledges the existence of such actors. Furthermore, de facto states in fact do 
have some legal responsibilities according to international law: according to the laws 
of war, de facto states can be considered as belligerents, expected to comply with the 
laws of war, and are liable for war crimes. This is especially true for situations of 
prolonged conflicts which at some stage obtain the shape of a full scale war, which 
often occurs in the case of de facto states.
100
 But such limited legitimacy has never 
been enough for the leaders of de facto states. 
One of the first to identify and highlight the de facto states’ desperate desire 
for legitimacy has been Barry Bartmann. According to Bartmann, de facto states 
suffer from a chronic and continuous crisis of legitimacy. For states that face such a 
crisis, “self-justification becomes a foreign-policy priority reflecting both the lack of 
confidence in the state itself and the perceived scepticism or indifference of the 
outside world. This is all the more true for governments of unrecognized states in 
waiting.”101 In order to survive, de facto states constantly justify their existence and 
try to legitimise their conduct which is usually associated with norm-violating 
behaviour. Here Bartmann makes an important distinction between moral and 
practical legitimacy. When de facto states highlight their moral legitimacy, they refer 
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to their historical rights over their claimed territories, their right to self-determination, 
past promises for statehood, or grievances about discrimination and persecution of 
their people by the state. Practical legitimacy, on the other hand, means exhibiting 
success in meeting what is perceived by the international community as good 
statehood.
102
 Separatists often begin by justifying their actions based on moral 
legitimacy. When they turn into a de facto state, practical legitimacy becomes part of 
this endeavour. In other words, the transition into de facto governance entails an 
ideational transformation and subsequently in the interaction with international 
society. The attainment of positive sovereignty drives de facto states to view 
themselves differently and therefore justify their existence and actions in a different 
manner. The threat posed by the armed forces of the central government to the well-
being of the population and the survival of the militias is now overcome by the threat 
of annihilation of sovereignty and state-institutions. The more successful the process 
of state-building is, the more it will dominate the discourse of de facto states. 
Unfortunately, Bartmann fails to elaborate on this important point. 
One scholar that has taken one step further in this regard is Nina Caspersen. 
Examining Abkhazia, South-Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, Caspersen has 
highlighted these entities’ success in state-building, with a focus on democratic 
transitions. According to Caspersen, the relatively successful process of state-
building, which those de facto states have gone through, has become central to their 
effort to secede from their metropolitan states. As Caspersen demonstrates, as part of 
their effort to gain international legitimacy for their aspiration to secede, these de 
facto states have emphasised what Caspersen defines as their earned sovereignty, 
namely their ability to function relatively well despite the lack of recognition – or in 
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other words, their de facto statehood (and thus the equivalent to Bartmann’s practical 
legitimacy). This discourse has come to replace what Caspersen defines as remedial 
legitimacy, namely claims for legitimacy based on the idea that recognition would do 
justice to the separatist movements by giving them control over their usurped land, or 
would rescue them from historical persecution and discrimination (i.e. Bartmann’s 
moral legitimacy). As she puts it, “Recently… these aspiring states have caught on to 
what they perceive as a normative change in the international arena… These entities 
now argue that they have proven their viability as democratic states and thereby 
earned their sovereignty.”103 In another place, Caspersen has suggested that de facto 
states basically “play the recognition game”: By emphasising such credentials, the 
unrecognised states are attempting to shed their associations with instability, shadow 
economies, ethnic cleansing and external puppeteers, and create entities that are 
deemed acceptable and therefore ‘worthy’ of recognition. De facto states are 
consequently trying to imitate what “good”, recognised states should look like.104 And 
elsewhere she noted that: 
The statehood proclaimed in these entities has therefore been significantly 
influenced by international developments; or rather by perceived changes in 
international norms and practices of recognition… not only are they trying to 
demonstrate their own democratic credentials, they are also claiming to be more 
democratic than their parent states and they frequently describe themselves as 
‘islands of democracy’ in otherwise authoritarian waters.105 
Here Caspersen identifies the importance of the SBS on the aspirations and 
conduct of de facto states and other separatist movements in the Balkans and Eurasia. 
Sharing the same cultural and political space with Kosovo, the de facto states in these 
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regions were quick to grasp what they perceived as a normative change following the 
“supervised independence” of Kosovo and Montenegro, and the now visible 
dominance of liberal political ideas in the discourse on recognition.
106
 The discourse 
of earned sovereignty has been to a great extent a response to what these actors have 
seen as the emerging demands of the international community, or the preconditions 
for statehood, and especially democratisation and liberalisation upon all of their 
components. That Kosovo in fact was not successful in meeting the standards set by 
international society did not deter the Eurasian de facto states. On the contrary, they 
began emphasising even further their own successes, in contrast to Kosovo’s failures. 
Caspersen quotes Arkady Ghukasia, the former president of Nagorno-Karabakh, who 
declared that ‘if the world community is ready to recognize the independence of … 
Kosovo, I think it will be very hard for them to explain why they don’t recognize 
Nagorno-Karabakh’.107 Such references serve as indications of the fact that the 
leaderships of de facto states have gone through some processes of learning through 
their endeavours to establish statehood. This also undergirds the notion that de facto 
states, even if not recognised, are not isolated from developments at the international 
level.  
Another interesting case is that of Taiwan. Several works have highlighted the 
incorporation of democratisation in the pursuit of legitimacy for its de facto secession 
from the rest of China and aspiration for recognition. With the demise of Taiwan’s 
long-standing dictator, Chiang Kai-shek, the voices calling for the ROC to give up its 
claims to rule the whole of China and establish an independent state in Taiwan grew 
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louder. Prior to that, such an idea was considered taboo. In addition to this shift, 
Taiwan also experienced a gradual process of liberalisation with Chiang Kai-shek’s 
death. This liberalisation began initially in the economic sphere, but was expanded 
during the late 1980s into the political sphere. By 1996 Taiwan held national 
democratic elections for the first time. The elected president Lee Teng-hui from the 
ruling Kuomintang party (KMT) declared publicly that Taiwan would become an 
independent state, side by side with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Ambiguous as his real intentions may have been,
108
 this statement still marked an 
important shift and strengthened those calling for an independent Taiwan. This shift 
did not only alienate those in Taiwan who kept seeing the ROC as the legitimate ruler 
of the whole of China, but mainly the PRC itself. The latter immediately launched a 
diplomatic war against what it defined as a renegade region. In response, Taiwan 
launched its own legitimation campaign in which its long sustained domestic 
sovereignty came to play an important role. As part of this campaign, Taipei adopted 
a more “proactive foreign policy,” which “among other things, has firmly reminded 
the world of a new political entity’s achievement, aspirations and unfulfilled 
ambitions.”109 This involved a constant reminder of Taiwan’s democratic nature vis-à-
vis the totalitarian nature of the PRC. This is reflected in a speech made by the 
Taiwanese Foreign Minister, Hung-mao Tien: “We will strengthen our efforts in 
publicising Taiwan’s outstanding achievements in economic development and 
political democratisation to make the international community understand better the 
significant role we can play.”110 Robert Madsen has referred to this as Taiwan’s 
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pursuit of “alternative legitimacy,” through a greater reliance on its economic 
liberalisation and democratisation.
111
 Rather than noting the different influences on 
Taiwan’s perception of the normative order, Madsen actually identifies the potential 
impact that Taiwan may have on other de facto states, noting that “polities that have 
lately become isolated have presumably concluded from Taiwan’s experience that 
their situation is not dire and that opening new channels of communications to other 
countries will be a fairly straightforward matter.”112  
In Somaliland as well, awareness of international expectations of liberalisation 
and democratisation became evident during the 1990s. The idea of practical 
legitimacy has been even more relevant in this case than in other de facto states, 
mainly because the case for remedial legitimacy has been weaker in the case of 
Somaliland, whose residents come from the same ethnic and religious group as in 
Somalia (although Somalilanders have often claimed clan-based persecution). Since 
the mid-1990s, Somaliland has consistently tried to prove its ability to meet 
international expectations about “good” statehood. True, democratic elections also 
served to solve disagreements and divisions which led to a civil war in the early 
1990s; yet, success in advancing some liberal reforms and establishing a proto-
democracy have been integrated in Somaliland’s constant campaigns for international 
recognition.
113
 Not just Somaliland authorities, but also supporters of Somaliland’s 
cause have embraced democratisation as a credible justification for sovereignty. In an 
interview with Mark Bradbury for his 2007 study of Somaliland, a senior political 
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leader in Somaliland stated that ‘democratisation must come before recognition. We 
will only know if it is working after three elections. If it fails then there is no point in 
seeking recognition’.114 As Bradbury documents, the first president of Somaliland, 
Ibrahim Egal, has declared on various occasions the idea that a multiparty system is 
the right path toward recognition, and that Somaliland was making the right steps 
toward this path.
115
 
Caspersen highlights an important point, namely the importance of domestic 
sovereignty to the de facto states’ legitimation campaign. By so doing, she diverts 
from the general tendency in the literature to examine de facto states only from a 
structuralist perspective. She, and several other recent students of de facto statehood, 
noted the important link between the success of de facto states in the process of state-
building and their foreign policy and interaction with other members of the 
international community.
116
 By so doing, these authors have also identified and 
highlighted the centrality of the pursuit of legitimacy to the conduct of de facto states. 
One should bear in mind, however, that domestic or earned sovereignty go well 
beyond democracy. Security and economic viability have been no less important for 
de facto states in their discourse of earned sovereignty, particularly given the fact that 
their aspirations for statehood have been denied, based on their low economic 
prospects or their depiction as sources of instability in the region and as habitats of 
transnational criminal activity. Referring to the harsh economic conditions of 
Abkhazia, one local politician declared that “Given its natural wealth, important 
strategic position, and active and enterprising population, one can positively assess the 
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perspectives for dynamic economic development. The numerous Abkhazian diaspora 
communities all over the world will undoubtedly also contribute to the economic 
recovery and prosperity of Abkhazia.”117 Similar comments were also made by the 
leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh, emphasising as well its diaspora community 
(Armenian diaspora) as an important source of revenue.
118
 Somaliland, in a different 
context, has actually been striving with displaying to international community its 
potential contribution to one of the most burning regional and global security issues, 
namely the global war on terror. Referring to several Islamist attacks on targets within 
Somaliland, its recently elected president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, declared that ‘The 
United States and United Kingdom should include Somaliland and other small nations 
in the fight against terrorism.’119 And Somaliland’s Foreign Minister, Mohamed A. 
Omar, bound Somaliland’s democratic achievements with the war on terror, noting 
that ‘Somaliland has been attacked by terrorists not only because they hate us, what I 
think what they are attacking is the principles and values we stand for, which is 
democracy’.120 
Bringing up the above two subjects is not coincidental. Understanding the de 
facto states’ motivation to prove their earned sovereignty could also help us 
understand why their leadership might decide to take unilateral steps or follow 
adventurous policies with regard to natural resources or, alternatively, participation in 
such international campaigns as the global war on terror. As argued later in this 
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research, the KRG’s desire to prove its domestic sovereignty has driven it to take 
several unilateral steps with regard to oil in its territory, in terms of oil extraction and 
export, or served as a motivation for the KRG to take further part in the war on terror, 
even though domestic Islamist terrorism has been less of a problem in the Kurdistan 
Region than in other parts of Iraq or the Middle East. 
An even more noticeable gap in the literature on de facto states, in addition to 
the overemphasis on democratisation at the expense of other dimensions of the 
conduct of de facto states, is the lack of attention to the connection between the 
position of de facto statehood, the pursuit of legitimacy and success in state-building, 
consolidation of domestic sovereignty and democratisation. International crises of 
legitimacy are treated as given, and there has been a limited effort to actually 
understand how the de facto states’ reaction to such crises can explain their 
development and evolution. Once again, Nina Caspersen comes closest to actually 
pointing out the connection between the lack of international legitimacy and the 
potential for domestic reforms and particularly democratisation. She notes that 
although often beginning as a mere façade, often democratic reforms can actually lead 
to some genuine transition, as took place in Somaliland, Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Abkhazia, where strongmen and warlords actually lost their grip on power following 
national elections.
121
 But for Caspersen, the source of these changes was mainly 
domestic; the circumstances under which de facto states were created, the 
homogenisation of the following events of forced population exchange (such as in the 
Caucasus), or the need for the leadership of the de facto state to legitimise their rules 
internally, all allowed political transitions and reforms. Caspersen acknowledges the 
relevance of the lack of legitimacy when she identifies it as an incentive for 
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democratisation; but she treats this as a given, as a process which is bound to happen, 
without elaborating on its importance and contribution to the process of reform.
122
 
In this research I argue that one cannot understand de facto states and their 
development without fully comprehending their pursuit of international legitimacy. 
As I demonstrate through the case of the KRG, the pursuit of international legitimacy 
necessarily involves communicative action, interaction, learning and argumentation. 
When the de facto states declare that they aspire to meet international standards for 
their recognition, they open the door for further scrutiny of their actions not only at 
the international, but also at the domestic level. Agents of change may get new 
opportunities to convey their ideas by advocating them to the governments of de facto 
states, primarily by emphasising their value to securing international legitimacy and 
sovereignty. True, adopting certain standards of governances considered as 
preconditions of recognition is utilitarian in essence; and more importantly, reforms 
inspired by such interaction are not irreversible or complete. In most cases of de facto 
states, we may see partial democratic transitions, which are often contested by the 
interests of the ruling elites. Still, such transitions are important both because they 
have an impact on the future course of the de facto state and its conduct at the regional 
and international levels; and because they actually provide us with some interesting 
insights into changes and transitions which can take place in international politics.  
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2.2.3 CRISES OF LEGITIMACY AND ITS PURSUIT: TOWARD A BETTER 
UNDERSTANDING OF DE FACTO STATES 
As noted earlier in this thesis,
123
 the domestic structure of a certain actor is crucial for 
the manner in which certain ideas or norms, and especially such ideas the actor had 
not been fully exposed to in the past, are carried into and implemented in the actor’s 
domestic sphere. This is joined by three other factors: the international environment, 
the actor’s level of interaction with it, and the manner in which actors perceive 
themselves. The previous sections reviewed the international environment, 
emphasising the normative shift in its conception of recognition and legitimation 
toward a greater reliance on capabilities and the implementation of norms relating to 
democratic governance and human rights. They also reviewed the manner in which 
the actors with which this research is concerned, namely de facto states, view 
themselves and the international society to which they aspire to belong. What is left 
now is to analyse and explain the domestic structure of the de facto state; as well as 
the nature of the agents of change in the context of the de facto states. 
Regarding the first aspect, it is worthwhile to go back to the model set by 
Thomas Risse in his examination of the impact of ideas conveyed by transnational 
coalitions on different governments. Risse, as well as Checkel, have noted the link 
between government centralisation and success in introducing and implementing new 
ideas. Risse, nevertheless, provides a more comprehensive analysis of different forms 
of governance, which can help students in cataloguing different actors. According to 
Risse, governments vary with regard to their domestic structures, namely the relations 
between government and society and their level of centralisation. He defines six 
categories: State-controlled domestic structure, in which the government is strong and 
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the level of societal organization is weak; State-dominated domestic structure, in 
which the government is strong but there are stronger intermediate organizations 
channelling societal demands into the political system and/or more consensus-oriented 
decision making norms. As Risse notes, “The political culture of such systems often 
emphasizes the state as caretaker of the needs of its citizens”; Stalemate domestic 
structure, in which a relatively strong state is facing “strong social organizations in a 
highly polarized polity and a political culture emphasizing distributional bargaining”; 
Corporatist structure, in which “powerful intermediate organizations such as political 
parties operate in consensus oriented political culture, resulting in continuous 
bargaining processes, geared toward political compromises”; Society-dominated 
structure in which fragmented political institutions face “strong social interest 
pressure”; and a Fragile domestic structure which combines “fragmented state 
institutions, a low degree of societal mobilization, and weak social organizations.”124 
De facto states in general share some common characteristics with regard to 
their emergence. In most cases, de facto states have emerged out of an armed 
liberation struggle and their leadership has arisen out of the paramilitary movements 
that have often conducted guerrilla warfare against a central government. Thus, the 
leadership in many de facto states often began its way with a centralised structure, 
where paramilitary leaders became political leaders. Nina Caspersen, in her 
comprehensive study of de facto states, traces this in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Transnistria and Somaliland,
125
 and Pegg points out to similar realities in Tamil Elam 
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and Eritrea.
126
 One could probably define the Taiwanese leadership as such, since it 
was led by the former General Chiang Kai-shek, who ruled Taiwan mostly through 
emergency-laws, as well as the KRG. Yet, in most cases de facto states do not fall 
under the category of state-controlled entities since they lack an important element of 
such structure, namely isolation from their population. In most de facto states, the 
population has some access to their leadership, mainly because in many cases the 
wide population played an important part in the struggle for national liberation and 
will potentially play an important part in any future struggles. This is particularly true 
in cases where there is a large diaspora community, since the diaspora community 
often becomes an integral part of the domestic society in the target actor.
127
 In 
addition, the formation of a de facto state entails the emergence of rudimentary forms 
of civil society activists, especially among students, intellectuals and trade unions.
128
 . 
Hence, most de facto states fall into what Risse has defined as state-dominated 
domestic structure. 
This leads this section to the issue of transnational intervention and the nature 
of the transnational agents of change in de facto states. Those agents of change have 
been transnational coalitions of major INGOs, IOs and individuals, working together 
with local NGOs and individuals. Here, the circumstances of the emergence of the de 
facto states are highly relevant. First, the majority of de facto states were established 
following devastating wars, which often took place in their own territory.
129
 Once 
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again, Taiwan is somewhat of an exception, since it actually went through a process 
of de-recognition, starting as the solely recognised government of the whole of China, 
but ending up the illegitimate government of what has become a “renegade province” 
of the PRC.
130
 Second, as stated above, many of the de facto states have emerged out 
of paramilitary structures. Their leadership often had no experience in running civilian 
affairs. In order to fill this vacuum, experienced and well educated individuals were 
needed to help building the de facto state. These conditions paved the way for 
international aid organisations, governmental and non-governmental alike, since it has 
meant that the leaderships of de facto states have had a desperate need for 
international guidance and aid. And since aid has been scarce because of the lack of 
recognition, those who have been willing to offer their assistance and provide some 
aid also gain a significant opportunity to influence the target-government. This is 
because their help has portrayed them as committed to justice. It has also given them 
access to the leaderships as experts in their fields. Referring to the case of Abkhazia, 
Kolstø and Blakkisrud have demonstrated how local NGOs have managed to 
successfully lobby the government in 2008 to lift some legal bans on freedom of 
expression after establishing a coalition with British NGOs.
131
 In the case of the KRG, 
the combination of tremendous devastation by continuous wars in the region, as well 
as a suffocating embargo, have facilitated the entry of a growing influence of 
international aid organisations, different individual experts and members of the 
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diaspora to build close contact with both the authorities and the public in the 
Kurdistan Region since 1991.
132
 
The diaspora has often been an essential component of transnational activism, 
principally because members of the diaspora community have had the advantage of 
residing in the West, but have still been considered legitimate members of their 
homeland.
133
 Residing in the West, members of the diaspora have been constantly 
exposed to ideas about the nature of governance, democracy and liberalisation. 
Having the ability to travel and sometimes even live in both worlds, members of the 
diaspora community and returnees can play an important part as conveyers of new 
ideas into their homeland, or as mediators between the leadership of the de facto state 
and the international community and its ideas.
134
 This is particularly true for societies 
that are opened to members of the diaspora and which allot an important place for 
their experiences, such as the Kurdish society.
135
 In addition, members of the diaspora 
usually enjoy certain immunities that are often denied from the residents of the de 
facto states, especially when facing a more centralised government. Unlike residents 
of the de facto state, members of the diaspora have the backing of their governments 
in their homes, and can avoid punitive measures taken by a potentially oppressing 
government. As such, members of the diaspora community have the ability to amplify 
the domestic demands of the population of their homeland with less worry about any 
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potential repercussions. A good example is that of Somaliland, where the diaspora 
was one of the main engines for political reforms. The Somali diaspora was a pivotal 
element in the process of state-building in Somaliland already since its inception. It 
heavily contributed to its financial system, mainly by sending remittances to their 
families in the region, but also played an important role in advocating the cause of 
Somaliland at the international level and lobbying foreign governments for 
recognition.
136
 This provided the Somali diaspora more leverage in pushing for 
political reforms in the country. Already in the mid-1990s, the Somali diaspora 
managed to put pressure on the tribal elders to agree for national elections in the 
country and the delegation of some of their authorities to an elected government.
137
 
Whereas some members of the diaspora have been hesitant to return Somaliland due 
to regional instability,
138
 others have become more and more active in the region 
itself. Thus, many of the presidential and parliamentary candidates in the 2010 
elections were members of the diaspora community in London.
139
 In addition, 
members of the diaspora have become involved in civil society activism in the region, 
and mainly in democracy and women’s rights promotion NGOs.140 
An important factor in maintaining the long-term durability of policies and 
reforms instigated by transnational activism is the level of the government’s success 
in meeting and applying the ideas conveyed by the leadership of the de facto state. As 
noted earlier, the foreign policy of de facto states is often oriented toward 
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demonstrating their success in state-building and democratisation to the international 
community. Taking the example of Taiwan again, several observers have highlighted 
Taiwan’s constant use of its success in democratising and liberalising the system in its 
interaction with the international community. In addition to constantly highlighting its 
democratic credentials, the Taiwanese parliament now began exchanging “democracy 
emissaries” with other parliaments across the globe, for the purpose of exchanging 
ideas, and by doing so also lobbying other parliaments for recognising Taiwan. 
Similar efforts were also taken by different NGOs that proliferated in Taiwan since 
the late 1990s.
141
 Such form of diplomacy was enhanced through the mediation of the 
Taiwanese informal diplomatic representations spread across the globe, mainly taking 
the forms of trade chambers or even of private enterprises.
142
 The claims brought up 
about Taiwan’s democratisation were then returned to Taiwan by those who were 
advocating transition within Taiwan, linking “the goal of democratization directly to 
the issue of Taiwanese identity and the principle of self-determination.”143 Michael 
Yahuda, a close observer of Taiwanese history, noted this development as well, 
stating that “The process of democratization was at once a product and an instigator of 
a dynamic change to the domestic order which could not but alter the basis of 
Taiwan's claim to international recognition.”144 
Based on that, one can identify a cyclical movement: The dialogue or 
interaction between the de facto state and the international community may pave the 
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way for transnational intervention and increased cooperation with local factors, at 
both the elite and the public level. Such intervention may lead to changes at the 
domestic level, which are soon integrated in the de facto state’s “foreign policy” and 
interaction with the international community. To simplify this argument, one can 
actually represent this cyclical movement of interaction-intervention-reform-
interaction in this diagram: 
 
Changes in one of the links of the cycle are bound to affect the whole cycle, but when 
all conditions exist, the cycle might prevail over a long period. The case of the KRG, 
as detailed later in this research, serves as an excellent example for this cyclical 
movement as well: the KRG’s democratisation and its legitimating efforts based this 
democratisation and liberalisation opened the door for transnational pressure, which in 
turn resulted in further domestic reforms, which were then again incorporated in the 
KRG’s interaction with the international community. 
The idea that internationally-inspired reforms carried into target actors through 
interaction may actually create this cyclical and long-term process of change, has also 
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been applied to other cases of the pursuit of legitimation and recognition. In his study 
of European Union (EU) candidate states’ implementation of EU standards as 
preconditions for membership, Amichai Magen shows how the superficial 
implementation of reforms in the areas of the rule of law and official corruption in 
Turkey and Romania actually served as a platform for the opposition to enhance such 
reforms; or how new governments coming to power through such reforms actually 
expanded them after coming to power.
145
 This is precisely the point made in this 
research – certainly, reforms and other measures, and especially those inspired by 
external intervention, are embraced out of utilitarian or strategic calculation. But they 
may actually be maintained and further augmented when there is still a need for 
international legitimacy; when there are actors that are interested in expanding such 
reforms and developments; and when those actors have some access to the process of 
policy-making. All three conditions are highly relevant for many de facto states, 
including the KRG. 
Here, it should be noted: de facto statehood and the pursuit of international 
legitimacy do not necessarily guarantee successful state-building and democratisation. 
Not all de facto states are democratic in essence and some of them have actually failed 
to build even rudimentary state-institutions. Pegg brings the example of Tamil Elam, 
dominated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) as an example for a de 
facto state led by a fundamentally undemocratic movement that relied extensively on 
terror and personality cult to establish control over its proclaimed state.
146
 The 
Eritrean de facto state (1991-1993), hailed by Pegg as relatively progressive and 
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inclining toward popular representation,
147
 turned, after its recognition, into a single-
party human-rights violating government.
148
 Caspersen has made a similar argument, 
noting that “The need for external legitimacy does not necessarily translate into an 
emphasis on effective, democratic statehood.”149 Moreover, she indicates that several 
de facto states which had demonstrated some genuine progress at some stage, later 
failed to further progress, as in Abkhazia, and even reverted to a period of autocracy, 
such as the case of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
This, however, should not undermine the importance of pursuit of legitimacy 
as an engine of change for de facto states. It does underscore the importance of the 
existence of all other conditions, namely interaction and the existence of actors that 
are able to advocate certain ideas and hold the governments somewhat accountable for 
their statements. If we take the case of Tamil Elam for example, the LTTE 
government chose to remain mostly isolated from the international community, thus 
lacking a significant form of interaction. In another example, in 2011 Freedom House 
downgraded Nagorno-Karabakh’s status for the first time from partly free to not free. 
The research for this report was conducted shortly after the signing of the diplomatic 
normalisation agreement between Turkey and Armenia, which led some to believe 
that Nagorno-Karabakh’s status would be settled – namely in a period in which the 
leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh may have felt more internationally legitimate.
150
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And in the case of South Ossetia, Kolstø and Blakkisrud suggest that “Tskhinvali 
[South Ossetia’s capital] has never given high priority to building a state, since the 
aim has been to join Russia as soon as possible.”151 In other cases, such as Eritrea or 
Kosovo, one can argue that the pursuit of legitimacy has been a relatively short 
process, as both were bestowed wide international legitimacy already at an early stage 
of their existence. This is in contrast to other de facto states that have gone through 
prolonged processes of legitimation such as Taiwan, TRNC (both in existence since 
the 1970s), the KRG and Somaliland (both de facto states since the early 1990s). 
Thus, at least in some cases, the less an entity relies on the pursuit of legitimacy, the 
less it engages with the international community. Caspersen has also indicated that, 
noting that “If international recognition is deemed unobtainable, or immediate 
survival is a more pressing concern, then the support of a few external patrons may be 
substituted for general international acceptability, and these patrons may care less 
about the kind of entities that are created, or may take demands that do not reflect 
hegemonic international values.”152 Again, nonetheless, Caspersen reduces the pursuit 
of legitimacy to strategic engagement, without taking into account the element of 
interaction which is so essential for any change. 
Of course, there are many other factors that should be taken into account when 
explaining success in state-building. With regard to de facto states, one may argue that 
they have been more successful than their parent states or other quasi-states in the 
process of state-building because, unlike the latter, de facto states are often more 
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ethnically or religiously homogenous due to actions of ethnic cleansing or population-
exchanges. After all, it is much easier to be tolerant toward minorities when those 
constitute only a small and almost insignificant percentage of the population and are 
not perceived as competing with the majority for resources. To this one may add other 
factors; for instance, at least during the first years of its existence, the leadership of 
the de facto state may enjoy wide popular support, being considered the liberators of 
their people. This has been true for many currently independent states, where the 
national liberation movement also took power with popular support after recognition. 
This research does not reject the idea that domestic factors as well are essential for 
explaining reforms and transformations. International politics, nevertheless, is multi-
layered and the domestic and the international are inevitably intertwined. In many de 
facto states the transitions and reforms began as an elite-initiated project, but were 
then embraced and utilised by the population and other actors involved in the process. 
Maybe surprisingly, given the documented antipathy of the international 
community toward secession, successful examples of state-building in de facto states 
did generate some debate in the international community. In the case of Taiwan, the 
US Congress issued a resolution calling for the Clinton administration to adopt a ‘One 
China, One Taiwan’ policy. Based on Taiwan’s democratic credentials, namely the 
establishment of a “vibrant democracy on the island of Taiwan,” and because “the 
people of Taiwan through their democratically elected leader, President Lee Teng-hui, 
for the first time ever referred to Taiwan's ties with China as a `state-to-state' 
relationship,” the resolution urged the US government to “commend the people of 
Taiwan for having established a democracy on Taiwan over the past decades and for 
repeatedly reaffirming its dedication to democratic ideals; and… recognize Taiwan's 
independence if the people of Taiwan opt for such status through a democratic 
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mechanism, including a plebiscite.”153 The case of Somaliland as well has also won 
some supporters in academia, media and politics. As Gerard Prunier, a historian of 
Africa, has argued, “The irony is that the "international community" refuses to 
recognise this oasis of peace and democracy, while it continues to give legitimacy to 
Somalia on the basis of the 1960 unification, even though it is a state in name only, 
incapable of meeting any democratic criteria or of re-establishing peace.”154 Seth 
Kaplan, another close observer of developments in Somaliland, has also highlighted 
the inherent hypocrisy of democracy promotion, but denying such a ‘success story’, as 
he views it, as Somaliland of recognition.
155
 As shown later in this research, the 
stabilisation, sovereignty and de facto independence of the KRG have also prompted 
different individuals to promote the idea of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. At this 
stage, nevertheless, most de facto states probably still face very stark chances of 
recognition.  
 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has established the theoretical framework in which this study takes place. 
First, it has defined the term de facto state, based on the existing literature, as an entity 
which has obtained domestic and Westphalian sovereignty, in the sense that it has 
managed to acquire autonomy from its parent state and establish at least some of the 
rudimentary institutions that characterise states. Based on existing accounts, this 
chapter has also noted that many of the existing de facto states have gone through 
some successful process of state-building, which has also included some process of 
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democratisation and liberalisation. While in most cases such successes are treated as 
anomalies, this chapter has argued that the situation of de facto statehood actually 
carries within it the potential for such processes, and by applying the concept de facto 
state we could actually get a better understanding of the actors that fall under such a 
category. The chapter has also counted the elements of such change: first, the 
transition of a national liberation movement preoccupied with warfare with its parent 
state into a de facto state affects the separatist leadership’s identity, interests and 
interaction with international society – guns and landmines are now replaced by 
institution-building and legislation as the main mechanisms of national liberation; the 
pursuit of international legitimacy is an important factor in shaping the domestic and 
foreign policies of de facto states; and finally, both levels are intertwined, since 
success in achieving domestic sovereignty often serves de facto states in their effort to 
achieve international legitimacy. The chapter ended by demonstrating that although de 
facto statehood does not necessarily guarantee reforms and political progress, and that 
political reforms or success in state-building are not irreversible, it does carry the 
potential for such reforms. 
The following chapters analyse the inception and development of the KRG as 
a de facto state, whose roots lie in the Kurdish national liberation movement in 
northern Iraq. The developments detailed in the following chapters will be constantly 
analysed against the framework laid in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE EMERGENCE OF THE KURDISH 
NATIONALIST STRUGGLE IN IRAQ: DECOLONISATION 
AND THE MORAL LEGITIMACY OF A MINORITY 1958-
1991 
This chapter opens the second part of analysis, namely the empirical part which 
focuses on the evolution of the Kurdish national liberation movement in northern Iraq 
into a de facto state and the impact of this transition on the movement’s national 
liberation struggle and strategies. It focuses primarily on the period between 1958 and 
1991, although the first sections provide a short (but detailed) review of the Kurdish 
national liberation movement since its gradual surfacing and consolidation in the late 
nineteenth- early twentieth century. During this period, the Kurdish national liberation 
movement in northern Iraq began to define its aims within Iraq (and to a lesser extent 
within the larger Kurdish nationalist movement), and established a front against the 
Arab-dominated central governments in Baghdad. 
Although it is the Kurdish de facto state in northern Iraq that stands at the core 
of this research, I found it necessary to provide an elaborate account of the Kurdish 
national liberation movement in its earlier incarnation as a nationalist movement 
employing armed resistance to protect the Kurdish compact minority in Iraq from the 
oppression of the government in Baghdad. The logic behind focusing on this period 
relies on the importance of transition and interaction to this research and to the 
understanding of de facto states. The Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq 
(and in other parts of Kurdistan) was getting increasingly exposed to the international 
community during this period, aspiring to understand the meaning and preconditions 
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of statehood. As noted in the previous chapter, both Bartmann and Caspersen have 
noted that prior to the transition into de facto statehood, national liberation 
movements had tended to rely more on claims for moral or remedial legitimacy, 
namely group rights, past independence or oppression by the central authorities. What 
they did not refer to is that such understandings as well derived from interaction and 
learning. The Kurdish national liberation movement was no different than other de 
facto states, and thoroughly examining the period preceding its transition into a de 
facto state also underscores the shift in the forms of interaction and legitimation. In 
addition, though the Kurdish insurgents during this period tended to avoid taking over 
large swaths of territory, the foundations for the Kurdish de facto state, including for 
the process of institution-building, were laid during this period. Finally, this chapter is 
necessary in establishing the importance of interaction to the process of learning and 
the conveyance of ideas from one level to another, as it demonstrates the impact of 
interaction on Kurdish political thought already from an early stage of its existence. 
 
3.1 THE EMERGENCE OF THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN 
THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 
It seems as if every study of the Kurdish nationalist movement and any survey of the 
Kurdish question begin with the following question: who are the Kurds? This question 
has multiple answers and the debate around the sources of modern Kurdish national 
identity has been long and painful. After more than a century of Kurdish nationalist 
activism, one can argue that a Kurd is a person who views himself or herself as one, 
who speaks one of the Kurdish dialects (the most common among them are Kurmanji, 
Sorani, Zaza) and who identifies himself or herself with the Kurdish culture and 
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history. The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, with Shiite (known as Faili), 
Yezidi and Christian minorities.
1
 Prior to the major urbanisation and industrialisation 
processes of the twentieth century, the Kurds were organised in clans or tribes, though 
some forms of such social organisation survived into this period. The majority of 
Kurds have resided in the vaguely defined geographic area known as Kurdistan. 
Divided into fiefdoms and kingdoms, Kurdistan had enjoyed various degrees of 
autonomy under the Ottoman and the Persian empires, but this autonomy was greatly 
compromised and eventually lost with the formation of the modern nation-states on 
the ruins of the great regional empires, that is, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia. 
Large Kurdish communities have also existed in the  main urban centres of these 
empires and states, and during the twentieth century large Kurdish communities also 
emerged in the capitals of Western Europe. Admittedly, this description of the 
Kurdish nation is an overly simplistic and shallow one – throughout history, 
individuals and groups have worn, shed and re-worn their Kurdish identity, based on 
interests or even genuine self-identification with different groups. Yet, this research is 
not about the Kurdish people and their construction of national identity – space 
limitations do not allow a more thorough investigation of this dimension.   
A debate which is easier to contain here is about the rise of Kurdish nationalist 
sentiments and the roots of the Kurdish nationalist movement. Some students of 
Kurdish history view the tribal uprisings in the nineteenth century, such as those led 
by the agha (tribal leader) Badr-Khan in 1847 and by the Sufi Sheikh ‘Ubaydullah of 
Nehri in 1880, as the springs of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Kurdistan.
2
 The 
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fact that Sheikh ‘Ubyadullah aspired to unify Kurdish tribes in the region under his 
influence for the purpose of his raids into Persia in defiance of Ottoman policy has led 
researchers and Kurdish nationalists alike to view him as an early symbol of Kurdish 
nationalism. The Sheikh is also one of the first Kurdish leaders to be documented 
justifying his actions based on the interests of the Kurdish nation. In a letter to 
William Abbott, the Consul-General in Tabriz, he argued that “The Kurdish nation … 
We want our affairs to be in our own hands.”3 Other contemporary observers, on the 
other hand, disproved the idea of the Sheikh as seeking political independence, 
arguing that his actions mainly served him in his negotiations with the Ottoman 
Sultan about the level of Kurdish autonomy amid Ottoman centralisation efforts.
4
 
Other observers have traced the roots of the rise of Kurdish nationalism to the 
emergence of Turkish nationalism. Such processes took place initially in the Kurdish 
periphery. Whereas many Kurdish urban notables actually joined the Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP), the umbrella organisation for Turkish nationalist 
movements which came to power following the 1908 Revolution in Turkey,
5
 those 
were Kurdish leaders in the periphery who began considering secession. It was Sayyid 
Nursi, another religious leader, who declared the necessity to establish an independent 
Kurdish-Armenian state.
6
 Constant Russian meddling in Ottoman affairs and the 
Ottoman alliance with Germany during the First World War led to the radicalisation 
of Turkish nationalist sentiments among the CUP. Consequently the CUP leadership 
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began enacting new agendas and policies of excluding ethnic and religious minorities. 
This drove the urban Kurdish intellectuals to turn to their Kurdish identity and 
strengthen their ties with the traditional Kurdish leadership in the periphery.
7
 
Consequently, the first years of the CUP reign witnessed a growing number of literary 
and cultural societies being established by Kurdish intellectuals.
8
 The CUP, wary of 
any ideological activism in the Empire which undermined Turkish nationalism, was 
quick to suppress the activism of the Kurdish cultural clubs, co-opting Kurdish 
activism under the banner of Islam and Jihad during WWI. With time, Kurdish 
nationalist activism shifted to European capitals, as the newly established Kurdish 
exile community began advocating the Kurdish cause before the great powers under 
the auspices of the war.
9
 According to Martin Van-Bruinessen, the ethnic cleansing of 
Kurdistan from its large Armenian population and the consequent homogeneity of the 
region’s population contributed further to the strengthening of Kurdish nationalist 
identity in Kurdistan.
10
 
Regardless of its historical sources, there is a wider agreement that toward the 
end of WWI a fledgling, more intellectually-inspired Kurdish nationalist movement 
emerged in Kurdistan and in major Ottoman, Persian and European cities, advocating 
the self-determination of the Kurdish people in Kurdistan and their liberation from 
what was perceived as the historical suppression in the hands of the regional powers. 
Amid new global trends, those early nationalists came to embrace a new path in their 
effort to achieve their aims, that of national self-determination. 
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3.2 THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN THE INTERWAR ERA 
AND THE IDEA OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
The growing popularity of the idea of national self-determination, as embodied in 
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points Speech, also attracted the Kurdish nationalists. In 
fact, the twelfth point in the speech was of direct relevance to the Kurdish people in 
the Ottoman Empire, stating that “The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman 
Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but other nationalities which are now 
under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely 
unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.”11 Inspired by this speech, a 
Kurdish delegation attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The head of the 
Kurdish delegation, the former Ottoman General Sharif Pasha, submitted a 
memorandum to the leaders of the Allied victors which articulated a Kurdish demand 
for an independent state in Kurdistan.
12
 Sharif Pasha’s demands were accepted by the 
signatories, and Article 62 of the resultant Sevres Treaty stated that in six months of 
the signing of the Treaty, autonomy would be given to the Kurds on the area between 
the Euphrates, Armenia, Syria, and Mesopotamia. Article 64 stated that in one year of 
the granting of autonomy, the League of Nations would consider, based on the desire 
of the Kurdish majority, whether or not to grant full recognition to this autonomous 
region. Motivated by these developments, Kurdish nationalists began to organise in 
political movements, e.g. Azadi (Freedom or Liberty) and Khoybun (Independence), 
although still mainly among Kurdish exiles.
13
 These groups denounced both Turkish 
and British presence in Kurdistan, thus identifying long-standing Ottoman control of 
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Kurdistan with European colonialism, and based their demands for independence not 
only on their historical right for the land, but also on the Ottoman-Turkish oppression 
of the Kurdish people.
14
 In short then, the Kurds embraced a moral legitimacy 
discourse during this period, trying to justify their desire to secede from the Ottoman 
Empire based on prevalent contemporary notions of the right to self-determination. 
The defeat of the invading Great Powers and Greece by the Turkish forces 
under the command of General Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) put an end to the 
Kurdish aspirations.
15
 The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which marked the end of 
foreign occupation of Turkey, carried no mention of what was promised to the Kurds 
in the Treaty of Sevres.
16
 Moreover, the Treaty of Lausanne resulted in the division of 
Kurdistan between newly established four new nation-states in the region, namely 
Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, as well as a small portion of Armenia. This was a painful 
blow to Kurdish nationalism, which lost its raison d’être, namely the liberation of 
Kurdistan. The Kurds now became separated minority communities, rather than a 
nation whose identity is shaped by its state-institutions. Each Kurdish community now 
faced a formidable enemy – the nation state, with its central power, army and desire 
for unity. Subsequently, relations between Kurdish communities and the central 
governments in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria were characterised as centre-periphery 
relations, or as majority-minority relations. 
The enthusiasm of Kurdish intellectuals with the idea of national self-
determination and the idea of independence could be traced even years after the Paris 
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Peace Conference and the eventual Kurdish failure to gain statehood. In one of the 
earliest studies of the history of modern Kurdistan conducted by a Kurd, historian 
Muhammad Amin Zaki declared that  
No one can deprive nations and people who incline to independence and 
freedom [of them]. This is their natural and most basic right, and none should 
condemn a people [for desiring independence]. These peoples and nations, and 
particularly their enlightened leaders and classes, should make independence 
and freedom an aim and a target …This is so that these nations will not be 
distanced from the rule of science and wisdom, and protect their spirits and 
properties as much as possible.
17
 
Therefore, Zaki maintains, the Paris Peace Conference “which spoke highly of 
justice, fairness and the saving and liberation of people under occupation, clearly 
revealed, before all humanity, that those are empty words with no content nor 
meaning in contemporary politics and reality. It has aimed at nothing but soliciting 
nations and peoples and deceiving human societies”.18 
The most formidable state-machine was that of Kemalist Turkey. In its 
campaign to build the Turkish nation, the Kemalist elite delegitimised “Kurdishness,” 
i.e. individual self-identification as a Kurd. The use of the Kurdish language in the 
public arena was prohibited and so was the use of the term Kurd as self-reference. The 
suppression of Kurdish identity in Turkey, together with the increasingly intensive 
secularisation of the state, caused unrest among the Kurdish tribes in south-eastern 
Anatolia. One such rebellion was led by Sheikh Sa’id of Piran, a leader of a Sufi 
tariqa (order). In addition to his demands to revive the recently abolished Caliphate, 
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Sheikh Sa’id also demanded the establishment of an independent Kurdish state 
“where the Islamic principles… are to be respected.”19 This served well the Turkish 
government, which described the rebellion in its media as “religious reactionism,”20 in 
a direct effort to defuse potential European sympathy with what might have been seen 
as a minority seeking for self-determination. That legitimation and the effort to 
legitimise their claims based on internationally-held values (namely secular 
nationalism and progress) was an important aspect of this struggle is demonstrated in 
a letter sent by Kurdish leaders in exile to Prime Minister Ismet İnönü several years 
after the rebellion, in which they denied the religious motives of the rebellion and 
condemned Turkey for not respecting the “principles of the civilised world in the 20th 
century: nation and freedom.”21 
The nation-building process in other parts of the region was less aggressive 
than the Kemalist one. The demographic constitution of the recently established Iraqi 
state and the circumstances which led to the coming to power of the Hashemite 
monarchy forced its elite to find different paths of nation-building. They have also 
had an impact on the development of Kurdish activism in Iraq. In 1926, British 
pressure led to the final annexation of the Mosul Vilayet to Iraq. This was partly due 
to the British desire to gain more influence on the exertion of oil in the region, as the 
British still had a mandate over Iraq during this period; but also partly because of the 
desire of King Faisal ibn-Hussein to balance the Shiite majority in Iraq by annexing 
the predominantly Sunni region. Encompassing the sanjaks of Kirkuk and 
Sulaymaniyah, the annexation of Mosul meant that the Kurds now became a compact 
minority concentrated in the northern provinces of Iraq, constituting the majority of 
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the population in the governorates of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and parts of the Mosul 
governorate. In addition, the region was also home to Christian, Jewish, Yezidi and 
other smaller religious and ethnic groups. The population of the southern governorates 
has been predominantly Shiite, whereas central Iraq had large Sunni, Shiite, Christian 
and Jewish communities. Under such circumstances, the early stages of the process of 
nation-building in Iraq was highly centralised and directed from Baghdad. The 
Hashemite monarchy advocated an Iraqi-first citizenship (or wataniyya). This current 
actually allowed some space for Kurdish identity, at least in its tribal and conservative 
form. On the other hand, pan-Arab nationalism (qawmiyya), advocated by some 
members of the Iraqi elite, was far more exclusionary and did not leave room for other 
forms of nationalism in the Arab space, including Kurdish nationalism.
22
 The latter 
current, nonetheless, was to become the dominant trend during the 1960s, advocated 
mainly by the Ba’th party in Iraq. 
The instability which characterised Iraq during the 1920s and early 1930s, as 
well as the British/Iraqi-Turkish contestation over the annexation of Mosul prior to 
1926, gave some leverage to the Kurdish tribes in the region vis-à-vis the Hashemite 
monarchy. The British mandate authorities, based on their experience in India and 
Baluchistan, preferred to let the tribes run their own affairs, with minimal intervention 
from their side.
23
 This allowed the establishment of what Ofra Bengio has referred to 
as the first Kurdish autonomy in Iraq in 1919,
24
 under the leadership of Sheikh 
Mahmoud Barzanji of Sulaymaniyah. However, the eventual annexation of Mosul 
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allowed King Faisal to increase his power vis-à-vis the Kurdish tribes, and 
particularly Sheikh Mahmoud. Even the promise given to the Kurds to allow them to 
use the Kurdish language in education was abandoned when Iraq obtained its formal 
independence in 1932. And when the Kurds rose in uprising against Baghdad in the 
same year, they were pacified with the help of the Royal Air Force. At this stage it 
was again the urban leadership that came to lead the Kurdish nationalist movement. 
Urban intellectuals addressed more and more the international community, once again 
stressing the oppression of the Kurds by the Iraqi government. Sheikh Mahmoud as 
well, before crossing the Iraqi border once again to launch an attack against Iraqi 
targets, petitioned the League of Nations from his place of exile in Iran against the 
atrocities committed against the Kurdish people.
25
 The latter point is important, 
because it stresses that in contrast to some observers of Kurdish history,
26
 Kurds 
actually did present their cases before the international community until a far later 
stage. 
 
3.3 POST-WAR ERA: FURTHER CLAIMS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION, 
THE RISE OF DECOLONISATION AND THE MAHABAD REPUBLIC 
As noted earlier in this research, the end of the Second World War witnessed some 
drastic changes in international society, with the introduction of decolonisation as a 
precondition for recognition of aspiring states.
27
 Members of the Kurdish national 
liberation movement, much like other national liberation movements in Asia and 
Africa, found in the anti-colonial movement an ideational framework for their own 
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struggle. The Hiwa (Hope) Party, active during the 1940s and the 1950s in Kurdish 
provinces in Iraq and Iran, provides us with examples of an anti-colonialist rhetoric. 
The Party’s stated goals were to unify the tribes, “liberate Kurdistan by political 
means,” establishing relations “with other freedom-seeking parties,” and “fight the 
colonial policies of Iraq.”28 The platform of the Rezgari Kurd (Kurdish Deliverance) 
Party from 1945 demanded, as well, unity, language rights, the administrative 
independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, and the establishment of contacts with “democratic 
nations with the object of combating imperialism and reaction, and their agents.”29 It 
then went on claiming that “When the World War II drew to its end the hope of the 
oppressed nations revived this included the Kurdish nation who… stresses and alleges 
that its rights should be returned as a necessary and preliminary step to self-
determination and sovereignty.”30 Thus, for Kurdish nationalists the surrounding 
states, themselves becoming more entrenched in the anti-colonialist movement, came 
to be seen as their imperialists and colonialists. 
Amid this surge of Kurdish nationalist activism, regional governments tried to 
undermine the Kurdish nationalist efforts. In 1946, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Tawfiq 
al-Suwaidi, declared that there is no Kurdish problem in Iraq because the number of 
Kurds in Iraq is very low. Hence, the Iraqi PM did not try to deny the Kurdish right 
for self-determination, but the existence of a Kurdish nation (at least in Iraq). Rezgari 
reacted to that by publishing a manifesto that blamed Suwaidi with fabricating the 
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facts “in accordance with a plan prepared by the Imperialists.”31 The Kurdish 
movement, Rezgari’s manifesto stated, had not been clearly and sufficiently reported 
by the free press as a living national issue in order to enlighten public opinion on the 
scandalous imperialist intrigues.”32 Elaborating on the suffering of the Kurdish people 
under Iraqi tyranny, the manifesto described the Kurdish nationalist movement as a 
democratic, anti-imperialistic, and anti-reactionary movement.
33
 Throughout the 
1930s and the 1940s, Kurdish individuals and groups kept petitioning IOs and 
governments, detailing the persecution of the Kurdish people and their right for 
statehood.
34
 
The establishment of the short-lived Republic of Mahabad in Iranian (Eastern) 
Kurdistan was perhaps one of the most important events in this chapter of Kurdish 
history. Its roots date to the Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941 and the division of the 
country into a British-controlled area in the south and a Soviet-controlled area in the 
north, with a buffer zone in the centre. As part of their policy of supporting national 
liberation movements (or desire to gain control over the area), the Soviet supported 
the establishment of an autonomous government in Iranian Azerbaijan, known as the 
Azerbaijan’s People Government (APG) whose administrative centre was located in 
the city of Tabriz.
35
 Although physically located outside of the Soviet zone of 
influence, the foundation of the APG and Soviet ideas had a tremendous impact on 
Kurdish youth and intellectuals in Mahabad, the largest town of the predominantly 
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Kurdish Sauj Bulagh region. They soon established the nationalist Komala-i Jiyanawi 
Kurdistan (the Committee of Kurdish Youth) movement which adopted a nationalist 
platform. The movement attracted almost immediately the attention of Kurds outside 
of Mahabad, as well as Soviet and British attention.
36
 The Komala initially preferred 
to build contacts with the Western powers, mainly because the Kurdish population 
still had bad memories from Russian raids in the region. When the Western powers 
refused to assist the Kurdish cause, the party addressed the more willing Soviets. 
Under Soviet guidance, Komala became bolder in its demands for Kurdish 
self-determination and for recognising the right of the Mahabad Republic for 
autonomy. In 1943 it succeeded in driving away Iranian police forces stationed in the 
province, backed by Kurdish tribal warriors. Consequently, the Mahabad province 
became de facto autonomous, free of any form of Iranian authority and now under the 
leadership of Qazi Muhammad, a religious judge and a Kurdish nationalist. This 
further bolstered the activities of Komala, which now established branches in other 
parts of Kurdistan. It also petitioned the UN about its cause.
37
 When the Soviets 
seemed to consent to the idea of Azeri and Kurdish independence, Qazi Muhammad 
was quick to act. Now heading the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), which came to 
replace the Komala, Qazi Muhammad declared the establishment of the Republic of 
Mahabad in January 1946. The new republic was now supported by warriors from the 
Barzani tribe, who crossed the Iraqi border under the leadership of Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani, a tribal sheikh who fled Iraq a after a failed uprising against the authorities in 
1943. The Komala’s initial modest demands for local autonomy and recognition of the 
Kurds as a distinct nation were now replaced by the wish “to take advantage of the 
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liberation of the world from fascism and to share in the promises of the Atlantic 
charter.”38 Poets and intellectuals in Mahabad, inspired by developments in the 
neighbouring APG, encouraged Qazi Muhammad to put an emphasis on language and 
literature as part of his quest for self-determination. 
Throughout its existence, the Republic of Mahabad received only minimal 
material and moral support from the Soviet Union. Yet, both later Kurdish nationalists 
and contemporary observers exaggerated the Soviet role in the region. Both Jalal 
Talabani and Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou later stressed Soviet friendship and support 
for the Republic.
39
 Robert Rossow Jr., the American Charges d’Affaires in Tabriz in 
1945-1946, and historian William Linn Westermann viewed Mahabad as a Soviet 
puppet state.
40
 Indeed, Mahabad set the pattern for one of the most common strategies 
employed by the adversaries of the Kurds in future struggles, namely accusing the 
Kurds with serving as puppets of external powers. Qazi Muhammad was aware of this 
depiction of the Kurds, as he argued that “Our country has never been occupied by 
Soviet troops, and… neither the Gendarmerie nor Iranian troops have penetrated into 
Kurdistan. We have therefore practically been living in independence since that time. 
Further we shall never tolerate foreign intervention wherever it comes from.”41 
In December 1946 the Soviets decided to withdraw their support of the APG 
and Mahabad due to Western pressure on the USSR to terminate its presence in Iran. 
Notwithstanding its limited support of the Mahabad Republic, Soviet presence in the 
region did deter the Iranian army from invading the region. With the Soviet Army 
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gone, the Kurdish and Azeri forces were easily defeated by the Iranian army and both 
republics ceased to exist. In spite of its short existence, the Republic of Mahabad has 
had a tremendous impact on Kurdish thinkers and intellectuals. It has served Kurdish 
nationalists as a proof that the Kurds can run their own affairs and unify not only 
against an outside force, but also for the purpose of a positive goal – the maintaining 
of a state. As Archie Roosevelt, the American Military Attaché in Teheran at the time 
and one of the few Westerners to visit the Republic (upon its leaders’ invitation) 
stated, “The Dream of Kurdish nationalists, an independent Kurdistan, was realized 
on a miniature scale in Iran from December 1945 to December 1946.”42 
The fall of Mahabad also marked an intermediate stage in the Kurdish 
nationalist struggle. Struck by the Iranian army, Mullah Mustafa Barzani left Iran and 
crossed the border to Soviet Armenia, only to return to Iraq in 1958. Inspired by the 
events in Mahabad, the KDP (whose acronym has now changed into the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party) now launched new branches in Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Yet, no 
major uprising had taken place up until 1961 and the Kurdish uprising in northern 
Iraq. It is also interesting to note that during this period the nature of the Kurdish 
community outside of Kurdistan and the Middle East began changing. The Kurdish 
exiles of the early twentieth century, who came mostly from the ranks of the Kurdish 
notable families in the Ottoman Empire, were now joined by students arriving at 
universities in Western and Eastern European capitals. Albeit relatively small in 
number initially, they had an important impact on Kurdish nationalist activism. Those 
young students were exposed to new intellectual trends and forms of activism. There 
they were further exposed to the anti-colonialist movement, now concentrated on the 
liberation of states in Asia and Africa. They established the first Kurdish student 
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organisations and began interacting with other anti-colonialist movements in Europe 
and outside of it.
43
 Leaders such as India’s PM, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Egypt’s 
President Jamal ‘Abd el-Nasser, were petitioned by Kurdish students to take action in 
their matter.
44
 This diaspora was to play an increasingly important role not only in 
advocating the Kurdish cause in Europe, but also in shaping the nature and aims of the 
Kurdish nationalist movement, particularly after the eruption of the 1961 uprising in 
northern Iraq. 
The Kurdish national liberation movement, as concluded in the previous 
sections, gradually integrated into the global arena which was itself characterised by a 
continuous struggle to define the rapidly changing nature of international society and 
its aspiring members. Kurdish nationalist activists, in spite of the division of 
Kurdistan between the new nation-states in the Middle East and their fierce effort to 
subjugate Kurdish nationalist sentiments, were still able to interact with different 
members of the international community, present their grievances, but also learn what 
they perceived as the new international standards of statehood and recognition. 
During the early 1960s the Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq took the lead 
in formulating and struggling for the Kurdish nationalist demands – although to a 
greater extent this was confined to the Kurdish provinces in Iraq. 
  
 
 
                                                          
43
 Khalid Khayati, “from Victim Diaspora to Transborder Citizenship” (PhD diss., Linköping 
University 2008), 83. 
44
 Jwaideh, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 275. 
109 
 
3.4 THE KURDISH UPRISING OF 1961 AND THE ROOTS OF THE 
KURDISH DE FACTO STATE IN IRAQ 
On July 14, 1958, a group of officers headed by General ‘Abd el-Kareem Qassem, 
known as the “Free Officers,” overthrew the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq and 
established a republic in its place. This historical change instilled the hope in the 
Kurdish nationalists in Baghdad and in Iraqi Kurdistan that their aspirations for 
cultural and maybe even political autonomy would be met. Such hopes were fuelled 
both by the Kurdish active participation in the coup, and also by Qassem’s inclination 
toward Iraqi wattaniyya, or local-nationalism, rather than the pan-Arab qawmiyya that 
dominated other parts of the Arab world. Thus, Kurdish intellectuals and members of 
the Iraqi branch of the KDP were quick to put pressure on Qassem to introduce the 
Kurdish language into the national education-system, to celebrate Nowruz (Kurdish 
and Persian New Year) as a national holiday, and to grant citizenship to Faili (Shiite) 
Kurds, who had been defined as Iranians by the monarchy.
45
 Qassem, from his side, 
opened with a few gestures to the Kurds, the most celebrated among them being 
allowing the return of Mullah Mustafa Barzani from his long exile in the Soviet 
Union. 
The understanding between Qassem and the Kurds, however, was short-lived. 
As Charles Tripp asserts, Qassem’s policies aimed merely to counteract his rivals 
within the Free Officers as well as the leftist forces within the Kurdish nationalist 
movement, and particularly the KDP, which was now led by Ibrahim Ahmad and the 
party’s politburo. Therefore, Charles Tripp suggests, Qassem “had no intention of 
granting the Kurds the institutional autonomy that would have satisfied the KDP.”46 
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The return of Barzani served, according to McDowall, that purpose exactly. Barzani, 
in turn, enjoyed the free hand given to him in consolidating his position within 
Kurdistan and fighting the leftist strand of the KDP.
47
 As Qassem’s power grew 
stronger, he began to turn against his former allies and potential contenders. Pan-
Arabists and Communists were Qassem’s initial targets, but Barzani was soon to 
follow. In order to weaken Barzani, Qassem provided his tribal rivals with arms and 
funding.
48
 Barzani reacted by increasing the Kurdish demands for political autonomy. 
In March 1961, after Qassem rejected his demands, Barzani and his fighters launched 
an attack against Qassem’s Kurdish supporters and fled to the mountains.49 This 
marked the beginning of a nine-year long conflict between the Kurds in northern Iraq 
and Baghdad. 
The first round of fighting between Baghdad and the Kurds also marked the 
beginning of a campaign by both sides to justify their actions to the international 
community. Much like his predecessors in Iraq, and its neighbours Turkey and Iran, 
Qassem did not condemn the idea of national liberation for ethnic minorities, but 
rather denied the existence of a Kurdish nation. As Sa’d Jawad notes, Qassem referred 
to the Kurds as an “indistinguishable, indivisible segment of the Iraqi people,” 
suggesting that “the word ‘Kurdu’ from which the name ‘Kurd’ was derived, was a 
Persian title bestowed on valiant warriors whose descendants later became part of the 
conquering Muslim army,” hence “insinuating that the word had no national 
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significance.”50 Relying on this perception, Qassem ordered the closure of the Kurdish 
teachers’ and workers’ unions, merging them with the national ones. In addition, 
Qassem turned to portraying the Kurds again as agents of external powers, either the 
USA or the Soviet Union. In his meeting with American diplomats in Baghdad, 
Qassem repeatedly demanded that the US would cease supporting the Kurdish 
fighters.
51
 The Americans denied such accusations vehemently, but did embrace the 
idea that at least some segments of the Kurdish nationalist movement, including some 
tribal leaders, are actually linked to the Soviets. For that reason, the Kurds were 
denied the right to advocate their cause in Washington DC.
52
 
The Kurds responded to Qassem’s attacks by intensifying their own campaign 
at the international level, taking advantage of any public forum to present and debate 
their stand. The audiences which the Kurds were trying to reach were diverse, and 
included the Arab public opinion, decolonisation movements and Western 
governments. Ibrahim Ahmad, the head of the KDP’s politburo, travelled to Baghdad 
where he publicly denied links between the KDP and the Soviets. He also insisted on 
portraying the KDP not as a separatist movement, but as a national liberation 
movement which had been suppressed and persecuted by the imperialists and their 
agents.
53
 KDP representatives also met with Nasser in Cairo, and described to him the 
Kurdish revolt as an anti-colonial struggle, “part of an overall nationalist movement,” 
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and as a “just war” waged by oppressed people against a chauvinistic dictator.54 At the 
same time, the KDP also petitioned the UN Secretary General, U Thant, accusing the 
Iraqi government of committing genocide against the Kurdish people and demanding 
an immediate investigation for war crimes.
55
 The Kurdish desire to internationalise 
their struggle and the question of their rights is vividly demonstrated in a letter sent by 
Emir K. Bedir Khan, the representative of the Kurdish people in New York City,
56
 to 
U Thant. Claiming that the Iraqi army was supported by the Syrian army in the 
conflict, he appealed to the Secretary General: “In consequence of the above, I am 
convinced, your Excellency, that you will not accept the view, propounded by the 
Iraqi government, that the present war in Iraq is to be considered as merely an internal 
Iraqi problem and of no consequence to the United Nations Members.”57 In another 
letter sent by Bedir-Khan to U-Thant, the former demanded some international 
recognition of the persecution of the Kurdish people, arguing that the 
Kurdish question is a national question, a question of national rights; on the 
other hand, the atrocities committed by the Iraqi army have reached such 
dimensions that it can no longer be considered a simple internal affair of Iraq… 
Your intervention… will, at the same time, cause the Iraqi government to 
become aware of its own paradoxical attitude in denouncing imperialism on the 
one hand, and practicing it in its worst form themselves.
58
 
The first round of fighting ended in February 1963, with Qassem’s overthrow 
by a coalition of officers and the pan-Arabist Socialist Ba’th party. Against the view 
of the KDP’s politburo, Barzani, now the party’s President and the symbol of the 
armed struggle, preferred to negotiate with the new president of Iraq, General ‘Abd el-
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Salam ‘Aref. Barzani’s demands, however, now grew bolder and he spoke openly 
about Kurdish political autonomy in the predominantly Kurdish provinces Erbil, 
Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk. The latter was particularly contentious as it was (and still 
is) a home to one of Iraq’s largest oilfields. According to Edgar O’Ballance, Barzani 
also stipulated the “the evacuation of Kurdish territory by all Iraqi troops, and an 
equitable division of all state revenues, especially oil royalties, between Kurds and 
Arabs.” And in case Iraq was to unify with another Arab country, Barzani demanded 
that the forces stationed in the Kurdish autonomous region would be defined as a 
“Kurdish army.” Finally, Barzani conditioned peace in an amnesty to all Kurdish 
political prisoners and the nomination of Kurds to the positions of Vice President and 
Deputy of the General Chief of Staff.
 59 ‘Aref rejected these demands and the fighting 
was renewed. The second round of fighting lasted until November 1963. In that month 
‘Arif launched an internal coup, in which he purged his government from his former 
Ba’thist allies. During this cease-fire ‘Aref tried to divide the Kurdish camp by 
providing support for the KDP Politburo faction under the leadership of Ibrahim 
Ahmed and his son in-law, Jalal Talabani. This effort proved unsuccessful and the 
fighting was renewed. 
The third round of fighting lasted until 1966, when another ceasefire was 
agreed upon by both sides. During this ceasefire, the Iraqi government made one of its 
few sincere efforts to conclude the fighting with the Kurds. The newly appointed PM, 
the liberal jurist ‘Abd el-Rahman al-Bazzaz, formulated a peace-agreement which 
aimed to “affirm the reality of Kurdish nationalism and will enable our citizens in the 
north fully to preserve their language and cultural heritage.”60 This statement was a de 
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facto recognition of Iraq as a bi-national state. The agreement, which came to be 
known as the June 29 Agreement, included clauses which allowed the introduction of 
Kurdish as the language of education, administration and press in regions with a 
Kurdish majority; an autonomous administration run by democratically elected local 
councils; and the establishment of a university in Sulaymaniyah. President ‘Aref 
consented to the agreement, but was killed in a plane crash. The June 29 agreement 
was never formally proved by the government and ‘Aref’s predecessor, his brother 
General ‘Abd el-Rahman ‘Aref, gave in to pressure from the side of pan-Arab hawks 
and dismissed Bazzaz, and with him the June Agreement. Consequently, fighting in 
the north was renewed. In a communiqué explaining the reasons for the renewal of 
fighting, the Kurdish Student Society in Europe contended that 
the Iraqi government has only fulfilled a very small part of the 12 clauses of the 
plan. They have released a small number of Kurdish prisoners, re-employed 
some Kurdish individuals and paid some compensation to those who suffered 
because of the war… These rights [civil and cultural rights within Iraq], and 
even autonomy which is demanded by our people do not exceed the rights of 
any minority groups.
61
  
The next round of fighting lasted until 1968. It was interrupted by another 
political change in Iraq – the 1968 coup, in which members of the Ba’th party, 
civilians and army officers, overthrew President ‘Aref and took power. The civilian 
elements of the Ba’th, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, were 
desperate to consolidate their power within the party vis-à-vis the officers, as well as 
vis-à-vis opposition movements in Iraq. Fighting continued after 1968, but in 1970 
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Mullah Mustafa Barzani signed what seemed as a significant peace agreement, known 
as the March 11 Manifesto. The Manifesto, which relied on the preceding 
understandings between Bazzaz and the Kurdish nationalist movement, was the first 
formal Iraqi document which publicly recognised the national rights of the Kurdish 
people. The new agreement recognised Kurdish as the official language of the 
predominantly Kurdish populated regions in the north and guaranteed the introduction 
of Kurdish studies at schools, together with Arabic. It also committed to the 
incorporation of Kurds in political life, including the securing of five Kurdish 
ministers and a Kurdish vice-President. The agreement also discussed introduction of 
economic and agrarian reforms; further investment in Kurdistan; an official 
recognition of Kurdish nationalism as a constituent of Iraqi nationalism, together with 
Arab nationalism and “formation of a Kurdish area with self-government.”62 The 
Kurdish leadership, from its side, agreed to return all heavy weaponry and radio 
transmitters to Baghdad. 
Barzani accepted the agreement rather grudgingly, pressured to do so by the 
younger elements within the KDP who believed that an agreement could be achieved 
with the socialist Ba’th party. In retrospect, after the March 11 agreement failed as 
well to achieve the Kurdish goals and was followed by the renewal of fighting, 
Barzani claimed that that he had suspected from the start that the Ba’th had no 
intention of meeting its promises but had no other options. In 1970, nevertheless, the 
war between Baghdad and the Kurds, which started in 1961, reached its conclusion. 
The aspiration of the younger generation to find a common ground with other radical, 
seemingly progressive, elements in the region, such as the Ba’th, is conspicuous in the 
writings of leading members of the younger generation of the Kurdish nationalist 
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movement. Although the initial purpose of many of these works was to examine 
Kurdish history, they often served to advocate the Kurdish case and to further expand 
the public sphere in which the deliberation about the Kurdish case, and about self-
determination, take place. In his book, Kurdistan and the Kurds, published in 1965, 
‘Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, the leader of the KDP in Iran (only loosely, if at all, 
connected with the KDP in Iraq), stressed the anti-imperialist nature of the Kurdish 
national liberation movement and the need of the Kurdish national liberation 
movement to join the wider Middle Eastern anti-imperialist and democratic 
movement. For Ghassemlou, then exiled in Prague, imperialism was embodied in the 
Western powers. The reactionary regimes in the region, or the “feudal cliques,” served 
to facilitate this imperialism, serving as its “stronghold.”63 Here Ghassemlou 
identifies the paradox of the Kurdish nationalist movement; it is an anti-imperialist 
movement which is forced, due to circumstances, to confront people who are 
themselves the victims of imperialism and colonialism. In Ghassemlou’s view, the 
only solution for the Kurdish problem, “In case the Kurds… wish to attain freedom 
and independence,” was “joining the anti-imperialist democratic movement of the 
whole Middle East.”64 A similar tone characterises a book published in 1971 in 
Arabic by Jalal Talabani, then representing the Marxist-inclining branch of the KDP. 
Much like Ghassemlou, Talabani highlights the reactionary-imperialist alliance to 
oppress the Kurdish nationalist movement. Talabani stresses the joint Arab-Kurdish 
standing against imperialism, in spite of the Kurds’ long suffering from Arab 
chauvinism. And much like Ghassemlou, Talabani stressed the Kurdish willingness 
for unification with the Arabs, although stressing that “Kurdish nationalism 
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[qawmiyya – pan-Kurdism], like other nationalist movements, holds its legal right for 
the realisation of its own fate and though the scientific socialism views this right to 
the extent of separation and the constitution of an independent national state.”65 
During its first war against Baghdad, the Kurdish national liberation 
movement managed to obtain several, although rather limited achievements at the 
international level. In May 1963, the People’s Republic of Mongolia, probably under 
guidance by Moscow, appealed to the UN General Assembly to put the Kurdish 
question before the Assembly. Although the request was later withdrawn by 
Mongolia, it was the first time in which the Kurdish question was officially presented 
before the General Assembly. On July 9, 1963, the Soviet Union officially requested 
to put the Kurdish subject on the agenda of the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) in Geneva. This request was objected by Jordan (representing the Arab 
states), the Western members of the Council and India (which was most disappointing 
from a Kurdish perspective). Senegal, Ethiopia and Yugoslavia had abstained.
66
 
Expressing Kurdish hopes and disappointment about these votes, Ismet Sharif Vanly, 
a Lausanne-based academic and Kurdish political activist, complained that “The 
Kurdish case, in fact, has all the merits of deserving the full support of all the Afro-
Asian nations, who knew, like the Kurds do now, how bitter and degrading national 
oppression and exploitation are.”67 Sa’d Jawad noted that public support for the 
Kurdish cause was also documented in Israel, where public opinion inclined in favour 
of the Kurdish plight. This was partly due to the fact that the Kurdish insurgency 
hindered the ability of the Iraqi army to take part in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also 
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because of what was seen as the genocidal policies implemented against the Kurds by 
the Iraqi regime.
68
Another pattern set during this period of de facto control over parts 
of Kurdistan was that of internal struggles between Kurdish factions in times of 
ceasefire. Already in the late 1960s, Barzani and the KDP politburo, now led mainly 
by Jalal Talabani, started clashing over potential influence in the “liberated” areas, as 
they referred to them. The signs for the civil war which was to erupt eventually in 
1994 already appeared during the early 1970s, when both parties consolidated their 
control over different parts of Kurdistan. The KDP politburo established its power-
base in Sulaymaniyah, in the southern part of the Kurdistan region, while Barzani and 
his supporters gained control over the Dohuk and Erbil provinces in the north. 
 
3.5 THE 1970S: THE RISE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN, THE ALGIERS 
AGREEMENT AND THE FALL AND RESURRECTION OF THE KURDISH 
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN NORTHERN IRAQ 
The March Manifesto provided a much needed relief for both sides. The Kurdish 
militia, the Peshmerga (lit. those who face death) used the opportunity to recover 
itself, recruit new fighters and purchase new arms. The signing of the March 
Manifesto also buttressed the Kurdish sense of national self-consciousness and 
boosted their demands. Kurdish optimism was reflected in a statement issued by the 
KDP representation in Europe, praising the Ba’th party 
The declaration of March 11 constituted a great achievement for the Kurdish 
people since it ratified its right for autonomy [lit. self-rule] within the Iraqi 
Republic. It also constitutes a victory for the Iraqi people – Arabs, Kurds and 
other fraternizing minorities, the fruit of their sacrifice and the unity of their 
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joint struggle against colonialism and reactionism. It is also a victory for our 
Kurdistani Democratic Party and the Socialist Arab Ba’th party, as well as all 
other progressive parties and forces which have fought for a peaceful and 
democratic solution for the Kurdish question, for defeating the chauvinistic and 
reactionary policies, and stands against the repressive racism to which our 
Kurdish people have been subjected throughout the previous sad years of 
fighting.
69
 
Official Ba’th publications in the aftermath of the signing of the Manifesto took a 
similar line, emphasising the Ba’th’s recognition of Kurdish right to self-rule, and 
underlining the party’s progressive nature compared with racist Zionism. The Kurdish 
struggle was portrayed as a layer in the global struggle against imperialism and 
colonialism.
70
 Certainly, the first months following the signing of the March 
Manifesto were characterised by an apparent harmony between the central 
government, led by President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his deputy Saddam Hussein, 
and the Kurdish leadership. The government did implement some of the clauses of the 
March Manifesto, and especially those related to nominating Kurds for government 
positions. 
During this period, an important step toward the achievement of future 
autonomy was achieved, with its first stages taking place already prior to the signing 
of the March Manifesto. As pointed out by students of the war between Baghdad and 
the Kurds, the Kurdish guerrillas initially avoided taking over territory, since this 
meant the further burden of feeding and defending the civilian population, often at the 
expense of more successful attacks on isolated garrisons and military posts.
71
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However, due to the intense fighting, the Iraqi bureaucracy joined the army in its 
withdrawal from the region, leaving an administrative vacuum which drove the 
Kurdish leadership to reconsider their stand. This vacuum was filled by Kurdish 
deserters, lawyers, doctors, teachers and government officials, who chose to join the 
KDP ranks. With their modest means, they managed to establish rudimentary health 
services and village and district councils, which maintained some degree of law and 
order.
72
 Although initially small in number, the early 1970s, particularly near the 
emergence of the 1974 war between the KDP and the Ba’th regime, witnessed a 
growing influx of Kurdish professionals moving to the zones under the control of 
Barzani and the KDP. Reporting in 1974 from what he termed a “de facto autonomous 
region,”73 Lord Kilbracken, a vocal supporter of the rights of Kurds in Iraq, 
documented that: 
The influx of this new elite has altered the whole face of the revolution. Without 
it, Barzani could hardly have claimed, as he did when speaking to me, that a de 
facto independent state had now been established in the area under his control 
and influence. For it has made it possible to set up an effective civil 
administration, besides strengthening the revolutionary pesh merga army [the 
KDP paramilitary force].
74
 
This set the pattern which would recur in 1991, with the establishment of the KRG, 
and in 2003, after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, when large numbers of exiles 
and members of the diaspora would return to contribute to the reconstruction of 
Kurdistan. 
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The cracks in this harmony began to appear during the second year of the 
peace-agreement. Already in 1972 a US Department of State report envisaged the 
renewal of fighting between Baghdad and the Kurds, suggesting that “The Iraqi Kurds 
are once again soliciting outside support for a possible renewal of their civil war with 
the Iraq government.”75 During this time the Kurdish leadership began complaining 
that the Ba’th was not standing up to its commitments. One Kurdish complaint 
regarded the nomination of Kurds to key posts in the Iraqi administration.
76
 An even 
stronger case was made by the Kurds against what was described as the Arabisation 
of Kirkuk and some parts of the Ninveh (Ninawa in Arabic pronunciation) and Diyala 
provinces, namely their ethnic cleansing from their Kurdish population and a 
resettlement of Arab families from other parts of Iraq instead. In December 1973, the 
Information Department of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, in charge of propagating 
the Kurdish cause and based mainly in Europe, published a pamphlet in English 
entitled the “Arabization of Kurdistan.” According to this report, although the March 
Manifesto seemed like a “harbinger of goodwill and optimism,” the first sign of the 
Ba’th government’s insincerity toward solving the Kurdish question appeared already 
in the aftermath of the signing of the Manifesto, the most dangerous of whom was the 
“persistent pursuit of a policy of Arabization of Iraqi Kurdistan which continues up to 
the present.”77 
                                                          
75
 US Department of State, “The Kurds of Iraq: Renewed Insurgency?” 31 May 1972, FRUS 1969-1976 
IV (1969-1972), Doc. 310. <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d310> (June 
20, 2010). 
76
 A detailed report on the number of Kurds in each ministry and in the Revolutionary Command 
Council appears in a report presented in the summer of 1974 before delegates of a UN Seminar on the 
subject of national, ethnic and other minorities. See KDP, “A Paper on the Kurdish Problem in Iraq: 
Presented to the Delegates of the United Nations Seminar on the Rights of National, Ethnic and Other 
Minorities,” Ohrid, Yugoslavia, June 25 – July 8, 1974. 
77
 The Information Department of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, “Arabization of Kurdistan: Racialist 
Designs of the Ba’thist regime of Iraq,” December 1973 [place of publication not stated], 1-2. Kurdish 
claims were later reaffirmed by other studies, such as the Human Rights Watch Report on the Ba’th 
genocidal campaign against the Kurds. See HRW/Middle East, Iraq’s Crime of Genocide: the Anfal 
Campaign against the Kurds (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 22. 
122 
 
The latter point was directly linked with a third bone of contention between 
Baghdad and the Kurds, namely the definition of the autonomy of the Kurdistan 
region. The KDP presented a detailed autonomy plan to Baghdad on March 9, 1973. 
Very broadly, the autonomy plan demanded the foundation of a relatively wide self-
rule within a unified Iraq, in which both Kurdish and Arab nations would be equal. 
The autonomy plan stressed the necessity of Kurdish participation in the Iraqi central 
government on an equal basis, which meant proportional representation for Kurds in 
the legislative authority and at least one Kurdish vice president. It also demanded the 
formation of a legislative authority in Kurdistan, elected freely and directly by the 
region’s people. The legislative authority was to be in charge of taxation and running 
the regional budget. It was also to have power over setting regional economic, cultural 
and social development plans. The autonomous region was also to have an 
autonomous executive authority, accountable to the regional legislative authority and 
headed by an executive council. The executive authority was to have a ministry of 
education; a ministry of internal affairs, in charge of local police and security forces; 
and also ministries of health, finance and planning. The plan left foreign affairs and 
national security subjects in the hands of the central government, but demanded the 
evacuation of all national security forces from the region. The KDP’s autonomy plan 
insisted that the regional autonomy would have a “legal personality” in the Iraqi 
constitution.
78
 
The autonomy plan did not detail the geographic border of the region, but the 
KDP periodical in Arabic, al-Akrad, stated that “It is clear that the manner in which 
the Kurdish people practice their right of self-rule within the Iraqi Republic, based on 
the March Agreement, is in a Kurdish region based on the results of a general census 
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agreed upon a year ago in the above mentioned agreement. [The Kurdish region] is 
defined as the region whose majority of residents is Kurdish.” It added that the 
“Kurdistan region is not a singular unit, but divided into different provinces, some are 
purely Kurdish, like Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Dohuk, while others have some 
minorities, such as Kirkuk… Ninawa and Diyala.”79 The volume also added another, 
not so subtle, statement about Kurdish aspirations, declaring that 
Autonomy is not an alternative to the right of the Kurdish people to determine 
their own faith. However, the objective reality of the progress of the Kurdish 
liberation movement and the conditions and the circumstances relating to it 
necessitate using the banner of self-rule for the strengthening of the joint 
struggle against the aggressions of the [Iraqi Arab] Pan-Arabists [qawmiyyin].
80
 
Thus, the Kurdish leadership still viewed the preconditions for statehood that 
dominated the international society during this era, that is, the right of an ethnic 
majority in a region considered to be colonised by an external power, as constituting 
the Kurdish right for statehood. Interestingly, an article in the same publication also 
reviewed in detail the Autonomy agreement signed in Sudan between South Sudanese 
separatists and President Ja’far al-Nimeiri in Khartoum. This article stressed the 
details of the autonomy agreement, but also the debates revolving around the issue of 
federalism in Sudan and the question of language in the country. This reflected that 
the KDP and the Kurdish rebels were well aware of international developments with 
regard to self-determination and national liberation.
81
 
Ghareeb offers another cause for the understanding of the eventual eruption of 
the conflict. According to Ghareeb, it was the arms and training provided to Barzani 
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by the US, Iran and Israel that led to the war. True, during this period the KDP came 
to be seen by the Iranian security apparatus as a reliable proxy against the Ba’th 
regime. In April 1972 Baghdad signed a 15-year-long treaty of friendship and 
Cooperation with Moscow, which alarmed the Iranian Shah Muhammad Reza 
Pahlavi, as well as the Richard Nixon administration. The image of Iraq as a Soviet 
proxy was further strengthened with Baghdad’s nationalisation of the oil industry in 
Iraq, so far controlled by British and American corporations. Barzani further 
contributed to this emerging image of Iraq, arguing in a private conversation with 
Central Intelligence Agency officers (through its representatives in Washington DC) 
that “the Soviets are now controlling events in Iraq.”82 To counterbalance Iraqi power, 
both governments began providing the KDP and the Peshmerga with weapons, 
training and intelligence, jointly with another US ally in the region – Israel. According 
to Ghareeb, the new supply of arms and political support not only boosted Barzani’s 
confidence in his ability to fight Baghdad, but also allowed him to overcome any 
potential opposition from within the Kurdish camp.
83
 
One may assume that the arms and training provided to Barzani during this 
period played some role in his decision to eventually confront Baghdad. As appears in 
a correspondence between US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the Tehran 
Embassy, the former had to discourage Barzani from undertaking a military attack 
against the Iraqi army in October 1973.
84
 On the other hand, one should also bear in 
mind that Barzani and the KDP had already gone to war with Baghdad without 
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substantial external support, and without significant political backing, as in 1961, for 
instance. McDowall comes up with a more convincing explanation, suggesting that 
Ba’thist ideology, with centralisation as one of its main pillars, could not accept any 
form of decentralisation, and even more so one that challenges Arab hegemony over 
the whole of Iraq.
85
 
The mutual suspicion between both parties grew rapidly and local clashes 
began to take place between Iraqi security forces and Peshmerga fighters in some of 
the centres of controversy. Amid these developments, Baghdad changed its tone 
toward the Kurdish leadership. Not only did it now portray the Kurds as Iranian 
agents, but Ba’th publications also began to underline alleged cases of KDP’s 
brutality toward its internal opposition.
86
 In different cases, the Ba’th organs blamed 
the KDP for establishing nineteen prisons in the territory under its control, brutal 
attacks against Kurdish oppositionists and the shelling of villages that gave them 
shelter, sabotage, and “Preventing other national minorities from exercising their 
national rights.”87 Hence, Baghdad’s delegitimation of the KDP and Barzani did not 
refer solely to issues of nationalism and self-determination. Instead, the Ba’th directed 
at least some of its critique against Kurdish ability to run its own affairs in the areas 
under KDP/Barzani’s control. 
On 11 March, 1974, four years after the signing of the March agreement and 
the date set for the implementation of a mutually agreed upon autonomy law, Saddam 
Hussein presented the Kurds with an autonomy plan which emptied the idea of 
Kurdish autonomy of any significant content. Barzani rejected this proposal, sticking 
to his initial demand for a Kurdish autonomy free from the presence of the Iraqi army 
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and with wide political, cultural and economic freedom. Baghdad responded with a 
unilateral implementation of its proposed autonomy law. Barzani reacted by 
establishing an independent administration in the north, nominating eight ministers for 
education, health, financial affairs, internal affairs, justice and awqaf (religious 
endowments), housing, public works and agriculture. This in effect was a declaration 
of war and fighting broke out shortly after. 
During the first stages of the war, the Peshmerga inflicted heavy casualties 
upon the Iraqi army, which in turn retaliated by launching attacks against civilian 
targets. In 1975, nonetheless, Peshmerga successes in the battlefield suffered a major 
setback. In March that year, the Iranian Shah, the Kurds’ main source of support, 
signed a peace-agreement with Saddam Hussein in Algiers. According to this accord, 
Iraq withdrew its claims for the Shatt al-‘Arab river as well as other territorial claims 
which stood at the heart of its conflict with Iran. The Shah, in turn, committed to halt 
its support for the Kurds and to stop channelling American and Israeli aid. Under 
these circumstances, Barzani and the KDP were given an ultimatum to surrender and 
were allowed to flee to Iran. The Kurdish leadership had no choice but to surrender 
their arms and set off for a long exile, of which Mustafa Barzani never returned – he 
passed away from cancer in Washington DC in 1979. 
The departure of Mustafa Barzani and his people meant the defeat of the 
Kurdish revolt. The Ba’th government took no risk in suppressing the uprising and 
embarked upon a path of collective punishment. Reviewing captured documents on 
this period, a report by Human Rights Watch concluded that The Ba’th now reframed 
its aims from counterinsurgency to “physically redrawing the map of northern Iraq.”88 
Hundreds of Kurdish villages were razed in the governorates of Ninveh, Diyala and 
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Dohuk, their residents forcefully transferred to Southern Iraq and left with no housing, 
or with very primitive housing in government-controlled mujamma’at (collective 
settlements). Estimations of the numbers of deportees in the years following the revolt 
ranged from 28,000 families according to Ba’th reports,89 to 600,000 individuals and 
even more being deported to the mujamma’at according to others.90 The borders of 
the Kirkuk governorate were redrawn so as to exclude towns with Kurdish majority. 
These towns, among them Kalar, Kifri, Chamchamal and Tuz Khurmatu now became 
part of the Sulaymaniyah, Diwaniya and newly established Salah al-Din provinces. 
The purpose was to change the demographic characteristics of the governorate in 
order to undermine Kurdish claims over the region in the future. International reaction 
to the events in northern Iraq was mild in the better cases and non-existent at most. 
Most western governments preferred not to turn a blind eye to the events, partly 
because of economic interests in Iraq. Some protest, nevertheless, did come from the 
side of international aid organisations and reporters, particularly after Iran banned the 
access of aid-relief organisations to Kurdish refugees in its territory. 
Kurdish guerrilla insurgency within Iraq came to a halt. Activism now shifted 
to Turkey, particularly with the establishment of the Turkish Workers Party (known 
better as PKK, after its Kurdish acronym); and in Iran, where the revolution revived 
Kurdish aspirations for autonomy. The Kurdish liberation movement in Iraq post-
Barzani sank into a period of internal fighting and succession struggles. On the 1st of 
June, 1975, Jalal Talabani, the leader of the KDP politburo and its more leftist wing, 
established the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The new movement was based 
mainly on Talabani’s faction within the KDP as well as a coalition of other smaller 
movements with Marxist or socialist orientation. The KDP now organised itself in the 
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diaspora under the leadership of Idris and Mas’ud Barzani, Mullah Mustafa’s sons, 
and Sami ‘Abdul Rahman, a veteran Peshmerga commander.91 The fighting within 
Iraq was renewed in 1977, when the PUK Peshmerga launched several small scale 
attacks against Iraqi army targets. Both parties, nonetheless, gradually became 
consumed with internal, often bloody, skirmishes and competition, even inside the 
Kurdistan region. 
Iraqi Kurdish political activism now shifted mainly to the diaspora, with 
students and exiles now reviving the campaign of obtaining moral legitimacy for the 
Kurdish cause. Again, these publications emphasised the nature of Baghdad as an 
imperialist and colonialist power, with the Arabisation of Kirkuk portrayed as a 
project of colonisation. Maybe inspired by the emergence of the PKK, or maybe 
triggered by the rise of the PUK, KDP publications began taking a more Marxist-
Maoist tone, describing it as a revolutionary vanguard party that relies on urban 
guerrilla warfare. A publication issued in 1979 by the KDP’s (London-based) 
International Relations Committee, for instance, stated that 
Revolutionary action against imperialism has become a feature of our era. How 
can we allow ourselves, while engaged in a continuous revolution, to confine 
our military operations to the mountain peaks, away from the eyes of the broad 
masses and far from main interests, inside Iraq, of the fascist regime, that tries 
to hide the existence of the revolution by its propaganda at home… 
Revolutionary action in the urban centres of Iraq is the best reply to the racist 
settlement and forcible deportation and displacement of Kurds in Kurdistan.
92
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The Kurdish movements in Iraq, however, did not have much time to implement their 
new tactics. The 1980s witnessed the eruption of the Iran-Iraq War. This new phase 
provided some new opportunities for the Kurdish movements to unify in their fight 
against Iraqi authorities, but also witnessed some of the most aggressive policies taken 
by Baghdad against the Kurds. Somewhat paradoxically, the atrocities committed by 
the Ba’th regime against the Kurds were essential for the emergence of a de facto state 
in northern Iraq. 
 
3.6 THE PATH TO DE FACTO STATEHOOD: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, THE 
ANFAL CAMPAIGN AND THE CREATION OF THE KURDISTAN FRONT 
In 1979 Saddam Hussein became Iraq’s formal ruler after disposing of President Bakr 
in an internal bloodless coup. One of his most influential and, in retrospect, most 
disastrous decisions as president was the declaration of war on the Islamic Republic of 
Iran in September, 1980. Hussein had several incentives to declare this war. First, the 
new Iranian leadership headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini constantly used the 
secular Ba’th regime in Iraq as a target in its revolutionary discourse. Second, the 
predominantly Sunni Ba’th leadership feared that the rhetoric employed by the Iranian 
revolutionary regime and the general revolutionary zeal characterising its large 
neighbour would inspire revolutionary aspirations among the mostly oppressed Shiite 
majority in Iraq. In addition, Hussein was seeking to consolidate his own position 
within Iraq; this was particularly acute for him as the one who initiated the Iraqi 
concessions to the Shah in Algiers. Finally, weakened by continuous purges within 
the security forces and the administration, and subjected to power struggles between 
the different revolutionary streams, Iran seemed to Saddam Hussein as an easy 
130 
 
target.
93
 This proved to be a miscalculation on the side of the Ba’th regime and Iraq 
sank into a devastating war with Iran which lasted until 1988, costing the lives of 
millions of soldiers and civilians on both sides. 
Both the KDP and the PUK took part in the fighting from its early stages. The 
KDP Peshmergas served as scouts for Iranian forces and facilitated their occupation 
of the important frontier town of Hajj ‘Umran. Saddam Hussein retaliated by 
amassing the members of the Barzani tribe, killing 8,000 men and sending tens of 
thousands of the tribe members to mujamma’at in the south. The PUK, on the other 
hand, found it harder to collaborate with Iran. Talabani’s close relations with 
Ghassemlou, the leader of the KDP-Iran, and his own secularist agenda caused him to 
hesitate on siding with Iran. Based in Damascus, the PUK leadership still tried to 
maintain its image as a progressive movement and an element in the wider anti-
colonialist movement in the region.
94
 Therefore, Talabani tried to approach Baghdad, 
setting Hussein again with the Kurdish plan for autonomy, as well as demands to 
release Kurdish political prisoners and disband the Iraqi-supported Kurdish militias 
known as Jahsh (small donkey in Arabic). When these were rejected by Baghdad, the 
PUK joined efforts with the KDP.
95
 In 1987, both parties, together with five other 
smaller ones, established the Kurdistan Front (KF), an umbrella organisation aimed to 
facilitate the concentration of efforts against Saddam Hussein. 
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Constantly criticised for its cooperation with Iran, an international outcast at 
the time of war,
96
 the KF moved to justify its actions by presenting to the international 
community the continuous oppression of Kurds in Iraq and the violation of their most 
basic human rights. Once again, the Kurdish students’ organisations in Europe played 
an important part in the Kurdish interaction with the international community. The 
Kurdish Students’ Society in Europe (KSSE), for example, took a leading role in 
spreading information about the actions of Iraqi (and Turkish) forces against the 
Kurdish population in northern Iraq and in encouraging European solidarity with the 
Kurdish people.
97
 
The Anfal campaign, a punitive operation launched against the Kurdish 
population in Iraq between 1986 and 1989, has had a tremendous impact on Kurdish 
identity and interaction with the international community. Its main aims were to 
permanently uproot the Kurdish resurgence, destroy its infrastructure and deter the 
Kurdish population from supporting it. Kurdish writers have also described it as an 
effort to destroy Kurdish national identity. The campaign was orchestrated by ‘Ali 
Hassan al-Majid, Saddam Hussein’s cousin and the Secretary General of the Northern 
Bureau of the Ba’th party, although documents captured in 1991 reveal that it was at 
least partly planned from Baghdad. According to some estimates, between 50,000 and 
100,000 non-combatant civilians were killed during the campaign,
98
 with the highest 
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estimates reaching 200,000.
99
 Large scale campaigns against the Kurdish population 
had taken place before the Anfal campaign,
100
 but never on such a scale and in such 
an organised fashion. Kurds were indiscriminately executed and thousands of villages 
were razed by Iraqi forces and the Jahsh. Tens of thousands of these civilians were 
forced into the mujamma’at. One of the most lethal operations in the campaign was 
the attack on the town of Halabja, in the South Eastern part of the Kurdistan region, 
which was considered to be a Peshmerga stronghold. The attack resulted in the death 
of about 5,000 Kurdish civilians attacked with poisonous gas and became a symbol of 
Iraqi aggression against the Kurdish people.
101
 
The most important outcome of the Anfal campaign was that it enhanced the 
Kurdish motivation for disengaging from Baghdad. For many Kurds, the campaign 
signalled that freedom from Baghdad was necessary not only for maintaining their 
national identity, but for their physical survival. This was reflected vividly in the mass 
desertion of the Jahsh and Kurdish soldiers from the Iraqi army. According to one 
observer, the Anfal marked “the violent birth of an unwanted nation.”102 Furthermore, 
the Anfal campaign finally attracted the much desired international attention to the 
Kurdish question in Iraq. Before 1990, only a handful of reports about the events 
taking place in northern Iraq had reached the outside world. It was the end of the Iran-
Iraq war and the following that the Gulf-War which resulted in a flow of news about 
the massacre of the Kurds by the Iraqi government. It is not a coincidence that this 
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overlapped with the establishment of the KRG – revelations about the Anfal 
facilitated the establishment of the KRG and served the Kurds in justifying their own 
violation of one of the most important principles of international society: the sanctity 
of territorial integrity. 
The Kurdish discourse of self-determination and the justification for self-
determination moved to rely heavily on Iraq’s violation of the Kurdish people’s 
fundamental right – the right to life. Particularly during the early 1990s, KF’s 
leadership began emphasising the atrocities committed by the Baghdad regime to 
justify their seemingly separatist actions. For instance, in a session held by the 
Carnegie Endowment for Peace in July 1992, Talabani declared that: “This war in 
Kurdistan [the Iran-Iraq war] has introduced strong suspicion in consciousness of 
many Kurds about the viability of Iraq as a united entity, and thus determines the 
basis of Iraq's integrity.”103 And Mas’ud Barzani, in a visit to Halabja, declared that 
“For whenever the Kurdish people's issue is discussed anywhere, people will 
remember Halabjah and its tragedy. Indeed, Halabjah has promoted the Kurdish 
cause.”104 Najmaldin Karim, Talabani’s spokesman in Washington during the 1980s 
and the 1990s and one of the prominent figures in Kurdish informal diplomacy, when 
participating in a session held by the US Senate Committee of Foreign Relations on 
mass killings in Iraq, stated that 
There is… an Armenian state next to Turkey, which Turkey has recognized 
officially.  There is an Azerbaidzhan [sic] on the northern border with Iran, with 
25 percent of its population who are Azeris.  Why can't we have a Kurdish state, 
an Iraqi Kurdistan, and have the Kurdish people exercise the right of self 
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determination like the rest of the people of the world? … It's time for the 
international community to accept and go back to the days when President 
Wilson asked for self-determination for the Kurdish people, and the Seaver (sp) 
[sic] agreement also pointed the fact that the Kurds should have a homeland of 
their own. We ask your committee to come out in support of a Kurdish entity, to 
give the Kurdish people the right of self determination”105 
And in a final example, Kendal Nezan, a Turkish Kurd, the founder and chairman of 
the Kurdish Institute in Paris and a prominent advocator of the Kurdish cause in the 
diaspora argued that 
practically all the four million Kurds currently living under Baghdad's yoke will 
opt for independence of their country - a country which has suffered widespread 
devastation but which, given its considerable oil and water resources, would 
soon be able to rebuild itself and become prosperous… The Western powers 
and the Soviet Union which, by their connivance, their silence and their 
manifold support, particularly in military form, to the oppressors of the Kurds, 
would thus find a way to pay off their moral debt towards a martyred people.
106
 
In short, the Anfal drove further the Kurdish leadership to view statehood as a remedy 
for the severe and ever more aggressive oppression of the Kurdish people by the Iraqi 
authorities. In the last years prior to the complete collapse of Iraqi power in the 
region, Kurdish discourse about entitlement to statehood came to revolve mainly 
around the violent suppression of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq.  
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
In the twentieth century, then, the Kurds turned into a divided minority in the newly 
established nation-states now controlling Kurdistan. Consequently, the Kurdish 
struggle for national liberation, partly the result of the formation of these states, now 
became that of a peripheral minority struggling against an oppressive political centre. 
In Iraq, due to the nature of the state and the historical circumstances of its formation, 
as well as geopolitical conditions, the struggle for liberation was probably the fiercest. 
Inspired by wider political and historical developments, the Kurdish nationalist 
leadership came to view, and portray, their struggle as anti-colonialist and anti-
imperialist in nature, with the new nation-states and their administrative predecessors 
as the representatives of colonialism and imperialism. This was not merely an ad-hoc 
strategy, or a “recipe” for recognition. It was the product of constant interaction 
between Kurdish nationalists and the international community, through international 
forums in the aftermath of WWI, through exiles in European capitals, Kurdish 
students in Western and Eastern Europe and the exposure to other national liberation 
movements across Asia and Africa. Armed insurgency was the main tactic to achieve 
self-determination, but it was justified by the Kurdish remedial right for statehood. 
This remedial discourse, which marked most of the period of insurgency 
during the 1960s and 1970s, was gradually supplemented by the emphasis on the 
violence taken by the Iraqi government in its campaign to subjugate the Kurds to its 
control, especially in light of the Anfal campaign. In the decade to come, the Kurdish 
national liberation movement was to transform dramatically, together with the manner 
in which it would interact with the international community, its identity and its 
strategies. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE FIRST DECADE OF KURDISH DE 
FACTO STATEHOOD IN NORTHERN IRAQ: THE 
DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE, ITS COLLAPSE AND STEPS 
TOWARD REVIVAL, 1991-2001 
The Kurdish de facto state in northern Iraq emerged out of the devastation of the 
1980s, the First Gulf War and the period of chaos that followed it. This chapter 
reviews the formation of this de facto state and the transformation of the leadership of 
the Kurdish national liberation movement into the Kurdistan Regional Government in 
Iraq. It does so against the discussion provided in chapter 2 about the nature of de 
facto statehood and the impact of this status on the relations between de facto states 
and the international community. Therefore, it focuses on the two key aspects for 
understanding the de facto state; the process of transition from insurgency into 
governance, and the impact of this transition on the identity of the entity and its 
leadership and their interaction with the international community. By paying attention 
to these two key dimensions, the chapter seeks to explain the dramatic changes that 
characterised the first half of the 1990s, namely the beginning of the process of state-
building that took place with the inception of the KRG, the historical election 
campaign of 1992 and the ensuing Kurdish campaign of legitimation which focused 
on Kurdistan as a democratic experiment. The chapter argues that the transition into 
de facto statehood and to fledgling democratisation took place because the Kurdish 
leadership, through its interaction with the international community, perceived such 
steps as essential for solidifying its sovereignty over its territory and for legitimising 
its controversial step of taking over the administration of the region. 
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The chapter continues into the civil war that erupted in 1994 and lasted until 
1997. It argues that the civil war, which resulted in a practical division of the KRG, 
hindered, but did not terminate the state-building process in the region. While the de 
facto state in the region in fact ceased to exist during the war, it was recovered after 
the end of the civil war in 1997. The introduction of the Oil for Food Programme 
(OFFP) in 1996, as well as other forms of international aid before and after the civil 
war, all played an important part in sustaining the interaction between the Kurdish 
national liberation movement and the international community. 
All in all, this chapter serves to support one of the key arguments in this 
dissertation: the idea that with the transition of the national liberation movement into a 
de facto state, sovereignty, legislation and state-building become central to the foreign 
policy of the actor and its interaction with the international community. 
 
4.1 THE EMERGENCE OF A DE FACTO STATE: THE GULF WAR, 
UPRISING AND OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 
Saddam Hussein had various incentives for invading Kuwait. The almost decade-long 
war with Iran devastated the Iraqi economy. This compromised Hussein’s ability to 
sustain his network of patronage and support the Iraqi bureaucracy, which served as 
the main employee in Iraq. Kuwait’s vast oil reserves seemed like a remedy for Iraq’s 
economic problems. In addition, by invading Kuwait, Hussein hoped to put pressure 
on Saudi Arabia to erase Iraq’s debt following the large Saudi loans given to Iraq to 
support its war against Iran. Additionally, Iraq has long claimed Kuwait to be its 
province, usurped by the imperialists and their reactionary allies in an effort to gain 
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control over Arab oil.
1
 Finally, Hussein assumed that the international community 
would not intervene to protect Kuwait, either because of its silent support of Iraq 
during the Iran-Iraq war, or because of global circumstances and the end of the Cold 
War. Thus, on August 2, 1990, Hussein ordered his army to invade Kuwait. Soon after 
he ordered the annexation of Kuwait, whose royal family, Al Sabah, fled to Saudi 
Arabia. Hussein, however, miscalculated the Western reaction; alarmed by the 
violation of Kuwait’s sovereignty, and the threat to regional stability and international 
oil supply, a coalition of Western and regional powers, led by the US army, launched 
Operation Desert Storm against Iraqi presence in Kuwait on January 17, 1991. The 
alliance’s victory was swift and in February 1991 the shattered Iraqi forces fled 
Kuwait, not before burning Kuwait’s oil fields.2 
The collapse of the Iraqi military in Kuwait and the apparent weakness of the 
Ba’th regime led to a growing unrest in the Iraqi periphery. Encouraged implicitly by 
a statement made by the American President George H. W. Bush about the need of 
Iraqi people to get rid of Saddam Hussein, riots erupted among the Shiite community 
in the southern provinces in March 1991. Inspired by events in the south, spontaneous 
riots also erupted in the northern governorates. The uprising in the north, often 
referred to as the Kurdish (and Shiite) intifada, was initially a grassroots movement, 
led by former Jahsh fighters, who resented Saddam Hussein due the events of the 
Anfal. Soon, the KF got into the picture and took control over what now became a 
national uprising. Yet, the American implicit support of the uprising was soon 
abandoned. Pressured by Turkey and Saudi Arabia to prevent what was seen as the 
potential partition of Iraq, the allied forces allowed the Iraqi army to use helicopters to 
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suppress the riots. Still scarred by the events of the Anfal, the Kurdish population 
abandoned their towns and villages, fleeing en-masse to the safety of the Turkish and 
the Iranian borders. According to one estimate, about 450,000 Kurds concentrated on 
the Turkish border, while approximately 1.5 million fled toward the Iranian border.
3
 
Bearing in mind the refugee crisis during the Anfal campaign, Ankara became 
worried about the interaction between the newly arrived refugees and the Kurdish 
population in south-eastern Anatolia. The Turkish authorities now faced the need to 
distance the Kurdish refugees from the border, while still saving its international 
reputation. The Turkish President, Turgut Özal, suggested the establishment of a safe-
haven for Kurdish refugees on a small enclave in northern-Iraq. This idea was 
embraced by the coalition forces, themselves pressured by international public 
opinion, which was exposed to the images of the dire conditions of the Kurdish 
refugees. On April 5, 1991, the UN Security Council (UNSC) issued resolution 688 
which condemned Iraq for the repression of its people, “including most recently in 
Kurdish populated areas,” thus being the first UNSC official document to mention the 
Kurds explicitly.
4
 Although UNSC 688 did not define their mission in these terms, 
American, British and French forces established a no-fly zone in southern and 
northern Iraq, basing their decision on Resolution 688. The no-fly zones stretched 
northward of the 36th parallel and southward of the 32nd parallel. In the north, then, it 
eventually came to encompass the governorates of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Dohuk, in 
what came to be known as Operation Provide Comfort. The first stage of this 
operation lasted until the 24th of July, 1991. The second stage of the operation, which 
involved permanent protection of the Kurdistan Region, began on the same day. 
Under the auspices of the operation, the Iraqi army was also forced to withdraw from 
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the region, with the direct aim of protecting Kurdish population and the resettlement 
of the Kurdish refugees. Turkey as well played an important role in this operation by 
allowing the allied forces to use the Incirlik Air Base for the operation. 
The coalition forces made a clear effort to demonstrate their commitment to 
Iraq’s territorial integrity, stating overtly that the establishment of the safe-haven did 
not mean support for the foundation of an independent, or even autonomous, Kurdish 
entity. Turkey’s pivotal role in this operation was probably a good indication for the 
coalition’s intentions. The KF, worried about being abandoned by the coalition forces, 
desperately tried to negotiate with Saddam Hussein about the future status of the safe-
haven and the possibilities for Kurdish autonomy in the region. Yet, Hussein rejected 
any compromise with the Kurds, declaring that the safe-havens in Iraq were a 
violation of Iraqi sovereignty. He consequently ordered the withdrawal of the state 
apparatus, cutting all essential services to the Kurdish population as well as the 
salaries to the civil servants in the region. By so doing, Hussein was hoping that the 
Kurdish leadership would succumb to the difficulties and ask for the Iraqi return to 
the region. Much like his decision to invade Kuwait, Hussein’s calculation proved 
erroneous. Faced with no other choice, the KF started filling the administrative 
vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Iraqi state. It swiftly embraced the role of a de 
facto government in the Kurdistan, thus utilising the tragedy inflicted upon their 
people to take a major step in the way of achieving Kurdish self-determination. 
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4.2 DE FACTO AUTONOMY AND NEW IDENTITY: THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KRG AND THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT 
The KF now faced a brutal reality. It was subjected to a double embargo, one imposed 
by the majority of the international community on the whole of Iraq, including the 
Kurdistan Region; and one by Baghdad. This crisis was intensified by the mass return 
of Kurdish refugees from the Turkish and Iranian borders.
5
 The infrastructure of the 
region was devastated following years of fighting, and particularly the Ba’th punitive 
campaign against the Kurdish uprising. The KF’s leadership had very limited 
experience in running civilian affairs and, even more so, a political system. Jalal 
Talabani put it in the most vivid manner, stating in an interview with Gareth 
Stansfield that ‘we came from the mountains, we were trained as fighters, and now we 
had to run cities’.6 Mas’ud Barzani as well brought up similar claims in an interview 
with Stansfield, reporting that in meetings with Kurdish technocrats he stated that “his 
experience, and the experience of the peshmerga, were in destroying bridges, cutting 
electricity and destroying roads.”7 These tensions intensified political rifts within the 
Kurdish camp. A CIA report from the period identified rising tensions with regard to 
the question of autonomy in Kurdistan, noting that “Frustrated by the deep rift 
between Mas‘ud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, Iraqi repression, and the dwindling 
prospects for an autonomy agreement with Baghdad, local Kurdish tribal leaders and 
small rebel groups are taking more independent or extreme measures to oppose Iraqi 
government and gain a say in Kurdish politics.”8 
                                                          
5
 According to one estimate, out of almost two million refugees, all but 124,000 returned to the region 
during the first few months following the Ba’th withdrawal. See Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, 85. 
6
 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan (London: Routledge Courzon, 2003), 123. 
7
 Ibid, 122-123 [italics in origin]. 
8
 “Special Analysis: Iraq, Kurdish Radicalism on Rise,” CIA National Intelligence Daily, September 
27, 1991. <http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000498212/DOC_0000498212.pdf> (15/01/2011). 
142 
 
Facing this crisis, the KF was looking for ways to control its territory and 
somehow provide the basic necessities of the population in the region, without 
provoking regional powers to believe that the Kurds were actually seeking 
independence. Initially the KF used local committees to control the different districts 
of Kurdistan, each run by a different member organisation of the KF – a system 
common in cases of popular uprisings and guerrilla warfare. But the Kurdish 
leadership quickly realised the need to establish some sort of a central administration 
in the region. This policy was warmly embraced by members of the Kurdish diaspora, 
although the leadership on the ground, aware of its limitations, was somewhat more 
worried about the consequences. Yet, amid the growing tensions within Kurdistan and 
out of necessity to establish their power, the members of the KF agreed upon 
establishing executive and legislative authorities. By so doing, they realised the 
Kurdish aspiration for autonomous governance as articulated in the early Kurdish 
autonomy plans. 
The decision to hold regional elections was based on two considerations. The 
first was the increasing tensions between the PUK and the KDP about the division of 
power within the region. Elections were viewed as the only way to settle these 
controversies.
9
 The second reason was the need to guarantee international legitimacy 
for the existence of a Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq. Amid Baghdad’s constant 
accusation of the Kurds of undermining Iraq’s territorial integrity, and facing their 
usual portrayal as a backward element in the region, conducting democratic elections 
was seen as a means to legitimise the unpopular Kurdish autonomy. The first basic 
laws constituted by Kurdish legalists in preparation for establishment of the new 
administration in the region regarded the establishment and election of the Iraqi 
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Kurdistan Assembly and the Leader of the Kurdistan Region.
10
 The importance of this 
legislation and of elections were emphasised by one of the Kurdish legislators, who 
was involved in the process of establishing the National Assembly. As he argued: 
The democratic principle has been shown to have universal validity… the IKF, 
as a de facto ruling power… is taking the first step to catch the train of the 
civilized world. It intends to reconstruct Kurdish society on the basis of 
democracy and respect for human rights in accordance with international norms 
and agreements. It will demonstrate to the world that the people of Iraqi 
Kurdistan are capable of such self-government.
11
 
The dimension of securing domestic legitimacy, on the other hand, which has 
been presented by Nina Caspersen as an important incentive for governments of de 
facto states in going through some process of democratisation,
12
 was probably less 
relevant for the KF at this stage. Perceived as the liberators of Kurdistan, the KF 
enjoyed the Kurdish public’s support for the time being. Furthermore, many of the 
region’s residents were returning refugees, living in temporary shelters and 
experiencing the harsh living conditions of the Kurdish winter and were thus rather 
immobilised. Consequently, being able to provide stability and services to the Kurdish 
population was no less important for the legitimacy of the KF than the conduct of 
elections. 
The preparations for the election campaign reveal not only the Kurdish sense 
of urgency with regard the democratic transition, but also the further opportunities 
that democratisation, together with increased public exposure to the Kurdish tragedy 
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in Iraq, has provided for the Kurdish leadership to interact with different members of 
the international community. Election monitoring is one such example; the KF 
searched desperately for internationally-accepted observers to monitor, and thus 
legitimise, it regional elections. Correspondence between representatives of the KF 
and Michael Meadowcroft, a former British Liberal MP and the head of the Electoral 
Reform Society (ERS), a London-based NGO which took part in various election 
campaigns around the globe,
13
 offers some important insights about the role 
transnational actors could play in the early stages of the formulation of the KRG. The 
ERS, Meadowcroft reveals, was approached shortly prior to the designated date for 
the elections: 
The Electoral Reform Society has been invited to monitor the above elections. 
As you will see from the attached (confidential) memo, the first contact was 
only on the 28th April. Whereas normally ERS would not attempt to mount any 
election monitoring operation at such short notice, the special circumstances of 
the Kurds in Northern Iraq encouraged me to see what can be done to assist. 
Our initial enquiries suggest that preparations for elections have been carefully 
done, although there are inevitably a number of questions unanswered at this 
distance.
14
 
The preparations for this election campaign served as an opportunity for exiles and 
members of the diaspora to take part in what was happening in Kurdistan. 
Meadowcroft was approached by two members of the Kurdish exiles community in 
London, Burhan Jaf (later to become the KRGs representative to the EU) and 
Sherwan Dizayee, the KDP’s representative in the city.15 Correspondence with other 
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potential monitors took place simultaneously in the US as well, as demonstrated by 
one of the replies to Meadowcroft’s request for support from American NGOs: “NDI 
[Washington-based National Democratic Institute], too, has been approached by 
various Kurdish organizations to observe the May 17 elections.... Let me specifically 
draw your attention to the International Human Rights Law Group, which also is 
planning on sending a small team for the elections.”16 
The electoral process, the first of its kind in Iraq’s history, proved to be 
relatively free and fair. A publication issued by the ERC in the aftermath of the 
campaign described it as a “full and free expression of the wishes of the Iraqi Kurdish 
electorate.”17 The Election Law set a threshold of seven percent of the votes for 
entering the parliament, with five out of 105 seats in the parliament preserved for 
Christians. Only the KDP and the PUK managed to cross the high threshold. The 
Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK), another member of the KF, came third with 
five percent of the votes. The KDP gained a slight advantage over the PUK, in a rate 
of 51:49. Mas‘ud Barzani, however, agreed to a 50:50 division of seats with the PUK, 
in order to avoid conflict. Fearing the implication of the elections, both Turkey and 
Iraq strived hard to hinder the process of the elections, mainly by preventing 
volunteers from entering the region and even providing the basic essential elements 
for an election campaign, such as ink and ballot boxes (which were provided 
eventually by the UN).
18
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The apparent success in the election campaign was perceived as a milestone 
for the KF in establishing and proving its right to govern the region. Even before the 
KRG and the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) were formed, the Kurdish 
leadership began emphasising its now proven ability to control the Kurdistan Region. 
Again, influenced by the global geopolitical shift and the gradual rise of democracy as 
an entitlement for independence, as reflected in the case of the former Soviet and 
Yugoslav republics, Kurdish leaders were quick to stress their ability to run their own 
affairs. In one example, Falaq al-Din Kakai, a KDP representative in KNA, stated that 
In addition to its contemporary political significance the act [elections] has great 
historical and cultural meaning for the Kurdish people. It is the first law in the 
history of modern Iraq to be enacted by a de facto Kurdish authority exercising 
power and assuming decision-making rights within the Kurdish region of Iraq, 
irrespective of the central government in Baghdad. The resolution to hold a 
general election in Iraqi Kurdistan in May 1992 was a crucial element in this 
assertion of authority.
19
 
This perception also becomes evident in Talabani’s post-elections statements. First, 
Talabani rejected the idea that the elections should be seen as a step toward secession. 
This of course underlines the widespread idea that elections were perceived in the 
early 1990s as an essential step toward statehood. Yet, he also stated that he 
‘personally believe[d] that the elections proved that the Kurdish people are worthy of 
freedom and capable of engaging in democracy and the electoral process, despite the 
lack of experience' and that the ‘Kurdish people can exercise government in their 
region and that they deserve to enjoy the right to self-determination within a unified 
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democratic Iraq’.20 Mas‘ud Barzani, when launching the regional election campaign, 
declared to his audience that  
These elections should demonstrate to the entire world that when our people are 
given the chance, we can run our own affairs. The world should see that we 
know how to practise and entrench democracy, and how to live with the 
freedom and dignity which we have lacked so far because we have not been 
given a chance to exercise these rights.
21
 
And Finally, Hoshyar Zebari, a returnee from London and a key individual in the 
KDP’s foreign relations efforts, declared in an interview for the National Public 
Radio’s Morning Edition that 
We don't see a better alternative to this election, because we are in a race against 
time.  We have to get our act together.  We have to organize ourself [sic].  
People accuse the Kurds – that they are unstable element in this area, they are 
unable to govern themselves, they are unable to run their affairs.  We have to 
prove to the outside world that we are capable of that, and we will build 
democracy in our country for our people.
22
 
The association of democratisation with aspirations for independence are 
evident as well in the reaction of neighbouring states, as well as Baghdad, to the 
elections. Baghdad was the most vocal among them in its reaction to the campaign. In 
correlation with the events in the northern governorates, it chose to change its 
delegitimation tactics. Whereas in the past Ba’th representatives chose to describe the 
Kurds as either agents of external powers or as a primitive element in Iraqi society, it 
now targeted the Kurdish leadership’s ability to run regional affairs. Official 
governmental and Ba’th organs were quick to report real and invented calamities in 
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the Kurdistan Region due to KRG’s incompetence. In one instance, al-Qadisiyya, the 
Iraqi army’s organ, reported that 23 Kurds were shot dead by Talabani’s people in the 
city of Sumail, after demonstrating against Talabani and the PUK.
23
 This report was 
followed by a brief description about the chaos taking place in the Kurdistan region 
on the eve of the elections. On the same date, al-Thawra, the Ba’th organ, claimed 
that 39 Kurds died as a result of food poisoning, caused by grain imported from Iran 
by Talabani’s people.24 A report in the same spirit, alleging popular upheavals in the 
Kurdistan Region and clashes between the ‘gangs’ of Barzani and Talabani, also 
appeared in Babil, a newspaper directed by Uday Hussein, Saddam’s elder son: 
The angry protest demonstrations against what is known as the Kurdistan Front 
continued in the regions of Sulaymaniyah, Bdhinan and Chamchamal. The 
demonstrators protested against the actions of this front against the citizens of 
the autonomous Kurdistan region... [observers] added that the feelings of the 
protestors reveal the depth of the tragedy which this front has caused. 
The article also elaborates on inner fighting between Talabani’s and Barzani’s men, 
which also caused distress to the people of Chamchamal.
25
 
The Ba’th government’s anxiety about the elections even drove Saddam 
Hussein to contemplate the idea of sending troops to the region in order to halt the 
campaign, described as ‘illegal’ by the party’s spokesman.26 The national Iraqi News 
Agency declared the elections to be “without a judicial foundation and obeyed no 
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legal rule.”27 And when the KDP and PUK announced the establishment of the 
national unity government, based on the 50:50 agreement, the Iraqi official news 
agency accused the Kurdish leadership of “stealing fuel supplies sent by the 
government to northern Iraq, thus depriving the population there of required fuel” and 
thus causing “a strong wave of protests which is currently engulfing the governorates 
of Arbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah.”28 
The Iranian and Turkish governments demonstrated nervousness as well – and 
they had their own reasons – a CIA report from September 1992 revealed that “The 
recent achievements of Kurds in northern Iraq have reinforced the commitment of 
politically active Kurds in Turkey to change their own status. Hoping to emulate the 
May elections in Iraq, some Turkish Kurdish activists… speak of holding unofficial 
“elections” in the southeast to form a local Kurdish parliament. Iranian Kurds have 
also become more active this summer, although not on a scale of their Iraqi and 
Turkish counterparts.”29 An Iranian semi-official daily asserted that Iran, Syria and 
Turkey “are principally concerned about the destabilising effects of the recent 
developments in northern Iraq, and their unpredictable outcome which could only 
benefit countries not directly involved in the region.”30 Turkey chose to cope with the 
elections in two ways: official silence on the one hand, and military action on the 
other. Thus, the Turkish governmental official news agency, Ayın Tarihi [history of 
the month], almost completely ignored the elections. The only mentioning was a short 
report, commenting that “It was announced by Massoud Barzani, the leader of the 
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Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party, that the elections in Northern Iraq, which were due 
yesterday, had been cancelled because of Jalal Talabani's request regarding ‘the 
inefficiency of the ink in preventing multiple voting’.”31 Senior army officers, on the 
other hand, stated that the elections may lead to the continuation of instability and 
internal and regional violence. These statements were followed by a Turkish shelling 
of the region.
32
 
To some extent, one may argue that the worry expressed by the Turkish, 
Iranian and Iraqi governments was not entirely baseless. Even if the KRG usually 
distanced itself from the idea of secession, others did view the elections as a sign of 
the Kurdish path toward independence. Washington watched closely the 
developments in northern Iraq as, much like Turkey and Iran, it believed that elections 
signalled secessionist aspirations. When Saddam Hussein threatened to send soldiers 
to hinder the elections, the US remained committed to the protection of the safe 
haven, warning Baghdad that such action may invoke an allied-reaction. Nonetheless, 
it stressed that “We and our coalition partners have made it clear to Saddam Hussein 
and the Iraqi regime that Iraqi forces should not engage in repressive actions against 
the people of Iraq.”33 Not only the US, but also UN agencies preferred to keep silent 
on the matter of the elections in Kurdistan. Fearing of enraging Saddam Hussein 
during this period of instability, and remaining loyal to the principle of territorial 
integrity, no UN agency took part in the elections, even not as observers. The only aid 
provided by the UN to the process was the provision of indelible ink and ballot boxes. 
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Albeit casting doubt at the ability of the elections to solve the real problems of 
the Kurdistan Region, “that nobody else has any control over,” the UK-based weekly 
The Economist maintained that “The Kurdish “safe haven” in northern Iraq was never 
meant to be a state. That has not stopped the Kurds from organising an election.”34 
John Gittings, a journalist and a researcher, linked, as well, elections and sovereignty. 
Shortly prior to the elections he stated that 
Next month the region's first free elections will be held in Iraqi Kurdistan - with 
2.5 million ballot slips supplied by the UN - to earn the essential democratic 
credentials of the new age. If that is not independence in action, what is? The 
contrast with Ankara's repression in south-east Turkey will only become more 
marked...
35
 
Michael Meadowcroft, as well, acknowledged the association between democratic 
elections and a change in the status of the Kurds. In one of his correspondences with 
regard to the elections he noted that “Also, given the continuing tension in the region, 
“successful” elections in the Iraqi Kurdish Autonomous Region will no doubt be 
valuable in enhancing the Kurds’ status.”36 In fact, Meadowcroft seemed committed 
to the idea that complying with international norms of governance would lead to a 
change in the status of the Kurds. Already prior to the elections he encouraged the KF 
to try and sign the Geneva Conventions, writing to British Labour MP Ann Clwyd 
that “The conventions help identifiable groups within country – i.e. like the Kurds – 
themselves to accede to the Conventions, and we have been discussing the benefits of 
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such action with Kurdish representatives here. They are keen to look into the 
possibility of their leaders signing the conventions.”37 
In sum, the 1992 elections marked a significant step on the path toward 
consolidating Kurdish sovereignty over the now “liberated” Kurdish provinces. This 
perception was shared by the Kurdish leadership, its neighbours and different 
members of the international community. The Kurdish decision to go for elections 
resulted, to a great extent, from its understanding that such a step is necessary to 
maintain its autonomy for international as well as domestic reasons. In retrospect, the 
emphasis on the elections process as a symbol of democratisation was indeed 
somewhat superficial and simplistic and, as shown later, also disastrous for the 
process of state-building in Kurdistan. But in 1992 it was viewed as a milestone in the 
process of change in Kurdistan, bringing about more developments in the process of 
state-building. 
 
4.3 INITIAL STEPS OF STATE- AND INSTITUTION-BUILDING 
As part of the unity government agreement between the KDP and the PUK, the two 
parties agreed to equally share the ministerial portfolios. For each ministry given to 
one party, a deputy minister was nominated from the other party. Each deputy 
minister had the right to veto decisions made by his minister. The premiership was 
given to Fouad Masoum of the PUK. At this time, Talabani and Mas‘ud Barzani 
agreed not to take any official role in the KRG, other than the leadership of the PUK 
and the KDP respectively. The KNA was inaugurated on June 4, 1992 in Erbil and its 
principles and procedures were defined as: legislating laws; debating and deciding 
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critical issues facing the Kurdish people, as well as determining the legal relationship 
with Baghdad; naming the PM; supervising the government; and more. Although 
subjected to constant interferences by the parties, the parliament did function as a 
sphere for public debate, even if a limited one. According to Stansfield, until 1996 the 
KNA held more than 200 ordinary and special sessions and promulgated 140 laws and 
resolutions.
38
 
Soon, the newly established administration began to receive substantial aid 
from international organisations, governmental and non-governmental alike. The most 
urgent task for the Kurdish leadership, even prior to the establishment of the KRG, 
was the resettlement of the mass influx of Kurdish returnees and internally displaced 
refugees. This was done with the help of the UN High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR), as well as various INGOs. In fact, due to the Ba’th government’s attitude 
toward foreigners, particularly from the US and the UK, most international aid to Iraq 
in the early 1990s concentrated in the Kurdistan Region. About 78 percent of the 
British Overseas Development Administration (later to become the Department for 
International Development) aid budget and about two thirds of the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) budget in Iraq were directed to the Kurdistan 
Region. USAID and other international organisations in fact had their headquarters in 
the town of Zakho, in the north of the region on the Turkish border. They were soon 
joined by other organisations such as the German Caritas, the Australian CARE, 
Oxfam, Save the Children, Christian Aid and more. These organisations became even 
more important for the development of the Kurdistan Region. Whereas the UNHCR 
was forced to comply with Baghdad's demands and avoid any action which might 
                                                          
38
 Indeed, the symbolic significance of the parliament is reflected by the fact that even during the 
fiercest chapters of the civil war, and even after the practical division of the KRG, the parliament 
remained unified and functioning, the only symbol for some unity. See Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 
135-136. 
154 
 
have been perceived as a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty,39 many NGOs chose to 
ignore Iraqi demands and subsequently became “illegal.” These organisations took 
upon themselves to resettle the Kurdish refugees and rehabilitate their destroyed 
villages. They also established hospitals in rural areas, while the UN set water 
sanitation projects in various villages in the region.
40
 In addition, a new education 
system was established in the region, with schools built by INGOs and teachers’ 
salaries as well as school feeding programmes, were funded by those organisations.
41
 
Kurdish was now introduced in the region as an official language of governance and 
education. Kurdification, as Natali refers to it, took place in media, public spaces 
(street names), and of course the education system, with schools and universities 
being established or reopened.
42
 
Isolated from the rest of Iraq due to the embargo, the KRG was forced to 
develop an independent economic system. For instance, the embargo meant that the 
KRG did not adopt the newly introduced Iraqi Dinar, instead continuing to circulate 
the old Iraqi currency. This in fact saved it from the hyperinflation that hit the rest of 
Iraq during the 1990s,
43
 but this was a very limited success. The task of building an 
economic system in the region proved to be impossible in the early years of the 1990s. 
International aid tried to revive local agriculture, which was devastated by the Anfal 
campaign. The international embargo, however, meant the closure of traditional 
markets for Kurdish products in Iraq. More importantly, international aid failed to 
mechanise agriculture in the region or to recover private industry which had existed 
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during the early 1980s.
44
 The KRG made an effort to demonstrate that it could extract 
oil from the oilfields in its territory and established a national oil corporation, 
KurdOil, which was registered in, and run from, London. Nevertheless, the KRG had 
neither the capacity to extract oil in commercial quantities, nor the means to export 
it.45 The attempts to extract and export oil, therefore, could be seen mainly as an effort 
by the Kurdish leadership to demonstrate to the international community its economic 
vitality, its ability to survive if only given the opportunity to administer its region. In 
other words, the initial efforts to extract oil in the region joined the democratic 
transition as another element in the construction of the KRG’s de facto statehood.46 
Oil has always played an important role in the mind of the Kurdish leadership, which 
had hoped already in the 1970s to attract international support based on its potential to 
become an oil producing state. The small amounts of oil that were extracted oil were 
smuggled into Turkey in trucks through the Ibrahim Khalil border passage, near 
Zakho. Thus, the KRG remained reliant on the black economy of smuggling, which 
emerged as the main semi-private industry in the region.
47
 
Their sincere desire to help the struggling Kurdish population notwithstanding, 
UN agencies and other NGOs were always cautious not to allow international aid to 
appear as undermining Iraqi territorial integrity. The aid from the beginning intended 
to rehabilitate the population, but not to build a Kurdish capacity for self-governance. 
Even works on infrastructure were impeded in order not to encourage Kurdish 
autonomy or make a controversial move with regard to the natural resources in the 
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region. Aid also did not lead to major social transformations within Kurdistan. The 
family remained the main social network in the Kurdish individual’s life, which 
particularly hindered the development of the status of women. In fact, during the first 
years of KRG’s existence, the situation for women probably worsened.48 Ba’thist 
centralisation legacies remained dominant in regional political thinking and the 
Kurdish leaders often preferred to consult their parties’ politburos rather than the 
KNA. The efforts to aid the reconstruction of the Kurdistan Region without 
implementing substantial structural changes in both the economy and society, and 
with the constant attempt to limit the KRG’s capacity for self-governance had the 
undesirable effect of turning the UN agencies and NGOs into an alternative for the 
former Ba’thist welfare state.49  
Reviewing the inherent problems in the early 1990s aid campaign, two NGO 
activists in the Kurdistan Region, Ronald Ofteringer and Ralf Backer, have contended 
that “UN and nongovernmental organization activities… directed by the large donor 
nations, have actually obstructed the rehabilitation of Kurdish society and 
compromised the option of self determination.”50 This is a harsh judgement. In spite 
of its obvious problems, international aid was essential for the evolution of the KF 
into a de facto state. Probably unintentionally, the aid relief operations by INGOs also 
facilitated the nascent process of state-building in Kurdistan. It was this aid that 
initially provided the KF with some basic lessons on how to run the affairs of cities 
and civilian politics. It thus allowed the KRG to consolidate its domestic sovereignty 
within what now came to be known as “Free Kurdistan.” Moreover, international aid 
did ease the conveyance of new norms into the Kurdistan Region. The elections in the 
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region constituted one factor in this transformation, but it was also supplemented by 
the creation of what Denise Natali has described as a “legal framework in which to 
integrate civil society into local authority structures, including laws that expanded the 
rights of ethnic and religious minorities and procedures for public demonstrations. 
Trade Unions, youth groups, media agencies, and local NGOs emerged and started to 
mobilize for educational reform, women’s rights and individual freedom.”51 The 
INGO's role in constructing the KRG also provided these external actors with 
channels to actually express their views about good governance and tried to guide the 
KRG. The strategy that such organisations took was to bind together democracy with 
development and recognition, though such mechanism of action would become far 
more relevant in later decades.  
Amid the difficulties, then, the KRG managed to establish its domestic 
sovereignty in the ‘liberated territories’ or ‘free Kurdistan’, as referred to by the 
Kurdish leadership and the Kurdish diaspora. This apparent success, as limited as it 
may have been, became a central principle in the KRG’s construction of its 
“alternative legitimacy,” to borrow Madsen’s term,52 in its interaction with the rest of 
international society. Trying to prove to the West that the KRG is a worthy object for 
protection and support, the KRG began to employ the discourse of “earned 
sovereignty,” stressing its apparent success in democratisation and state-building. The 
most important theme in the KRG’s campaign for international legitimacy was that of 
the KRG as an experiment in democracy, alternated sometimes with the term 
democratic experiment. 
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4.4 CONSTRUCTING ALTERNATIVE LEGITIMACY: THE DEMOCRATIC 
EXPERIMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
Perhaps the best example for the increasing dominance of the democratic experiment 
discourse in the KRG’s campaign for international legitimacy was in a July 1992 
meeting held in the Washington DC-based Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. In this meeting, representatives of the Kurdish parties presented their case as 
part of a meeting of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) – the umbrella organisation of 
opposition movement to the Ba’th government. Whereas the Anfal campaign, the 
Ba’th genocidal campaign which resulted in the death of at least tens of thousands of 
Kurdish civilians, was mentioned only once, at least 11 references were made to the 
democratic nature of the recently established KRG and of the Kurdish people in 
Iraq.
53
 The term “democratic experiment” was brought up frequently to counter any 
challenges posed to the KRG’s domestic and Westphalian sovereignty by one of its 
surrounding actors. When Turkey, Iran and Syria met in Ankara in November 1992 to 
discuss the development in northern Iraq, Talabani protested that “They [Turkey, Iran 
and Syria] start to think that they must forget their many differences and problems, 
and unite and scheme to destroy the Kurdish revolution, frustrate its democratic 
experiment, and take it back to the starting point.”54 
The same rhetoric was used to criticise internal opponents of the KRG. When 
PUK Peshmergas clashed with the militia of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan 
toward the end of 1993, Talabani blamed Iran for interfering in the KRG’s affairs, 
holding that it ‘wants to cause tension and trouble in Iraqi Kurdistan and foil the 
                                                          
53
 For the conference’s proceedings see “Special Conference or Speech about the Middle East,” 
Federal News Service, July 30, 1992. 
54
 Voice of the People of Kurdistan, November 15, 1992, as cited by BBC SWB, “PUK Radio Criticises 
Ankara Talks on Northern Iraq,” November 17, 1992, ME/1540/A/ 1 
159 
 
democratic experiment there’.55 In another example, when Francis Yusuf Shabu, an 
Assyrian member of the KDP was assassinated in Erbil in June 1993, the KDP 
released a statement in which it declared that “The new and unique democratic 
experiment in Iraq's Kurdistan received the admiration of all democrats and freedom-
loving people in the civilised world and drew the interest of many militant nations and 
movements.”56 And when the PKK renewed its attacks on Turkish targets from the 
KRG’s territory without the latter’s consent, Talabani came out against the PKK for 
‘working to abort our democratic experiment and remove our parliament’.57 
The Kurdish discourse about the democratic experiment facilitated the Kurds 
in furthering their deliberation with the international community about the nature of 
statehood in general, and the Kurdish question in particular. A brief review of 
international media from the early 1990s reveals a vibrant discussion about both 
subjects. American and European commentators used the opportunity to criticise the 
international community’s double standard in refusing to discuss the new reality in the 
region. David Keen, a British academic, urged the international community to 
increase its support for the Kurds in Iraq, highlighting as well the “Kurdish 
experiment in Democracy.”58 Julie Flint, a British journalist and a commentator 
covering the situation in post-war Iraq, criticised the West for not providing the 
essential financial help to sustain the Kurdish experiment in democracy: “Operation 
Provide Comfort still extends military protection against Saddam's worst excesses, but 
there is little concern for the economic protection without which the Kurds' 
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democratic experiment cannot succeed.”59 Although much rarer, one could also find 
voices within the Arab world that called for some reconsideration of the status of the 
Kurds. One Arab commentator, for instance, stated in 1993 that 
With regard to Iraq, my opinion is that the Kurdish issue must not be solved 
partially in Iraq alone, but its solution must be comprehensive, as it might 
weaken the Iraqi state especially since Iraqi Kurdistan includes the lion’s share 
of Iraq’s oil richness. This, nevertheless, should not undermine the importance 
and the need to establish a democratic regime in Iraq, which would give the 
Kurds autonomy or a federal entity within the framework of the unified Iraqi 
state, in the form of a federal union.
60
 
An even more remarkable sign for the increasing legitimacy of the Kurdish de facto 
autonomy was a meeting held between King Hussein of Jordan and Barzani and 
Talabani. For the King it was an opportunity to distance himself from his earlier 
support of Saddam Hussein.
61
 Though Talabani and Barzani were formally welcomed 
as Iraqi oppositionists, rather than Kurdish liberators, this was the first time in which a 
prominent Arab leader publicly met with the two symbols of the Kurdish national 
liberation in Iraq since Nasser’s days. 
Whereas the West preferred to shun away from the Kurdish question in 
northern Iraq, trying to observe the developments in the region without directly 
interfering, Turkey’s approach to the KRG went through some important, even if 
limited, transformations. Truly, the elections in the Kurdistan Region alarmed Ankara, 
which was one of the main veto-powers with regard to any change in the status of the 
Kurdistan Region. Soon, nevertheless, the True Path Party-led government in Ankara, 
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under the premiership of Süleyman Demirel, recognised some potential for 
cooperation with the KRG. The instability in the Kurdistan Region in the aftermath of 
the Gulf War provided the PKK with an opportunity to establish bases on the Turkish 
border from which to attack Turkish targets. Because of its dependence on Turkey, 
and because of its need for international legitimacy, the KRG seemed to Turkish 
policy-makers as a potential partner in its plans to remove PKK elements from the 
border region. The main challenge for Ankara was to come up with a policy which 
would allow it to cooperate with the KRG without enabling Kurdish secessionist 
aspirations and plans. Almost paradoxically, both Barzani and Talabani became 
welcomed guests in Ankara, meeting the most senior Turkish officials, including 
Demirel and President Özal.
62
 Already in November 1992 Barzani and Talabani were 
provided with Turkish passports, which allowed them to travel freely outside of Iraq 
and Turkey, a decision that stirred some controversy within the Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi (TBMM), the Turkish Parliament.
63
 Additionally, both the KDP and PUK 
were allowed to open official representations in the Turkish capital, which were 
important for the liaison between the Kurdish parties and the Turkish leadership. Soon 
these offices came to function as quasi-embassies hosting parties and meeting with 
representatives of other states. The discussions in these offices revolved around 
“security matters, political developments in the region, relations with neighbouring 
countries and with Europe, etc.”64 Naturally, this enraged Ankara, which realised that 
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its policy was in fact enhancing the autonomy of the KRG.
65
 These representations 
also “contributed to the economic survival of the Kurdish de facto state.”66 And later 
they came to serve as a model for other representations later to be opened in other 
capitals, such as London, Washington DC and Paris, to begin with.
67
 
On the other hand, Ankara did gain some cooperation with the KRG with 
regard to the PKK. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, Turkey launched several 
incursions into the Kurdistan Region. The largest of them took place on March 20, 
1995, when about 35,000 Turkish soldiers invaded Iraq in an operation which lasted 
43 days. Although Ankara did not publicly acknowledge such cooperation, one 
observer noted in 1993 that “Cooperating with Turkey to the north, where 10 million 
Kurds live, Pesh Merga fighters behind Massoud Barzani successfully took on the 
Marxist terrorist Kurds. This helps remove Turkish fears of a territorial threat from an 
autonomous region that might turn into an independent country called Kurdistan.”68 
After 1997, Turkey ceased to launch large-scale operations, but still kept standing 
forces within the KRG’s territory, whose numbers, according to some estimates, may 
have reached 8,000.
69
 As Mahmut Bali Aykan suggested, such intervention could be 
taken only under the auspices of operations Provide Comfort and Poised Hammer, as 
they legitimised the violation of Iraq’s (in reality the KRG’s) territory.70 
One may say, therefore, that when it came to Turkey, the KRG had taken a 
different line in its attempt to prove its earned sovereignty. Under Turkish pressure, it 
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preferred to highlight its ability to contribute to regional stability, through countering 
the undermining element which was the PKK. It should be noted that the KRG had its 
own interests in countering the PKK. The latter movement, still facing a coherent and 
efficient war machine, i.e. the Turkish military, was far more radicalised than the 
PUK and the KDP. Its leadership considered the withdrawal of the Iraqi state from the 
region as an opportunity to establish an independent Kurdish state and was highly 
critical of the KRG for not making this step.
71
 Its policy of launching attacks against 
Turkish targets was part of the challenge it set to the KRG. On the other hand, one 
should not underestimate the dilemma facing the KRG in cooperating with Turkey. 
Not only did it sympathise to some extent with the PKK, as another Kurdish national 
liberation movement, but, by consenting to Turkish incursions, even grudgingly, and 
with not much choice, the KRG became exposed to domestic criticism. 
In 1994, the Kurdish endeavour to consolidate domestic sovereignty over the 
three “liberated” provinces in northern Iraq suffered from a major setback, as the 
KRG plunged into a devastating internecine war between its two leading elements, the 
KDP and the PUK. This war resulted in the administrative division of the KRG and 
set a major challenge to any attempt to legitimise the KRG in the future. 
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4.5 THE DESCENT INTO A CIVIL WAR AND THE DEMISE OF THE 
EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY 
Factionalism has been endemic in the Kurdish nationalist movement from its early 
days and partisan affiliation had served as a source of armed clashes on various 
occasions, all over Kurdistan. Already during the late 1970's, the PUK and the KDP 
were fighting each other over territory and control. Some have tended to blame 
internal fighting on the tribal nature of the Kurdish society.
72
 Tribalism may have 
played a part in the civil war, as tribal forces were mobilised by both parties against 
the other. But such a claim, nonetheless, is essentialist in nature. Civil wars and 
internal conflicts erupt under various circumstances and ideology, often, is of no less 
importance than so called “primordial” sentiments. Defining the PUK as a tribal actor 
ignores the fact that the movement was founded by urban intellectuals with Marxist 
inclinations. Even in the KDP, led over long periods by the tribal leader Mullah 
Mustafa Barzani, the power of tribal elements had waned down during the 1970s. 
Rather, power political factors can better explain the descent into a civil war. 
The prelude to fighting between the PUK and the KDP were the armed clashes 
between the PUK Peshmergas and the IMK fighters. Led by ‘Uthman ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, 
the IMK forces managed to take over several towns, including the town of Halabja, 
and establish there a short-lived enclave toward the end of 1993. Those, nevertheless, 
were soon retaken by the PUK forces. However, developments during the month or so 
of fighting exposed the rift between the PUK and KDP and intensified mutual distrust 
and suspicion in the region. The PUK Peshmergas, under the leadership of the 
Minister for Peshmerga Affairs, Jabar Farman, refused to adhere to the orders of 
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Barzani, who functioned as a member of the presidential council, to restrain the 
fighting. Rather, the PUK forces inflicted heavy losses upon the IMK supporters. This 
exposed the fragile decision-making process within the KRG and essentially marked 
the beginning of the deterioration into civil war.
73
 
The fighting was triggered by a minor land dispute between junior members of 
the KDP and the PUK in May 1994. Several reasons have been thought to explain the 
breakout of civil war. Gunter, in one observation, blames disputes over the income 
from taxes levied on smugglers at the Ibrahim Khalil border passage, as a cause for 
eventual deterioration into war. The KDP’s dominance in the area of the border 
passage led to tensions about the use of income from the border.
74
 Elsewhere, he 
mentions the PUK’s assumption that changes in the balance of power in the KRG, 
following the joining of Sami ‘Abdul Rahman’s Kurdistan Unity Party to the KDP, 
made its leadership believe that it could not win the 1995 elections, which eventually 
drove it to launch a military coup, instead.
75
 Gareth Stansfield traces the sources of 
the war, at least partially, to inherent flaws in the democratic experience. Rather than 
relating it purely to greed, he also hinges the fighting in the Kurdish lack of 
experience with running civilian affairs and the Kurdish zeal toward democratisation. 
As each member of the KF had a veto power over the government’s decision, 
decision-making processes in the region became sluggish and inefficient. The inability 
to reach political decisions and negotiate eventually led to military clashes.
76
 Burhan 
Jaf, in contrast, blamed the eruption of war on personal rivalries between Talabani and 
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Barzani, amplified by the intervention of external actors, such as Iran (through the 
IMK).77 
The local clashes between the Peshmerga forces soon deteriorated into a full 
scale civil war, whose brutality exceeded any past conflict between the two parties. 
Both parties committed atrocities against each other, such as executing prisoners from 
each others' camps, or using torture methods which seemed to be taken straight from 
the Ba’th prison chambers. First mediation efforts were initiated by Ankara, which 
witnessed how regional instability contributed to a surge in PKK activism. It was also 
joined by members of the Kurdish diaspora. Talks took place in the Kurdish Institute 
in Paris and were observed by Turkish, British and American representatives in 
addition to prominent members of the Kurdish diaspora, such as Najmaldin Karim and 
Kendal Nezan. The talks resulted in a short cease-fire, which was interrupted, 
paradoxically, due to Turkish refusal to allow the PUK delegation to travel to Paris 
through its territory.
78
 
The second round of fighting witnessed the continuation of brutality and 
bloodshed, with cases of unlawful and deliberate detention of combatants, executions 
without trials, and even the killing of civilian protesters and political activists as 
condemned by Amnesty International (AI).
79
 During the fighting both parties relied 
heavily on external support, with Syria, Iran and the PKK occasionally supporting the 
PUK and Turkey providing assistance to the KDP. The low point of the conflict, 
however, took place in January 1995, when the KDP turned to Saddam Hussein for 
help against the PUK forces that captured Erbil. Upon their entrance to Erbil, the Iraqi 
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forces rounded up and executed members of the INC that were taking refuge in the 
region, in what was probably the price demanded by Saddam Hussein for his 
intervention.
80
 The PUK forces fled to the mountains, only to retaliate later in 1996, 
occupying Sulaymaniyah with the help of Iranian forces. The final round of fighting 
took place in 1997 but did not change the territorial realities set in 1996. On 
September 17, 1998 Talabani and Barzani signed a peace agreement, brokered by 
American president Bill Clinton. In this agreement, the Kurdish leaders declared their 
intentions to unite, willingness to counter PKK fighters in the region, and denying the 
entrance of Iraqi troops into the region. 
The war had a devastating impact on the KRG and its process of state-
building. Although there is no validated statistical data, it is estimated that it resulted 
in the death of thousands of Kurds and the deportation of tens of thousands from their 
homes. It caused the destruction of infrastructure and in fact wiped out almost any 
development achieved by the KRG. It greatly hampered the activity of NGOs in the 
region, mainly due to the predatory policies of local warlords, levying taxes on, and 
sometimes even commandeering, aid products.  The Iraqi incursion into the region led 
all government-supported American NGOs to “leave in fear of Iraqi reprisals against 
them.”81 Perhaps most devastating to the Kurdish cause was the division of Kurdistan 
into two separate administrations, one led by the PUK and controlling the 
Sulaymaniyah governorate; and the other covering the Erbil and Dohuk governorates, 
and ruled by the KDP. The KNA remained standing, but now lost any significance as 
a platform for debate and argumentation about the future of the Kurdish cause. Each 
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region was now run by an independent administration with its own ministries and 
security forces. Movement between the new regions was severely limited and so was 
collaboration with regard to the fighting against Baghdad, at least in the first post-war 
years. 
The division and self-inflicted devastation of Kurdistan heavily damaged the 
KRG’s image and the legitimacy it had managed to obtain during the first years of its 
existence. In particular, the KDP’s turning to Baghdad projected negatively on the 
image of Kurdish domestic sovereignty. One report portrayed the fighting as the 
“undeclared demise” of the Kurdish rule over their territory, as it “could prompt its 
Western protectors and regional powers to tolerate an intervention by President 
Saddam Hussein's forces.”82 Similar views were held by Kurdish politicians and 
intellectuals. Jaf, for instance, argued that “the Kurdish democratic experiment has 
failed,” adding that “Unfortunately, the collapse of the free-Kurdistan experiment is 
more possible now than ever before, and the principal reason is the intra-Kurdish 
strife.”83 Fawzi al-Atroushi, a pro-autonomy Kurdish journalist, sadly noted that “the 
outcome of what gathered today has tainted all the songs of praise which we 
composed for the right of this experiment, referred to as democracy, in Iraqi 
Kurdistan.”84 The Kurdish movement in Iraq, he contended, “is the gravity centre for 
the entire Kurdish nationalist movement and the sinking of the Kurdish project in 
Iraq, its entry into a dark tunnel and the fading of the glowing shine of the Kurdish 
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parties in the region was a striking blow to the extension of this movement all over 
Kurdistan…”85 
In spite of the demise of its political structure, the autonomous region 
remained geographically intact. The gloomy predictions about Western abandonment 
of the region proved false. Neither Iraq nor any other regional actor moved to wipe 
out the KRG, though all tried to increase their political influence in the region. Turkey 
still had soldiers stationed a few kilometres into the Kurdistan Region, but that was 
mainly in order to counter PKK activism and, as noted above, had a silent consent 
from the side of both parties. There are several explanations for the survival of the 
Kurdistan Region as a single unit. First, the Kurdish affiliation with the INC and the 
potential help that the Kurds could serve in counteracting Saddam Hussein drove the 
Clinton administration to carry on protecting the region. Although Clinton considered 
the KDP’s invitation of the Iraqi security forces to the region as no less than a 
betrayal, he was personally involved in brokering peace between both parties.
86
 
Second, the survival of Saddam Hussein as a president played in the Kurds’ favour. 
Facing such a pariah as the Ba’th regime and the memories of his past genocidal 
policies probably contributed to the continuation of moral support for the Kurdish 
autonomy. During the period of fighting, one of the most comprehensive and reliable 
studies of the Anfal campaign was compiled and published by Human Rights Watch, 
which provided a rather detailed description of the atrocities of the Ba’th regime.87 
The publication of the atrocities further boosted the activity of diaspora organisations, 
which became vocal again with regard to Kurdish human rights in the countries of 
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origin.
88
 And it may have been the fact that the KRG in reality served the interests of 
its neighbours. After all, the Kurds proved willing to allow both Turkey and Iran to 
maintain their “hot pursuit” policy in the region in order to counter the PKK and the 
KDP-Iran respectively. 
Finally, Gareth Stansfield brings up an interesting point with regard to the 
division. As he argues, the division, in spite of its potential demoralising effect for the 
Kurdish nationalist cause, in fact gave the Kurdish leadership an almost 
unprecedented opportunity for reorganising and streamlining their governance and 
stabilising the regional political system. Now relieved of the fixation on personal and 
party-based rivalries, the ruling parties could focus on “being governments rather than 
parties.”89 Furthermore, and of great relevance to the aspect of interaction in the 
development of de facto states, due to the new reality “twice as many bureaucrats 
have been exposed to the experience of governance, UN interaction, and NGO 
assistance. The Kurds… now have a substantial body of trained administrators. The 
capability of Kurds to govern their own country has obviously been enhanced by these 
actions.”90 The implementation of the Oil for Food Programme (OFFP) based on 
UNSCR 986 served as an important factor in the survival of the Kurdish autonomy. It 
provided an incentive for the Kurdish leaders to cease fighting; it further enhanced the 
KRG’s autonomy; and it immensely improved the economic situation of the Kurdish 
administrations, which served to distinguish the KRG from the rest of Iraq. The 
importance of the OFFP necessitates some special attention to its implementation and 
execution in the Kurdistan Region by UN agencies. 
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4.6 THE OFFP AND THE KRG: INTERNATIONAL AID AND THE 
CONSOLIDATION OF AUTONOMY IN KURDISTAN 
The OFFP programme enabled the KRG, for the first time, to enjoy income generated 
by the oil extracted in Iraq. In short, the OFFP was an effort by the UNSC to fund the 
aid-relief operations to Iraq, without completely removing the sanctions regime. The 
programme allowed Iraq to trade oil in return for the basic necessities of its 
population, namely food and medicine, without allowing the Iraqi government to 
sponsor the purchase of arms and other means of warfare. In 1996 Iraq was allowed to 
sell approximately $2 billion worth of oil with the sum growing every year until 2000. 
The three Kurdish provinces, now ruled by two administrations, were entitled to 13% 
of the income, divided proportionally between the governorates. 
Whereas in Iraq itself the income from the OFFP was run by the Ba’th 
government, as part of the agreement between the UN and Baghdad, income to the 
Kurdistan Region was administered by a UN agency. This had a paradoxical 
implication for the autonomy of the now divided Kurdish administration. On the one 
hand, the fact that money was now run by an external agency somewhat compromised 
the legitimacy of the Kurdish leaders as the main authority in the region. Even though 
the UN agencies running the OFFP cooperated with regional authorities, these 
agencies remained the top authority when it came to the allocation of funding. On the 
other hand, the UN administration meant that the allocation of funding was done more 
efficiently than in the rest of Iraq. In fact, money flowing from the OFFP resulted in a 
financial boom and a period of relative economic stability in the region. Certainly, it 
improved the situation in the KRG in comparison to Iraq. Amid descriptions of 
starvation in the rest of the country, one report noted that in 2003, food in the three 
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Kurdish provinces became “relatively abundant.”91 It led to the reduction of child 
mortality in the region between the years 1994 and 1999,
92
 as well as to an essential 
reconstruction campaign of houses and infrastructure in the region. Describing the 
region during the late 1990s and early 2000s, American journalist David Hirst claimed 
that 
It can't be said that prosperity has come to Iraqi Kurdistan - it would take three 
months of a teacher's salary to buy the pair of Italian women's shoes on display - 
but it's obvious that these northern provinces, which until 1990 were the most 
backward, deprived and oppressed of President Saddam Hussein's domains, are 
now much better off than those where his writ still runs. There are Mercedes, 
even an occasional BMW, on newly paved highways. Hotels are opening, and 
open-air restaurants flourish beside mountain streams.  There's a tourist industry 
too, mainly summer visitors from the Kurdish diaspora, or Iranians who cross 
the border for a weekend's dancing, drinking and veil-free relaxation.
93
 
Reviewing the situation in Kurdistan, Michiel Leezenberg held that “At first blush, 
Iraqi Kurdistan seems the Neoliberal success story of post-Saddam Iraq. For decades a 
poor, underdeveloped and conflict-ridden part of the country, it has emerged as by far 
the most stable, secure and prosperous region… especially since the start of the UN 
oil-for-food programme in 1997.”94 This new reality led Shafiq Qazzaz, then the 
Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, to maintain that “it was 986 that saved us.”95 
                                                          
91
 Katzman, “Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program,” 8. 
92
 A USAID report from 2003 noted “an overall decline from 80 to 72/1,000 for under five-year-olds 
and from 64 to 50/1,000 among infants” in the “Kurdish autonomous region” amid an increase from 
47/1,000 to 108/1,000 in “Center/South regions.” See Richard Garfield and Ron Waldman, “Review of 
Potential Interventions to Reduce Child Mortality in Iraq,” Basics II USAID Report, November 5, 2003, 
7. 
93
 David Hirst, “Kurds Reap Sanctions Reward: Oil for Food Feeds Them, but Iraq Reins 
Development,” Washington Times, August 15, 2001, 10a. 
94
 Michiel Leezenberg, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Contours of a Post-Civil War Society,” Third World Quarterly 
26, 4 (2005): 631. 
95
 As quoted by Hirst, Ibid.  
173 
 
The new economic boom in the region also drove both PUK and KDP to 
prefer stability over internecine fighting. The new resources meant fewer reasons for 
competition and perdition. As Denise Natali states, the OFFP aid created, 
unintentionally, a new class of nouveaux riche, mainly among the tribal leaders and 
political officials, and did not just enrich the leaders of the political parties. Enjoying 
the new avenues for wealth generation, the now divided administration stopped 
fighting for power and began to develop their respective regions. Although not aiming 
to develop a private sector, the aid and its distribution allowed the emergence of an 
entrepreneur class of NGOs and contractors that acted as the operating hand of the aid 
organisations, and contracts and subcontracts earned millions of dollars to the local 
population. Even small businesses began to flourish and small factories were 
established all around the region. From 1995 to 2000 the total number of small 
industrial projects reached 608, with all but two owned by the private sector. 
96
 The 
Washington Agreement was, to a great extent, the product of this realisation. 
Although an outcome of external intervention, this renewed stability helped 
the KRG regain some of the legitimacy it had lost during the civil war. Once again the 
region came to be described as an island of stability, in contrast to the rest of Iraq. 
Furthermore, it provided the two administrations, separately, with more opportunities 
to develop informal diplomatic ties with other actors in the region and particularly 
Turkey, as various Turkish contractors and firms found economic opportunities in the 
region, particularly in the post-2003 period. Thus, Barzani, in a visit to Ankara, in 
addition to stressing the KDP’s commitment to fighting the PKK, also declared on the 
financial opportunities waiting for Turkish contractors in the region, stressing that 
‘We prefer Turkish contractors because of Turkey's proximity and maintenance 
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facilities’.97 Turkey, in turn, acknowledged the increase in stability and safety of 
northern Iraq and south eastern Anatolia. Officially, though, it related it to the capture 
of Abdullah ‘Apo’ Öcalan, the PKK’s wanted leader, on February 15, 1999 and the 
“dissolution of the PKK terror organisation.”98 
Natali views the OFFP as signalling a transition in the nature of international 
aid from revolving mainly around relief operations to now focusing more on 
rehabilitation. This new stage meant increased interaction between Kurdish 
population and international and transnational actors, which contributed to the gradual 
consolidation of a nascent civil society in the region. Using OFFP income, UN 
agencies that now returned to the region, and especially the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), began devoting some 
of their resources to training members of the KRG. As Natali describes 
Even after the civil war ended, UN officials negotiated ongoing disputes 
between the parties and quelled potential conflicts. They taught principles of 
good governance, negotiation, and administration by conducting regular 
meetings with KRG representatives and incorporating local personnel into 
legitimate bodies. KRG representatives and local populations were liaised with 
the UN gained professional experience and language skills, while learning about 
the policies and protocols of international organizations.
99
 
The rehabilitation programme also introduced more openly new standards of good 
governance to the administrations, mainly through the education system. Subsidised 
by independent INGOs and UNESCO, “education departments now established new 
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courses for civic society and human rights that were integrated into primary and 
secondary school programs.”100 The rise of prices and taxation in the region also 
resulted in the creation of regional labour and professional unions which now lobbied 
for their sectors in issues such as taxation, disputes over contracts and protection of 
workers and businesses. One example was the Kurdistan Contractors Union (KCU); 
established in 2001, which soon spread across all three provinces.
101
 
Much like the preceding stage of international aid, nonetheless, UN agencies 
and other aid organisations were somewhat confined by the necessity to prevent aid 
from compromising Iraq’s territorial integrity. The best way to do so was to limit the 
KRG’s ability to develop independent governance capacities. As Natali documents, 
“Aid allocations increased over time; however, the KRG still could not purchase the 
necessary equipment to make investments, build technology, stir local production, 
engage in legal import-export activities, or develop taxation programs.”102 Kurdish 
officials had no role in the process of decision-making with regard to the OFFP 
policies and did not participate in meetings between programme officials and 
representatives of the Baghdad government. With the division of administrations, UN 
agencies were now functioning as all-regional ministries with UNOHCI as a council 
of ministers, HABITAT as a ministry of housing and reconstruction and UNICEF as a 
ministry of water and sanitation”103 Even in terms of economic development, 
international aid mainly enhanced Kurdish dependency on aid. As the embargo was 
still implemented, local products could not be purchased by aid organisations, which 
instead imported food into the region. This naturally hindered any development of 
local agriculture. Very little effort was undertaken with regard to social problems in 
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the Kurdistan Region, and particularly the exclusion of women from socio-economic 
life. On the other hand, the Kurdish leadership’s refusal to declare Kurdish 
independence and turn their region in a first step toward a Kurdish state, drove 
nationally conscious youth in the region into the arms of the PKK and other more 
radicalised groups. 
In spite of its inherent problems in the nature of the OFFP, one may argue that 
this aid operation was necessary for the survival of the enhancement of Kurdish 
autonomy from Iraq. Even if, toward the end of its first decade of de facto autonomy 
from Baghdad, Kurdish leadership’s self-governance capacity remained somewhat 
limited (mainly due to the civil war and the division of Kurdish administration), its 
sense of independence from the rest of Iraq, at least at the identity level, was actually 
bolstered. 
This was further reinforced by the importance that the Kurdish parties gained 
as part of the anti-Ba’th coalition. On the 31st of October, 1998, President Clinton 
signed the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which declared that the American intention 
was to remove President Saddam Hussein from power and to promote democratic 
governance in Iraq.
104
 Regime change in Iraq was to take place through domestic 
opposition groups. The designated groups included the PUK, KDP, and the IMK, in 
addition to the Iraqi National Accord, the Movement for Constitutional Monarchy and 
the Shiite Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
105
 The inclusion of both 
parties in the act meant that the two regained some of the administration’s confidence 
in their ability to assist in the battle against Saddam Hussein and in the 
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democratisation of Iraq. It also meant that both parties now had access to direct 
American funding, which they were denied following the Iraqi army incursion into 
Erbil. This was preceded by the enactment of Operation Northern Watch on the 1st of 
January, 1997. Much like previous operations, this one as well required Turkish 
consent and implicit support through the use of the Incirlik airbase. Turkey consented 
to a six-month use of the airbase with the option of extending the use for two 
consecutive six-month periods, although it stressed that such use would not become 
permanent. 
The stabilisation of the region and the reincorporation of the Kurdish parties in 
the anti-Ba’th coalition revived the Kurdish public diplomacy efforts. Once again, the 
Kurdish leadership sought to exhibit the Kurds’ ability to run their own affairs. Amid 
limited developments in the region during the latter half of the 1990s, the leadership 
resorted to underline the democratic experiment and the KRG’s potential to serve as a 
model for Iraq’s future. Barham Salih, then the prime minister of the PUK-controlled 
Sulaymaniyah administration (later to become the second PM of the reunified KRG), 
used the term “a model for Iraq” to define the KRG, holding that ‘Peace and stability 
in the strategically vital gulf area will come only from fundamental political change in 
Iraq and by building on the democratic experiment that has taken root in Iraqi 
Kurdistan’.106 Mas‘ud Barzani described the KRG in a similar way in an interview in 
2002, contending that ‘I cannot claim that the democratic experiment in Iraqi 
Kurdistan is ideal and without defects. However, when we compare it with what exists 
around us and in Iraq itself, I think that it was a unique experience and can be applied 
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in all Iraq’.107 And Fawzi al-Atroushi as well linked between Kurdish identity and 
democracy. Criticising young Kurds who posed as Arabs in order to get political 
asylum in Europe, he stated that 
[W]e do not see any reason as to why the need to wipe out ones identity, at a 
time when Kurdish generations joined the national struggle and shed rivers of 
blood and tears in the defence of the Kurdish identity, which its manifestations 
can be seen in the current Kurdish democratic experiment, which is reaping the 
harvest of certificates of appreciation, Allah Be Blessed, from prominent 
international circles, after peace and progress prevailed in the Kurdistan 
region.
108
 
Atroushi’s statement was not coincidental; toward the end of the 1990s and early 
2000s the UK, one of the main destinations for Kurdish asylum seekers, decided to 
remove the KRG from the list of those regions whose people are entitled for political 
asylum. This decision followed a prolonged debate within the UK which revolved 
around security and stability in the region, functioning of the local administration and 
its ability to provide its population with basic needs. The British government justified 
its decision by arguing that “it does not matter who the authorities are, as long as they 
are in control and are able to provide state or quasi-state protection.”109 
These statements reflect that once again, after the setback which the civil war 
posed, an international public sphere was opened for the Kurdish leadership to justify 
its actions, buttress its still controversial status, and thus also define its own identity. 
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Much like in the early 1990s, the Kurdish discourse and seeming stability came to be 
seen positively by some external observers. Carole O’Leary, a Professor at the 
American University in Washington and another close observer of developments in 
the Kurdistan Region, embraced the idea of the KRG as a model for the future of Iraq. 
In 2001 she contended that “Should the Iraqi army ever violate this safe haven, no 
part of which is any farther from Republican Guard positions than Washington is from 
Richmond, it would not only crush this experiment in democracy, but destabilize the 
entire region, sending as many as 3 million refugees into Iran and Turkey.”110 In 
another essay, O’Leary referred to the KRG as “10-year old experiment in 
democracy” and as a “golden age” of pluralism and freedom, not only for Kurds, but 
also for “people in the minority Turkoman, Assyrian and Chaldean communities.”111 
In 2002 the so-called democratic experiment in the Kurdistan Region was also 
endorsed for the first time by the European Parliament, when peers demanded 
“support for the democratic experiment of the Kurdish administration in Northern Iraq 
and for projects for the development of civil society” in a report condemning the 
human rights situation under the Ba’th rule.112 
The international public sphere, in which the Kurdish question was debated, 
was not confined to the Western members of the international community. The Kurds 
also tried to include the Arabs in this ongoing deliberation. One such effort was made 
in 1998 when representatives of both the KDP and the PUK met in Cairo with Arab 
politicians and intellectuals for a conference entitled The Arab-Kurdish Dialogue. The 
conference was organised by Ahmed Hamroush, a leftist Egyptian thinker, the head of 
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the Cairo-based think-tank of the Egyptian Commission for Solidarity and “a major 
figure in the liberation movements of the 1950s and 1960s,”113 and was endorsed by 
Egyptian President Housni Mubarak. Jalal Talabani, representing the PUK, chose 
again to use a more cautious and moderate tone, stressing Kurdish and Arab solidarity 
and emphasising that the Kurds do not seek to leave Iraq. However, he did argue that 
the unity of Iraq should be a voluntary one, suggesting that “even the demand for the 
right of self-determination is conditioned upon a union by choice with the Iraqi people 
within an Iraqi union and an independent Iraqi entity.”114 A similar approach was 
taken by Sami ‘Abdul Rahman, representing the KDP in the conference, who argued 
that 
In this era, following the liberation of peoples and the reconfiguration of 
nations, the era of democratisation and human rights, the Kurdish people in Iraq 
are fighting for benefiting from their national and democratic right to run their 
own affairs… At this moment, our people are in need of Iraqi unity and its 
consolidation and the solution is to be found in federalism within Iraq.
115
 
There is not much novelty in the declarations made by Talabani and ‘Abdul 
Rahman. Both statements include the same element of rapprochement to the Arab 
nationalist movement by guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Iraq, while 
underlying the Kurdish right for self-determination and the voluntary nature of 
unification. What distinguishes these statements was that for the first time since the 
foundation of the KRG, Kurdish leaders were invited to an Arab capital to present 
their case. As al-Ahram, the Egyptian semi-official weekly described it, this 
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conference was “the first discussion of its kind between Arab and Kurdish 
intellectuals and politicians centering on the relations and misunderstandings that 
have existed between the two communities for decades.” As the report goes on to tell, 
it was fiercely objected by Baghdad that described it as “an interference in Iraq's 
internal affairs… [Which] gave the United States exactly what it needed to put 
pressure on Iraq by highlighting the Kurdish claims of mistreatment by Baghdad.”116 
Thus, even if not a significant historical event in itself, it further legitimised the 
Kurdish cause and paved the way for further interaction between the KRG and the 
international community. 
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
In 1992 the Kurdish national liberation movement turned into a de facto state, by 
gaining political and economic autonomy from Baghdad and by going through a two 
year period of state-building, marked by historical democratic elections in the region 
and the formation of executive and legislative bodies. Though Kurdish leadership did 
not declare independence, and even explicitly stated that it did not seek secession 
from Iraq at this stage, elements in the Kurdistan Region, surrounding states and 
international community viewed Kurdish actions as de facto secession from the rest of 
Iraq. Therefore, from its inception, the KRG faced constant attack from its neighbours 
for the steps it had taken, and was therefore compelled to justify these actions. It did 
so mainly by referring to its success in democratisation and state-building. The civil 
war which erupted in 1994 froze state-building efforts in the region, and to some 
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extent wiped out many of Kurdish achievements at the international level. The end of 
the civil war and the division of the administration, taking place simultaneously with 
the implementation of the OFFP, re-established the process of state-building, and with 
it the Kurdish endeavour to legitimise Kurdish actions and aspirations in the region. 
Throughout most of this period, interaction with the international community 
played a significant role in the development of the KRG and its identity. It took the 
form of members of the diaspora community now contributing to the construction of 
the Kurdish entity, international aid organisations and UN agencies working with 
Kurdish civil servants and technocrats in rebuilding the devastated region, as well as 
various other forms. The impact of this interaction on the KRG’s understanding of its 
own position and of the actions it should take to secure its autonomy has been 
demonstrated through the actions and discourse of the Kurdish political elite. This 
impact was to be amplified in the second decade of de facto independence. 
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CHAPTER 5.  THE SECOND DECADE OF AUTONOMY 
AND THE REUNIFICATION OF THE KRG: REVIVING THE 
DE FACTO STATE IN THE KURDISTAN REGION 2001-
2010 
The study of the de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq is often examined against the 
background of the 2003 allied invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the Ba’th regime. 
Certainly, the invasion had a tremendous impact on the Kurdish question in the 
country, which is reviewed in this chapter. Yet, in spite of its significance, the 2003 
war did not instigate the emergence of the Kurdish de facto state in the region. The 
Kurdish autonomy entered its second decade of existence already in 2001, and its 
evolution has been shaped not only by dramatic events in Baghdad, but also by wider 
international processes, as well as by macro-level, inter-Kurdish events. 
To an even greater extent than the first decade of de facto statehood in the 
Kurdistan Region, the second decade supports the argument that the pursuit of 
international legitimacy is a crucial aspect of the foreign policies of de facto 
statehood, and that such pursuit of legitimacy relies on genuine or exaggerated notions 
of earned sovereignty. Moreover, the period from 2001 until 2010 reveals that the 
KRG’s understanding of earned sovereignty has now progressed beyond the focus on 
democratisation, to encompass such aspects as economic viability, law and order, and 
the ability to contribute to regional stability and security. Indeed, throughout this 
period, the reunified KRG used these principles to legitimise its wide autonomy from 
Baghdad, autonomy far wider even than the principles agreed upon in the aftermath of 
the overthrow of the Ba’th regime and Kurdish negotiations with Baghdad. Even 
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though the end of the Ba’th regime meant a formal reintegration of the Kurdistan 
Region into Iraqi politics, relations between Baghdad and the Kurds could no longer 
be characterised as relations between centre and periphery, or between a central 
government and a minority. Rather, as this chapter demonstrates, they have become 
almost state-to-state, or government-to-government relations, to borrow a term used 
by Robert Olson to describe relations between the KRG and Ankara.
1
 
To a great extent, this chapter focuses more on the foreign policies of the de 
facto states, while the other aspect of this research, the reciprocal relations between 
foreign policy and domestic development, will be discussed in more depth in the 
following chapter.  
 
5.1 SETTING THE CONTEXT: FROM THE WAR ON TERROR TO THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW GOVERNMENT IN BAGHDAD 
The September 11 attacks had an immense impact on international politics, as they 
changed dramatically common perceptions about security threats and international 
stability.
2
 Their impact on Iraq’s future was remarkably significant. The Ba’th regime 
was the second to be overthrown by a coalition of forces as part of the American-led 
campaign against global terrorism under the presidency of George Walker Bush. 
Intelligence reports indicating that Saddam Hussein had been sponsoring and training 
transnational terror organisations (including al-Qa’eda), that the Ba’th regime had 
been secretly recovering its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but also 
the regime’s notorious human rights record, were also invoked to justify the invasion 
                                                          
1
 Robert Olson, The Goat and the Butcher (Costa Mesa, CA.: Mazda Press, 2005). 
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 This was already noted in 2001 by Fred Halliday, in Two Hours that Shook The World: September 11, 
2001, Causes And Consequences (London: Saqi, 2001). 
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of Iraq.
3
 Other accounts of the war have argued that the September 11 attacks served 
merely as an excuse for the US to implement plans which had actually been 
formulated even prior to the attacks. Such accounts have hinged the war on George 
Bush’s personal motivation to complete his father’s mission,4 pressures by the Israel 
lobby in Washington,
5
 neo-conservative imperial aspirations, or simple oil-greed.
6
 
The invasion of Iraq began on the 19
th
 of March 2003, when American, 
British, Australian and Polish forces invaded the country, with the assistance of 
Kurdish Peshmergas. Fighting against the Iraqi army lasted until May, with Baghdad 
falling in April. Saddam Hussein fled Baghdad but was captured in December 2003. 
A new era began in the country, an era of potential political and civil freedom, but 
mainly of political instability and sectarian violence. The first years of the post-
invasion era could be divided very roughly into three periods: the establishment and 
reign of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA); the transfer of power into the 
hands of a transitional government in June 2004, with the formulation of a draft 
constitution which for the first time recognised the KRG as a legal entity; and finally, 
the foundation of a democratic federal republic in the country in 2006. 
The CPA was a mandate-style caretaker government. It was the sole 
determinant of budget allocation and civilian operations and war headed by the 
American diplomat L. Paul Bremer, with British diplomat Jeremy Greenstock as his 
deputy administrator. The CPA embodied the inherent deficit in the American 
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approach to Iraq in particular and to democracy promotion in general. The ambitious 
endeavour to constitute a liberal, free-market oriented democracy was set too hastily 
by the administration, resulting eventually in a “troubled and increasingly insecure 
country in which insurgency, lawlessness and sectarian conflict claimed growing 
numbers of Iraqi lives, in addition to taking a mounting toll of the occupation 
forces.”7 The surge of violence in Iraq drove the CPA to divert its attention almost 
entirely to countering the insurgency and trying to settle the resurfacing of sectarian 
tensions. To deal with the emerging problems in the country, the CPA established the 
Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), an unelected body of representatives of all sects. As 
part of this arrangement, the Kurds were allocated with five seats in the IGC, vis-à-vis 
13 seats to the Shiites, five seats to the Sunnis and one for each the Turkomans and 
the Assyrians. According to Nadje al-Ali and Nicola Pratt, the CPA’s policy turned 
out to be disastrous to the development of a unified Iraq. In the effort to secure 
representation for all sects in Iraq, the CPA ended up paving the way for a Lebanese-
style confessional system.
8
 
Following its failure to achieve its goals, namely the rebuilding of Iraq under a 
democratically-elected government, and due to the increasing unpopularity of the 
mandate style, the CPA was disbanded. It was replaced in June 2004 by the Interim 
Government, nominated by the IGC. Iyad ‘Allawi, a former exiled oppositionist, was 
appointed as the interim Prime Minister. In May 2005 Iraq held its first legislative 
elections for the Transitional Government, headed by Ibrahim al-Ja’fari of the Shiite 
Islamic Da’wa Party. Throughout this period, Iraq had descended into a bloody 
anarchy. The Sunni population became disgruntled for losing its privileged status and 
its members chose, or were coerced, to boycott the elections almost en-masse. During 
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this period extremist Sunni armed groups, most notably al-Qa’eda in Iraq led by the 
Jordanian-born Abu-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, began an insurgency campaign against 
American and government targets, as well as against Shiite civilian targets. The 
Shiites reacted to such attacks by establishing their own militias. The most notable 
among them was the Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi), led by the young cleric Muqtada 
al-Sadr. The Iraqi government collapsed amid the anarchy, exhibiting incompetence 
in stopping violence and providing even the most basic needs of the Iraqi population. 
This administrative vacuum was filled by the militias, which were the only bodies 
capable of providing some sense of security and basic services to the population. The 
helpless Iraqi government remained confined to the Green Zone (International Zone) 
in Baghdad, the government district heavily protected by American forces and by 
private contractors. 
In December 2005 Iraq held legislative elections for a permanent government, 
following the formulation of a new constitution in the country. The elections resulted 
in a shaky coalition government headed by the Da’wa Party, with its leader Nouri al-
Maliki as a PM. The foundation of a new government in Baghdad led to a temporary 
decrease in the level of violence in Iraq, but 2005-2006 witnessed a resurgence of 
sectarian violence. 
 
5.2 KURDISH NATIONAL LIBERATION AND THE NEW IRAQ 
The Kurdish public and leadership were generally enthusiastic about the idea of 
external intervention and the overthrow of the Ba’th regime. As long as the Ba’th and 
Saddam Hussein were still in power, the Kurdish autonomous region was under the 
constant fear of invasion and forced reintegration into Iraq. PUK and KDP Peshmerga 
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forces played a key role in the invasion by supporting the incursion of coalition forces 
from the north into Iraq. The importance of the Kurdish parties to operations in the 
north became even more acute after the Justice and Development Party (better known 
for its Turkish acronym AKP)-led government failed to pass a parliamentary motion 
allowing coalition troops to be stationed on Turkish soil and use Turkish air space for 
an attack.
9
 Amid this reality, the Kurdish Peshmergas, the only organised fighting 
force within Iraq, proved to be essential in securing the entry of American 10th 
Special Forces Group into Iraq from the north. 
Almost paradoxically, the Kurdish leadership and its sympathisers came to 
fear that the removal of the Ba’th regime would pull the rug from under the feet of the 
Kurdish parties’ claim to be the only pro-democratic forces in Iraq and subsequently 
deem the Kurdish autonomy, or even the aspiration for federalism, redundant. Almost 
to realise these fears, the CPA tried to compel the Kurdish parties to compromise 
some of their autonomy and demonstrate their commitment to a unified Iraq. Maybe 
to neutralise potential critique, the Kurdish administrations took the initiative to 
demonstrate to the CPA their readiness to reintegrate into Iraq, of course under their 
conditions. This involved such measures as integrating into the Iraqi monetary system 
by introducing a new currency into the Kurdistan Region,
10
 and by participating in the 
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joint institutions established by the CPA.
11
In retrospect, nonetheless, it seems that 
such moves all aimed eventually to bolster the Kurdish stand within Baghdad and 
serve as leverage on any Iraqi government. This trend had its roots in the Kurdish 
conduct prior to the invasion, as Kurds began taking central positions already in the 
INC. Eventually, the total collapse of the Iraqi government meant that the idea of 
Kurdish autonomy remained a legitimate one, as long as the Kurds could prove their 
ability to maintain the processes of state-building, democratisation and their potential 
contribution to the security of the region. In other words, the overthrow of the Ba’th 
government further bolstered the need to strengthen Kurdish practical legitimacy, a 
process which had begun already during the 1990s. 
The fact that the Kurds viewed the invasion as an opportunity to consolidate 
their position within Iraq and expand their gains from the 1990s became clear already 
during the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces. Witnessing the rapid collapse of the 
Iraqi security forces, the PUK Peshmerga fighters immediately entered the Taamim 
(Kirkuk) governorate and were deployed around and inside Kirkuk city. The PUK 
justified this action by the need to protect public order in the region and prevent 
chaos, but it was also probably in order to test the reactions of the coalition forces and 
Ankara, as well as to gain advantage over the KDP Peshmerga forces.
12
 Concerned 
about Turkish potential invasion, the coalition forces in the region demanded the 
Kurdish forces to evacuate the city. The Peshmerga did so shortly after, but both 
Kurdish parties did not renounce their plan to “liberate” the region. Rather, they 
decided to do so by changing the demographic constitution and by launching a 
process of ‘Kurdification’. This process meant populating the region with Kurdish 
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families which had been forced to leave under Saddam Hussein’s Arabisation 
campaign and encourage Arab families settled in the region by Saddam Hussein, to 
abandon it. 
The Kurdish conduct during the period immediately following the war divided 
not only the CPA, but also American forces with regard to the Kurdish issue in Iraq. 
On one side stood Bremer and Major General David Petraeus, commander of 101st 
Airborne Division, who expressed some antipathy toward Kurdish conduct. Petraeus 
even demanded the Kurdish parties to remove the Kurdish flag and wave the Iraqi one 
instead.
13
 Such a stand was motivated by the central command’s desire not to alienate 
Turkey, which, in the meanwhile, came to allow coalition forces to start using its 
airspace again, but also because they represented the American and British desire to 
maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity. On the other hand, the local forces stationed in 
northern Iraq kept supporting the Kurdish parties and Peshmergas, providing them 
with assistance against Islamist insurgents in the region, but also protecting them from 
Turkish incursion attempts.
14
 The Peshmerga, in turn, kept taking part in the coalition 
war efforts during the first years of fighting. In some cases it did so under the banner 
of the “new Iraqi security forces” (in reality composed largely of Peshmergas), as in 
the battle over Fallujah in December 2004. In other cases, they participated in the 
fighting wearing Peshmerga uniforms, as in Tal ‘Afar in September 2004. In fact, 
some support for Kurdish autonomy did not remain confined solely to coalition forces 
on the ground. 
Even within the US one could hear voices arguing for a new reading of reality 
and support for Kurdish wider autonomy or even independence. Leslie H. Gelb, a 
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former Assistant Secretary of State in the Carter Administration and a President 
Emeritus of the influential Council on Foreign Relations, argued for the idea of a 
“three state solution.” Gelb partly justified his idea by indicating that “The Kurds 
have largely been autonomous for years, and Ankara has lived with that.” 15 This 
comment reflected both the necessity to take Turkey into account, but also the 
realisation that the Kurds have been functioning independently from Baghdad over a 
long period of time.
16
 Peter W. Galbraith, a former Diplomat, a professional staffer at 
the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and later an advisor to the KRG 
argued in favour of dividing Iraq, contending that “The Kurds… enjoy the 
independence they long dreamed about.”17  
 
5.3 LEGALISING KURDISH AUTONOMY: THE KRG IN THE NEW IRAQI 
CONSTITUTION 
Although the IGC was often described as a mere rubber stamp for CPA’s authority, it 
served as a milestone in legitimising the KRG, as it was under the IGC that the 
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), the earliest version of the 2005 Iraqi 
Constitution, was formulated. The TAL became almost a sacred text for the Kurdish 
parties, as it included the articles which became the cornerstone in establishing 
federalism in Iraq. The first of these articles was Article 54, regarding Kurdish 
regional competencies 
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(A) The Kurdistan Regional Government shall continue to perform its current 
functions throughout the transitional period, except with regard to those 
issues which fall within the exclusive competence of the federal 
government as specified in this Law. Financing for these functions shall 
come from the federal government, consistent with current practice and in 
accordance with Article 25 (E) of this Law. The Kurdistan Regional 
Government shall retain regional control over police forces and internal 
security, and it will have the right to impose taxes and fees within the 
Kurdistan region. 
(B) With regard to the application of federal laws in the Kurdistan region, the 
Kurdistan National Assembly shall be permitted to amend the application of 
any such law within the Kurdistan region, but only to the extent that this 
relates to matters that are not within the provisions of Articles 25 and 43 
(D) of this Law and that fall within the exclusive competence of the federal 
government.
18
 
Article 55 in the TAL further reinforced regional autonomy, stating that “Each 
governorate shall have the right to form a Governorate Council, name a Governor, and 
form municipal and local councils,” adding that no regional official “may be 
dismissed by the federal government or any official thereof, except upon conviction of 
a crime by a court of competent jurisdiction as provided by law.”19 
A more controversial article, at least in the future to come, was Article 58, 
which discussed the Arabisation of Kirkuk and the region’s status in a new federal 
Iraq. The article stated that: “The Iraqi Transitional Government… shall act 
expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice caused by the previous 
regime's practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including 
Kirkuk.”20 This, at least as claimed by the Kurds, meant the return of expropriated 
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property to its original owners, the resettlement and compensation of those families 
who were forced out of the region as part of the Arabisation campaign and the 
provision of employment opportunities to those who were deprived of employment 
under the Ba’th regime. All of this was to be supervised by the Iraqi Property Claims 
Commission. In addition, the article stressed the need to redraw the region’s 
boundaries, which were themselves changed under the Ba’th authority as part of their 
effort to guarantee an Arab majority in the region. 
The Permanent Iraqi Constitution, which was adopted in October 2005, 
formally recognised the existence of a federal entity in the three governorates of Erbil, 
Sulaymaniyah and Dohuk, as well as some parts of the Kirkuk (al-Taamim), Ninawa 
and Diyala governorates, under the control of the KRG. Article 115 of the new 
constitution further consolidated the authority of regional governments (KRG being 
the only one at the time of the signing), stating that 
All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government 
belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organized 
in a region. With regard to other powers shared between the federal government 
and the regional government, priority shall be given to the law of the regions 
and governorates not organized in a region in case of dispute.
21
 
In legal terms, this article also allowed the regional governments to come up with 
their legislation in certain manners. This article was forcefully advocated by the 
Kurdish parties during the negotiations over the nature of the constitution, since, as 
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Michael Kelly indicates, in practice it severely constrained federal authority in the 
autonomous regions.
22
 
Another achievement of the Kurdish negotiators regarded the entitlement to oil 
revenues and the question of control over oil reserves in the autonomous regions. 
First, the Kurds secured that 17 percent of the Iraqi budget would be allocated to the 
KRG, based on the proportion of the region’s population of the total Iraqi population. 
More importantly, the Kurdish representatives were successful in introducing Article 
112 to the new constitution, according to which 
First: The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional 
governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from 
present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in 
proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, specifying 
an allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions which were unjustly 
deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged 
afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the 
country, and this shall be regulated by a law.
23
 
The term ‘present fields’ is essential here, since this ambiguous terminology left room 
for different interpretations, which was later to be used by Kurdish legislators. As 
Sean Kane has noted, with the introduction of this article the Kurds were successful in 
“creating a constitutional framework for Iraq where the main question was not what 
control regions should have over oil, but rather what role was left for the national 
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government.”24 It also reflected that “The participation of the Kurdistan Region in 
national oil contracting and revenue systems is seen as a voluntary choice and is 
dependent upon conditions that national authorities must first meet. This treatment of 
oil is a microcosm of how Kurds believe Iraq should work.”25 
Thus, for the first time the KRG was recognised by Baghdad as a legal entity. 
This meant that states, International Organisations, NGOs and multinational 
corporations could now communicate directly with Kurdish leadership in all matters 
other than those defined in the constitution as under the authority of the federal 
government. This enabled more interaction between the international community and 
the KRG and further contributed to the association between these geographical areas 
and Kurdish governance. Additionally, the new constitution also included a new 
article, Article 140, which for the first time offered a mechanism for solving the 
Kirkuk problem – a referendum to be held among all residents of the region no later 
than the 31st of December, 2007.
26
 The latter article boosted efforts which had already 
begun in the region since 2003. In order to guarantee their victory in the referendum, 
the Kurdish parties now increased their effort to Kurdify the region’s population. A 
new joint committee was now established between the KDP and the PUK in order to 
facilitate the return of Kurdish refugees and to determine financial assistance for Arab 
families that volunteered to leave the region. Such activities enraged the Turkoman 
and Arab communities, fearing forced ethnic cleansing. The Iraqi Turkoman Front 
(ITF), one of the parties representing the Turkoman community in Iraq, as well as 
other representatives of the Arab community, began referring to the process as an act 
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of aggression and coercion. The ITF also raised claims about physical violence used 
by the Peshmergas against Arabs and Turkomans in Kirkuk city. Nevertheless, foreign 
observers in the region refuted the claims of the use of violence in the region by 
Kurdish forces. Human Rights Watch (HRW), an INGO, for instance, argued that in 
addition to strict control of affairs by American forces in the district, “the leadership 
of the two main Kurdish parties had committed themselves to an orderly, legal 
process for the return of Kurds to an Arabized land and the resolution of property 
disputes, and therefore, they acted, for the most part, with restraint.”27 Such claims 
were also refuted by a group of fifteen Turkish observers, sent by Ankara to the 
region to supervise the process of Kurdification.
28
 
The new reality in Baghdad enabled Kurdish parties to gain more influence in 
the Iraqi capital. Because the Kurdish parties did not seek to dominate Iraq, they were 
potential partners in each coalition to be established in the capital. This was 
particularly exacerbated in the 2005 elections, as the Sunni boycott of the elections 
meant that the Kurdish parties had a disproportional representation in the parliament. 
In this manner, the Kurds became “kingmakers” in Baghdad. Assessing the 
importance of their impact in Baghdad to advocating their cause, the Kurdish parties 
ran in the elections as a unified bloc, the Patriotic Democratic Alliance of Kurdistan, 
better known as the Kurdistani Alliance (KA), which won about 26 percent of the 
seats in the Council of Representatives of Iraq, which translated into 75 seats. This 
power was somewhat diluted in the 2009 national elections, due to a high Sunni 
turnout. The KA joined Maliki’s coalition as a pivotal member. As part of the 
coalition agreement, Talabani was nominated into the President of Iraq, which, albeit 
a mainly symbolic position, bestowed Talabani with more international legitimacy 
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and influence serving him when advocating the Kurdish cause. Hoshyar Zebari of the 
KDP was appointed as Iraq’s Foreign Minister, an appointment he also held under the 
transitional government. Barham Salih, formerly the PUK-run KRG’s Prime Minister, 
was nominated Iraq’s deputy PM. 
The integration of these notable Kurdish figures into the Baghdad government 
marked for many the Kurdish commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity. Others, such 
as Denise Natali, have argued that the Kurdish representatives in Baghdad have 
actually turned into a Kurdish lobby, constantly pressuring the Iraqi government for 
concessions on Kurdish issues.
29
 The actions and statements of the Kurdish leaders 
actually support this assertion. In an interview to CNN, Jalal Talabani related to his 
past feuds with Mas’ud Barzani contending that ‘Well, Mr. Barzani was the man who 
nominated me for this post, and he insisted that I must represent the Kurds in 
Baghdad’.30 And in another example for the Kurdish perception of their politicians in 
Baghdad as lobbyists for the Kurdish cause, an article in the regional Kurdish-
language Awene which discussed Talabani’s alleged illness stated that Talabani’s 
situation caused alarm “not only for the PUK but for all Kurds”, especially given the 
question of “who will represent the Kurds in Baghdad after Talabani?”31 Referring to 
Barham Salih as Talabani’s potential heir, the article argued that Salih “managed to 
represent the PUK and the Kurds during the most critical times in Baghdad.”32 
The seeming harmony between the Iraqi government and KRG was only 
temporary. Clear tensions surfaced already in the immediate period following the 
2005 elections for the federal government and were exacerbated by sectarian violence 
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and the surge in Islamist terrorism targeting civilian, government and coalition targets 
within Iraq. Soon these tensions led to the eruption of the first direct conflict between 
Baghdad and the KRG at least since 2003. As in the negotiations between Baghdad 
and the Kurdish leadership, the eruption of the conflict in 2008 serves as another 
indication of the wide autonomy that the KRG has actually gained in the post-2003 
period. 
 
5.4 CONFRONTATION AND THE NEW NATURE OF ERBIL-BAGHDAD 
RELATIONS: FROM CIVIL WAR TO BORDER SKIRMISHES 
The round of direct conflict which opened in 2008 marked the first direct clashes 
between Baghdad and the Kurdish governorates since 1991. This time, nonetheless, it 
was not a rebelling minority clashing with the security forces of an oppressive central 
government, but of two actors equal in force, in what could be described more as 
border clashes or skirmishes than anything else. In this fashion, much like the 
cooperation between Baghdad and the Kurds, the 2008-2009 conflict indicated the 
important transition that the Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq has gone 
through. 
In August 2008, Iraqi military forces, in a pursuit of Islamist insurgents, 
suddenly diverged from their course and surrounded the town of Khanaquin, a 
predominantly Faily town in the Diyala Governorate under the KRG’s authority, 
according to the TAL. The commander of the Iraqi forces, General Mun‘im Hashim 
Fahd, demanded the removal of the Kurdish parties’ offices from the town and the 
withdrawal of the Peshmerga forces to the neighbouring Sulaymaniyah province. 
General Fahd argued that this was a part of the counter-insurgency operation, but Quil 
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Lawrence, who observed the events, argued that it was probably the result of the 
tensions between the KRG and Baghdad regarding the undisputed territories in 
Kirkuk, Ninawa and Diyala. Khanaquin, surrounded by oilfields, was part of this 
conflict as well.
33
 Fears of the local Arab tribes of Kurdification and their fate in the 
region probably drove the government to take further action in the region. 
Baghdad’s step invoked, among the Kurdish leadership, the image of Saddam 
Hussein and his Arabisation campaign, and Kurdish statements to the media were 
quick to remind the international community of past atrocities. President Barzani 
declared, on the KRG’s official website in Arabic that “I find it strange that some are 
talking about green lines and blue lines. If we had accepted these lines, Saddam would 
have been grateful for an agreement with us. Only Kirkuk was a subject for 
controversy and he [Saddam] accepted the inclusion of Sinjar and Khanaquin to the 
[Kurdistan] region.”34 Bukhari Abdallah, an MP for the KA in the Council of 
Representatives of Iraq described the operation in Khanaquin a part of Iraqi PM Nouri 
al-Maliki’s ‘undeclared war’ on Kurdistan.35 And another commentator argued that 
‘[Maliki] intends to stealthily throw us (the Kurds) out of Khanaqin… and Kirkuk’.36 
In spite of American mediation efforts, the Iraqi forces raided the city, only to be 
deterred by massive civilian demonstrations in town. Barzani travelled to Baghdad, 
where he negotiated a cease fire, and both sides agreed to remain at a distance of 25 
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km from both sides of the city.
37
 And “So began a full year of mutual provocations – 
troop rotations, ethnically targeted bombings and even a Kurdish order to shoot the 
Arab governor of Mosul on sight.”38 Again, this conflict greatly differed from the 
patterns that characterised previous clashes between Baghdad and Erbil, though 
observers did note that Maliki did try to use some of the tactics employed by previous 
regimes, namely manipulating local tribal militias, the Isnads, mainly by utilising 
their fears of the Kurdification of the region.
39
 
The clashes ended eventually without any major alteration of the KRG’s 
borders of influence. However, they did signify, for the Kurds, trajectory of 
Baghdad’s intentions and the shaky future of federacy. Likewise, it further reflected to 
the international community the cleavages between the Kurds and Baghdad and the 
KRG’s own perception of its status as a de facto state within the internationally 
recognised borders of Iraq.  
Concluding the preceding sections, the Kurds had managed to get the most out 
of what may have been a potentially unfavourable starting point in 2003. The nearly 
total collapse of the Iraqi state gave the Kurdish leadership an opportunity to prove 
itself again as worthy of its autonomy. When this autonomy was physically contested 
by Baghdad, the KRG confronted the central government with a historically 
unprecedented might, now further demonstrating and establishing its autonomy. The 
contestation and confrontation with Baghdad served as a background for the most 
significant event during the second decade of Kurdish autonomy, namely the 
reunification of the Erbil and Sulaymaniyah administrations. The reunification, which 
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reached its peak in 2005, marked the establishment of the second de facto state in the 
Kurdistan Region and accelerated the process of Kurdish state-building. 
 
5.5 THE FORMAL END OF THE CIVIL WAR: REUNIFICATION OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION AND ITS IMPACT ON STATE-BUILDING IN THE 
KURDISTAN REGION 
The foundations of reunification were laid already in 1998, during the Washington 
peace talks. The constant plans for the invasion of Iraq provided the Kurdish leaders 
with more opportunities for unification talks. In March 2000 Talabani approached 
Barzani for reunification, invoking the “experiment in democracy”: ‘The 1991 
uprising had many gains, such as the elections in 1992. For the first time the people of 
Kurdistan went to polling stations and cast their votes freely… Let us hold new 
elections with the presence of foreign supervisors. Let us normalize the situation in 
the cities of Kurdistan and give freedom to everyone.’40 The invasion carried with it 
even more opportunities for reunification, as new subjects emerged which 
necessitated coordination at some level between the administrations. More 
importantly, the new competition over resources from Baghdad drove both parties to 
try and monitor each other’s moves. The most significant of these opportunities was 
the need to police the border territories such as Taamim and Diyala. The first direct 
and public talks between both parties took place on June 12, 2003, in the summer 
resort of Dukan. Participants were Talabani and Salih for the PUK and Mas’ud 
Barzani and his nephew, Nechirvan Barzani, then the PM of the KDP-controlled 
administration. The meeting ended with an announcement of a decision to merge 
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administrations.
41
 Such statements gained support from leading personalities both 
within the KDP, such as Sami ‘Abdul Rahman,42  and the PUK, such as ‘Adnan 
Mufti.
43
 
As in 1992, the reunification was launched by an election campaign, which 
took place on the 30th of January, 2005, the same date as elections for the 
constitutional committee in Iraq. The KA ran for the elections as a unified list, 
consisting of, in addition to the PUK and the KDP, several other smaller parties: the 
Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Kurdistan Communist Party, the Kurdistan Toilers’ 
Party, the Kurdistan Democratic Socialist Party, and the Kurdistan Democratic 
National Party. This coalition won approximately 90% of the votes, or 104 out of 111 
seats in the KNA (five other seats were reserved to Christians, as in the 1992 
elections).
44
 Elections for regional presidency, which took place at the same time, saw 
the election of Mas’ud Barzani as president – a nomination made possible by the 
appointment of Talabani as the president of Iraq.
45
 Nechirvan Barzani was nominated 
as the KRG’s PM. The process of bureaucratic reunification began immediately after 
the elections and by the end of the 2005 most ministries were unified. The unification 
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agreement was endorsed by the regional parliament (which was renamed into the 
Kurdistan Parliament, KP hereafter) on the 22nd of January, 2006.
46
 Once again, the 
portfolios were assigned according to political affiliations, though the duality which 
characterised the first cabinet, with the nomination of a deputy from the other party to 
each ministry, was now revoked. The KDP and PUK once again shared between them 
the main portfolios, but this time some other parties also entered the coalition, 
receiving some other portfolios.
47
 Concluding the process of constituting a 
government, Mas’ud Barzani stated on the KRG website in English that “We are 
determined to establish strong constitutional institutions to further support the 
democratic process. Our main task is forming a system of good governance through 
the participation of all groups, with transparency and accountability, which means a 
modern, professional government.”48 
The reunification process was gradual and somewhat lethargic. Although most 
ministries had been reunited by 2006, four ministries remained divided until 2009: 
Peshmerga Affairs, Finance, Interior and Justice Ministries. In addition, both parties 
kept their security agencies: Parastin (Protection), run by the KDP; and Dazgay 
Zanyari (Information Apparatus), run by the PUK. These agencies kept operating in 
the areas which were still under the influence of both parties, along the Asayish 
(Security) which was subordinated to the KP. The final reunification of the ministries 
took place in 2009 with the formal merging of the Peshmerga Ministry in June 2009. 
As explained by Denis Chapman, an American officer involved in the training of the 
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Kurdish forces, reunification of the Peshmerga office was the most complex process, 
as it necessitated adjustment of the budget, as well as the establishment of trust 
between the two security forces.
49
 The security agencies were to be subordinated to 
the regional parliament in 2010. While the slow process of regional integration could 
serve those critical of the KRG to portray it as a potentially unstable political force, 
prone to political divisions and warlords’ greed, based on Stansfield’s analysis of the 
benefits of the post-civil war divisions one may actually understand this process as a 
careful effort not to fall into the same pitfalls of the early 1990s. This is particularly 
true when it comes to such sensitive area as security and armed forces. 
The KRG reunification enhanced the process of state-building in the region, 
which now took place simultaneously with reconstruction endeavours in the rest of 
Iraq. At least theoretically, the reconstruction programme and international aid 
changed dramatically from the pattern set by the OFFP, as it set capacity building as 
one of its main goals. With the removal of the embargo on Iraq, new agencies, NGOs 
and governments could now join the rebuilding efforts. Although the US government 
and its sponsored NGOs remained the most important sources of reconstruction and 
aid, new states and organisations now joined the reconstruction campaign, including 
the EU, Japan and South Korea.
50
 While not taking part in the first stages of the post-
war era, due to the fact that the US did not bring the war to a Security Council vote 
and the unpopularity of the war, UN agencies now assumed a key position in the 
reconstruction campaign. Through the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the 
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organisation basically supervised the transition from the OFFP into the new 
“democracy mission” phase, as referred to by Natali.51 
The Kurdistan Region was in a much better state than the rest of Iraq, partly 
due to the fact that Iraq had been subjected to several aerial attacks since 1991, and 
especially in 2003; and partly because during this time, and especially since 1998, the 
Kurdistan Region had gone through an uninterrupted reconstruction process. As 
Michiel Leezenberg, a scholar and a long-time activist in the reconstruction of the 
Kurdistan Region, noted in 2005, “At present Iraqi Kurdistan is long past the 
reconstruction stage. The rehabilitation of basic infrastructural facilities, which in Iraq 
as a whole has yet to get off the ground, has made considerable progress in the 
Kurdish-held north since the establishment of a de facto independent entity there in 
1991.”52 This actually had a negative impact on the level of aid to the Kurdistan 
Region, as now a larger share of the budget was directed to the ravaged central and 
southern provinces. As Natali notes, the seeming Kurdish aspirations for 
independence further impeded aid organisations, particularly those funded by the US 
government.
53
 But this did not mean that the KRG was completely marginalised. 
Indeed, aid money served to build “industrial zone, hydropower stations, road 
rehabilitation, private sector development, and microwave links connecting cities such 
as Sulaymaniyah, Arbil and Kirkuk to the rest of Iraq, including Baghdad, Baquba, 
Basra, and um Qasr.”54 With its new vast resources, pouring in from both 
international aid and the income from the government, the gradually unifying KRG 
could now further develop the regional economy. “Behaving like a quasi-
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developmental state,” the KRG now began to intervene in the economic life in the 
region with the purpose of encouraging foreign direct investment and “creating free 
market with a minimal state role that ensures the widest range of individual 
freedoms.” This endeavour also intended to foster the rise of a private sector. With 
that in mind, the KRG introduced in the region “one of the most liberal investment 
laws of its kind in the Middle East.”55 
In addition to the economic development of the region, international aid was 
also conducive to further liberalisation of the political system and to the expansion of 
domestic public space. Because physical reconstruction of infrastructure required 
fewer resources than in the rest of Iraq, more money could now be allocated to issues 
such as good governance and the building of civil society. The reconfigured education 
system now incorporated into its curricula “Democracy mission norms – human 
rights, religious freedom, and gender equality.”56 The Kurdish authorities now made 
more efforts to include women and minorities (especially Christian and Turkoman) in 
the newly established state-apparatus and to enact laws to reduce endemic violence 
against women. These policies have gained some success in terms of promoting the 
rights and participation of women and minorities in political institutions and the 
bureaucracy. In terms of democratising the system, in 2009 the KRG made another 
step in its long democratic transition, when, in the elections which took place in July 
that year, the opposition movement Goran (Change) won about 23% of the votes.
57
 
Even though limited in their scope, further democratisation and the success in 
state- and institution-building became important for the KRG in its effort to present to 
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the international public opinion its domestic sovereignty and to re-establish its 
international legitimacy. Throughout the years following its reunification, the KRG 
once again began promoting its image as an island of stability and prosperity in a 
chronically unstable region. To put it differently, in its interaction with the 
international community, the KRG has constantly been underlining its practical 
legitimacy. Interestingly, the term “democratic experiment” was now replaced with 
reference to the Kurdistan Region as the other Iraq. One of the first appearances of 
the term was in a KRG campaign to attract investment to the region. In one of the 
chapters, the narrator argues that “the Kurds have proven that they are, indeed, a 
committed force for freedom and democracy in a part of the world that desperately 
needs it… For the first time in history the Kurds set up their own civil democratic 
structures, and further developed their judiciary, police and security forces.”58 The 
stability and security in the region is already stated in the publication, which notes that 
“So strong has Kurdish security become, fewer than two hundred coalition troops are 
currently stationed throughout the entire Kurdistan Autonomous Region. And as of 
the spring of 2005, not a single coalition soldier has lost his life on Kurdish soil.
59
 
Amid sectarianism and the rise of religiously-inspired terrorism in Iraq, the secularism 
of the Kurdish leadership, security forces and people is invoked as well. One of the 
interviewees, a local man, was quoted saying that ‘The Kurdish people in general are 
secular. They’re less attached to religion than, let’s say, the Shittes [sic] of the south 
or the rest of Iraq’.60 In addition, a European English language teacher was quoted 
saying that “Any image of Islamic extremism… Just doesn’t exist here… I teach 
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classes where there are as many women as there are men. Where women are no more 
hesitant, or just as likely, to raise their hands and offer an opinion as are the men.”61 
Particular focus has been put by the KRG on its competence and consistency 
in protecting religious and ethnic minorities in its territory. In contrast to 
democratisation or political and economic liberalisation, legal protection and 
inclusion of minorities in the Kurdistan Region could by no means be portrayed as a 
historical precedent. Most governments in the region, including the Ba’th government 
in the past, have stressed their commitment to protecting minorities and incorporating 
them in political, social and cultural life. Nevertheless, the raging sectarian violence in 
Iraq and the targeting of Christians by almost all armed groups in the country, in 
addition to increased Western interest in the affairs of Iraq, served as a context for the 
KRG to present the international community with its tolerant and secular nature. 
Thus, since 2005 the KRG has served as a refuge for Christians fleeing the rest of 
Iraq. Such internally displaced people were allowed to settle in the region and practice 
their faith, with some help from the KRG in rebuilding churches and housing. Such 
measures have been highlighted by the KRG in its official media publications and in 
most opportunities of interaction with Western diplomats and representatives.
62
 Of 
course, the parliamentary practice of reserving seats for minorities has been 
underscored as well. The KRG policy of opening its gates to internally-displaced 
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Christian refugees was not merely a political one.
63
 Many of the refugees were highly 
educated and were part of the intellectual and professional elites in Baghdad and 
Mosul, and the migration of thousands of them to the main Kurdish cities meant an 
important boost for the Kurdish economy, and subsequently de facto autonomy.
64
 
Nonetheless, the approach of the Kurdish leadership to the subject of Christian 
refugees, as reflected in statements by the Kurdish leadership, reflects the Kurdish 
association of the protection of minorities with sovereignty. It was Talabani, as the 
President of Iraq, who declared that “Christians should move to the secure 
autonomously administered Kurdish areas until the situation elsewhere had 
stabilised,” as reported in one newspaper.65 This is not to imply that the KRG had 
necessarily met all of its commitments in this regard, but it does serve as another good 
example of the manner in which the KRG has come to view sovereignty, interaction 
and state-building. 
One image that was often invoked by the KRG when describing Kurdistan to 
international audiences during this period was of comparing Kurdistan to relatively 
small and wealthy nations, such as the Emirate of Dubai, South Korea and Singapore. 
Almost immediately after reunification, and with the help of international aid, the 
KRG began sending business emissaries to these countries, with the purpose of 
closely observing economic development schemes, and particularly those related to 
private sector-growth, in the above mentioned countries.
66
 In June 2006, Kareem 
Sinjary, the KRG’s Minister for Internal Affairs met in Dubai with the head of the 
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Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry. During the visit, Sinjary declared that 
“Although the hardships and difficulties Iraq has always been undergoing [sic], we, in 
Kurdistan, succeeded in surpassing those difficulties and have worked on developing 
the region economically, commercially, industrially and on the tourism level and we 
are in need of Dubai's leading experience on all fronts.”67 Shortly after this visit, 
Othman Shwani, the KRG Minister of Planning, noted that the KRG aspires to draw 
from the experience of ‘successful models of places like Dubai, Singapore and South 
Korea’, but with the ultimate aim of establishing a ‘Kurdish model’.68 In 2007 
Nechirvan Barzani travelled to Dubai to meet with Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed 
Rashid Al Maktoum, the Crown Prince of Dubai and the Chairman of the Executive 
Council of Dubai to discuss bilateral relations between the emirate and the KRG. 
Shortly after, the Dubai-based English-language daily Gulf News published that 
“Kurdistan adopts Dubai plan to boost development,” with the purpose of 
encouraging investors in Dubai to also invest in the KRG.
69
 
The invocation of the above-mentioned entities was not coincidental.
70
 The 
smaller Gulf emirates, much like South Korea and Singapore, are all relatively small 
nations, surrounded by powerful and sometimes hostile neighbours, which have often 
contested these states’ independent existence. Yet, all of these actors have managed to 
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prosper economically and become financial and business centres. That Dubai has been 
conspicuous among these examples probably relates to the emirate’s vast oil wealth, 
thus aiming to associate the KRG with oil wealth in international public opinion. By 
associating itself with such actors, the KRG has been trying not only to attract 
investors, but also to signal to the international community its potential for self-
sufficiency. 
Here again, the KRG aimed its effort not only at Western states, but rather 
made efforts to attract international legitimacy from actors which, as put by Henri 
Barkey, could hardly be considered as the KRG’s “primary source[s] of legitimacy 
and… existential support.”71 One such example is the KRG’s effort to attain 
legitimacy from Russia. Although Russia has been historically more inclined to 
support Baghdad and has generally demonstrated apprehension toward separatist or 
decentralisation tendencies, the KRG could not ignore Russia in its efforts. Thus, in 
1998 the KDP sent an emissary to Moscow headed by Sami ‘Abdul Rahman to meet 
with Yevgeny Primakov, the Russian Foreign Minister,
72
 soon after establishing the 
first Kurdish representation in Moscow. The main task facing Khoshawi Babakir, the 
Kurdish representative in Moscow, was to moderate Russian antagonism toward the 
idea of Kurdish autonomy. He did so by portraying the Russian attitude toward the 
Kurds as a ‘danger to the present democratic experiment in the KRG’, which might 
lead to global instability, which Russia would probably not desire, as he put it in 
Russian.
73
 Recalling the first years of his experience in Russia, Babakir was appalled 
to find out that most of the Russian policy-makers had not even known about, or 
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chosen to ignore, the existence of the safe haven and its legal status. ‘Even the people 
closest to us,’ complains Babakir, ‘were surprised to find out about the opening of a 
“Luna Park” [amusement park] in the town of Dohuk,’ or on the activities of the 
internet cafes, ‘spread all across the city’.74 In other words, Babakir was disappointed 
to find out that the Russians did not know about the existence of Kurdish sovereignty 
over the Kurdistan Region. To change this, Babakir and his colleagues began to 
disseminate information about educational and cultural developments in the KRG, all 
published in a monthly bulletin in the Russian language, Kurdisiya Mysli [translated 
roughly as Kurdish Thought or Intellect], followed by an Internet website in the 
Russian language.
75
 With the fall of Saddam Hussein, Babakir notes, Kurdish-Russian 
relations entered ‘a new, unprecedented stage’. At present, the words “the 
Representation of the Kurdistan Regional Government” are a reality and fact in 
Moscow, and the official ministries hear and cooperate with them”.76 Russia, in turn, 
was one of the first states to open a consulate in Erbil after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein. 
The case of Kurdish relations with Moscow highlights the importance of the 
semi-formal Kurdish representations in major capitals. According to the federal 
constitution, foreign policy remained exclusively in the hands of the federal 
government in Baghdad. Yet, the KRG could not have sustained its autonomy without 
having some form of communication with pivotal actors in the international 
community. More importantly, the KRG could not have constantly projected its 
achievements, and hence legitimate its existence, without such representations. The 
first KRG representations emerged out of a unification of the KDP and PUKs’ 
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representations in London, Paris, Washington, Ankara, Teheran and Moscow. These 
were joined by new representations in Bern, Madrid (also in charge of Portugal), 
Rome, Berlin, Vienna, Sydney, and Brussels (KRG Mission to the European Union). 
The formal capacity of these representations has been to advocate economic ties 
between the KRG and potential investors, to promote Kurdish cultural events in 
different countries and provide some basic consular services, mainly relating to 
documentation. But in reality, and in continuation to the precedent of the Kurdish 
parties’ representations in Ankara, the official Kurdish representations became means 
to spread knowledge about Kurdish achievements and serve as a space for meetings 
between Kurdish representatives and politicians in those countries. That these 
representations were perceived by the KRG as an opportunity for direct contact with 
other governments is hinted in the official statement of the KRG’s UK representation: 
“For decades the people of the Kurdistan Region were deliberately isolated from the 
world under the repressive policies of previous Iraqi governments, and especially 
under Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime. Since 2003, the KRG has ensured that we are 
full participants in the international community by forging closer foreign ties.”77 
The KRG’s expectation that its economic and political progress would attract 
public attention to its cause is best demonstrated in a statement issued by the KRG EU 
mission in Brussels. When the EU failed to even mention the elections that had taken 
place earlier in Kurdistan in its 2005 report on political progress in Iraq, the KRG 
Mission protested against what it referred to as a ‘dangerous omission’: 
The report makes no reference to the elections in Kurdistan in Iraq to the 
Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA), the formation of a new Government and 
the appointment of a President of the Kurdistan federal region. KRG expresses 
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its concern, not so much because the report fails to recognise institutions 
foreseen by the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), but because the report 
makes no reference to the positive democratic example that the people of 
Kurdistan and these institutions have offered to the federal republic of Iraq and 
their important contribution to the stability of the whole region…78 
As noted in chapter 2 of this research, nonetheless, the pursuit of international 
legitimacy goes beyond the focus on democratisation and liberalisation. Economic 
viability, domestic stability and potential contribution to regional security also 
characterise the interaction of de facto states with the international community. More 
importantly, taking this into account could better explain some of the foreign policies 
and actions taken by the KRG at the international level. Two examples are the role of 
oil in the KRG’s decision-making process, and particularly the Kurdish willingness to 
take unilateral steps with regard to the extraction and export of oil in the Kurdistan 
Region even at the price of direct confrontation with Baghdad and even when the 
Kurdish short-term ability to extract oil from these reserves is doubtful; and the other 
aspect is the KRG’s enthusiastic participation in the American-led global war on 
terror. The latter aspect in particular buttresses the argument brought up in chapter 2, 
that legislation should be viewed not only as a way to establish sovereignty, but also 
as a way to demonstrate it to other actors. 
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5.6 KRG’S COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN AND THE GLOBAL WAR 
ON TERROR: OLD THREATS AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES 
The KRG’s counterinsurgency campaign in the Kurdistan Region has attracted very 
little, if any, attention. Yet, the measures taken by the KRG in its struggle against 
Islamist insurgents in the Kurdistan Region reveal an effort not only to eliminate the 
threat of terrorism to the region, but also – or even primarily – to prove to the 
international community the KRG’s sovereignty and its autonomy from Iraq, as well 
as to distance itself from its image as a habitat of illicit activity and instability. A 
closer look at the KRG’s counterinsurgency campaign, as provided in this section, 
further supports the assertion that the act of legislation can serve, in the context of de 
facto states, as yet another tool for exhibiting sovereignty and securing international 
legitimacy.    
Perhaps the key here is the KRG’s effort to integrate this regional campaign in 
the global war on terror campaign, initiated by the US following the September 11. As 
part of this global campaign, Washington began portraying the struggle against 
terrorism at the local level as yet another practice of good governance. Such effort is 
best demonstrated by the words of American President George W. Bush shortly after 
the September 11 attacks and prior to the invasion of Afghanistan: ‘Every nation, in 
every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support 
terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime’.79 While for some 
Bush’s words came to symbolise yet another dimension of American imperialist 
                                                          
79
 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” September 20, 
2001, as cited by Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 25, 2 (2001-2002), xiii-xx. 
216 
 
aspirations,
80
 others have actually come to see the speech as an effort to build a clear 
image of the enemy – a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’.81 For the KRG, such 
Manichean portrayal of international politics, even if rigid and in fact far from reality, 
has been important for defining its identity. 
The roots of the KRG’s counterinsurgency campaign date to the early 2000s, 
when Peshmerga forces battled with Islamist insurgents concentrated in the region 
surrounding the town of Halabja.
82
 Throughout 2001 the PUK Peshmerga forces 
reported clashes with Islamist militias, sponsored, according to the PUK, by Iran.
83
 
Based on some accounts at least, PUK Peshmergas had alerted American security 
agents about the possibility of a major terror attack only a few weeks prior to the 
September 11 attacks, based on their observations in the Kurdistan Region.
84
 The 
allied invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and the overthrow of the Taliban 
regime intensified the struggle of the KDP and the PUK, as it drove some members of 
the Taliban movement, Kurds and non-Kurds alike, to find refuge in the mountainous 
Halabja region, where they joined Ansar al-Islam, a Taliban-inspired splinter group of 
the IMK which was based in the region. 
                                                          
80
 G. John Ikenberry, America’s Imperial Ambitions, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2002), 44-
60; Edward Rhodes, “the Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda,” Survival 45, 1 (Spring 2003), 
131-154;  
81
 Ivan Leudar, Victoria Marsland, and Jiri Nekvapil, “On Membership Categorization: ‘Us’, ‘Them’ 
and ‘Doing Violence’ in Political Discourse,” Discourse and Society 15 (2004), 243-266. 
82
 Although earlier signs could actually be traced back to 1993, when PUK Peshmergas fought the IMK 
militias in the prelude to the civil war. 
83
 International Crisis Group, “Radical Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan: the Mouse that Roared,” Iraq Briefing, 
February 7, 2003, pp. 8-9 Available on: 
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Le
banon/Iraq/B004%20Radical%20Islam%20In%20Iraqi%20Kurdistan%20The%20Mouse%20That%20
Roared.ashx> (last retrieved: December 14, 2010), 
84
 Quil Lawrence, Invisible Nation (New York: Walker and Company, 2008), 112. 
217 
 
As Quil Lawrence tells us, in contrast to other governments in the region, the 
KRG did not bandwagon on September 11 to gain American support.
85
 However, this 
began changing already toward the end of 2001. Gradually, the Kurdish parties were 
trying to make the case that local insurgents were actually associated with global al-
Qa’eda networks, thus positioning themselves on the side of the US and its allies. 
Jalal Talabani, for example, referred in one of his statements to Ansar as ‘a kind of 
Taliban’,86 while the mountainous base of the movement in Halabja came to be 
referred to by Peshmergas as ‘little Tora Bora’, in reference to the Taliban’s 
stronghold in Afghanistan.
87
 Other reports from the region claimed that Ansar served 
as a proxy for Saddam Hussein in his efforts to undermine the KRG, and that the 
organisation had received arms and training from Baghdad.
88
 In this manner, the KRG 
also associated the Ba’th government with al-Qa’eda, thus stressing the distinction 
between the Kurds and Baghdad. 
While Ansar may indeed have had some connections to al-Qa’eda networks,89 
in reality it constituted a rather marginal threat to the Kurdish parties and their hold on 
the Kurdistan Region. Albeit divided, the secular KDP and PUK were still far more 
powerful militarily than Ansar, holding tens of thousands of relatively well trained 
and well equipped fighters, vis-à-vis the 700 fighters strong Ansar militia.
90
 Even 
politically, Ansar had less popular support than the Kurdish parties, including in its 
own enclave of Halabja. A report by the International Crisis Group referred to Ansar 
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as a “minor spoiler in predominantly secular Kurdish politics in the Suleimaniyeh 
region.”91 In March 2003 the PUK Peshmerga forces managed to destroy Ansar’s 
strongholds with some limited American support, forcing most of Ansar’s members to 
flee to Iran.
92
 
In light of Ansar’s apparent weakness, one may question the KRG’s insistence 
on linking Ansar with al-Qa’eda; a material explanation would suggest that, like other 
regimes in the region, the Kurdish parties sought to secure material aid for its fight 
against a terrorist threat. Yet, the Kurdish militias were already the recipients of aid as 
part of the anti-Ba’th coalition. The obvious weakness of Ansar rendered more 
assistance unnecessary. In other words, the Kurds did not need more assistance 
against Ansar. A better explanation, therefore, is a one which takes the KRG’s pursuit 
of legitimacy into account: by portraying their fight against Ansar as part of the global 
war on terror, the Sulaymaniyah-based KRG was able to prove that the Kurdish 
authorities are keen to, and capable of, contributing to regional and international 
stability and that threats to those is to be removed by its security forces. 
The KRG’s conduct in the post-2003 period further supports this argument. 
While the rest of Iraq experienced terrorist attacks in an unprecedented scale, the 
KRG remained relatively safe of Islamist terrorism. In February 2004, Ansar al-
Sunnah, an offshoot of Ansar al-Islam, launched a suicide attack in Erbil which 
resulted in 117 casualties, among them Sami ‘Abdul Rahman, one of the KDP’s 
distinguished leaders. Nonetheless, this was the last and only major attack in 
Kurdistan.
93
 All in all, the Kurdistan Region experienced between the years 2003 and 
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2010 between 7 and 16 terrorist attacks, most of whom resulting in no casualties; this 
is against thousands of documented terror attacks in the rest of Iraq (including the 
disputed territories in Kirkuk).
94
 Although partly the result of the KRG’s long-term 
isolation from the rest of Iraq, it was also promoted by the KRG as one of its 
achievements.
95
 Masrour Barzani, the head of the KDP’s Security Agency, Parastin, 
commented in an interview about terrorism as a security threat to the region that, 
‘Yes, there is [a terrorist threat to the region], but it is much lower than to other parts 
of Iraq. And it would have been great had we not fought Islamist movements in the 
region and outside of it.’96 Politically as well, the only active Islamist party in the 
Kurdistan Region, the Kurdistan Islamic Union, was co-opted into the KRG as a 
member of the KA bloc in 2005. 
In spite of that, and in spite of the removal of Ansar from the region, the KRG 
kept demonstrating to the international community its commitment to 
counterinsurgency. In 2006 the Kurdistan Parliament (KP – replacing the KNA) 
passed a regional counterterrorism bill, Law No. 3 (2006): Anti-Terror Law in the 
Kurdistan Region.
97
 The bill was passed a year after a similar legislation was passed 
by the Council of Representatives in Baghdad, and in fact is somewhat similar to the 
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Iraqi legislation.
98
 Given that national security remained, according to the Iraqi 
constitution, in the hands of the government in Baghdad, one may question the 
necessity of the KRG to formulate such legislation. Moreover, the KRG had already 
had laws defining acts of terrorism and setting penalties, namely Articles 53 and 56 of 
Law 1, which the new counterterrorism bill drew from.
99
 Hence, the KRG’s need to 
come up with such a bill came to be questioned by outside observers: Hogr Chato, a 
legal expert from the region, maintained that: “there is no real need to issue an anti-
terrorism law if it is possible to use the Iraqi penal law which is in effect and which 
contains penalties more severe than the penalties mentioned in the Kurdistan 
parliament’s anti-terrorism law.”100 
One explanation for the KRG’s embracement of such counterterrorism 
measures is the Kurdish leadership’s effort to whitewash and legitimise abuse of 
political prisoners. Rebeen Rasul, a journalist from the region, for example, expressed 
his fear that “there are many gaps in the law which will permit security forces to 
prosecute those who oppose government policies.”101 A Human Rights Watch report 
as well related the torture of prisoners in regional detention facilities to the KRG’s 
anti-terror legislation.
102
 Nevertheless, such explanation fails to fully explain the 
KRG’s motivation in coming up with a unilateral, regional legislation. Certainly, the 
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KRG may have abused the legislation to silence political opposition. But this could 
have been done in the framework of the Iraqi legislation. 
The counterinsurgency legislation, therefore, as well other dimensions of the 
KRG’s counterinsurgency policies, could be understood if examined through the 
prism of its pursuit of international legislation. The Anti-Terror Law served as an 
opportunity for the KRG to prove that it is an important element in regional 
counterinsurgency efforts. If the KRG was aspiring to portray itself as an oasis of 
stability, then the Anti-Terror Law added a legal (statist) dimension into that.
103
 More 
so, formulating its own legislation on such a publicly-debated subject further 
demonstrated the KRG’s independence of the government in Baghdad. To put it 
shortly, the KRG’s counterinsurgency campaign served as yet example for the manner 
in which the act of legislation came to serve as yet another way for the KRG as a de 
facto state to prove its sovereignty. That the KRG was somewhat aware of that can be 
viewed in an article published in al-Ittihad, the PUK’s Arabic-language pamphlet; 
responding to the argument that Iraq’s criminal law can serve the KRG in its war on 
local terrorism, the article justified the Anti-Terror Law by arguing that “taking into 
account the uniqueness of the Kurdistan Region and bestowing it with the necessary 
distinction in a manner harmonious and consistent with our Kurdistani identity.”104 
That such text was published in Arabic, rather than Kurdish, can teach us that the 
KRG was trying to make a statement not only to its domestic audience, but also, or 
maybe even primarily, to those outside that were closely observing its increasing 
autonomy.  
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Although somewhat different in context, the issue of natural resources in the 
Kurdistan Region (namely oil), serves as yet another example for the manner in which 
the Kurdish de facto state’s pursuit of legitimacy can explain its policies and how the 
act of legislation can also serve as a demonstration of domestic sovereignty. 
 
5.7 THE KRG’S UNILATERALISM WITH REGARD TO OIL RESERVES IN 
THE KURDISTAN REGION: PROVING ECONOMIC VIABILITY 
The question of oil is particularly significant to the examination of Kurdish de facto 
statehood not only because of the centrality of oil to Iraq’s economy and to post-
conflict reconstruction in the country, but also because in no other field was Kurdish 
unilateralism so conspicuous as with regard to the question of control and use of oil 
reserves in the Kurdistan Region and the disputed territories. In the aftermath of the 
overthrow of the Ba’th regime, the KRG put control over oil production and export at 
the core of its aspirations to consolidate and legitimise its autonomy. To achieve that, 
the KRG did not hesitate to go, on some occasions, for direct confrontation with 
Baghdad and to act unilaterally on several fronts. Such unilateral steps included 
regional legislation which stood, at least according to Baghdad’s interpretation, 
against the constitution and initial agreements between the Kurds and Baghdad; as 
well independent contracts between the KRG and international oil corporations 
without Baghdad’s authorisation. Such actions have attracted great attention from 
various observers. Most of those observers have viewed the KRG’s actions as driven 
by its desire to secure revenues either for the purpose of secession from Iraq,
105
 or for 
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domestic purposes, namely the sustainment of its system of patronage through its civil 
service.
106
 
Following the general line of this thesis, this section argues that Kurdish 
unilateralism with regard to oil could be better understood through the prism of 
Kurdish pursuit of international legitimacy. As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, 
the KRG has relied on funds allocated to it by Baghdad. Unilateralism potentially 
risked this income and thus the KRG’s system of patronage in the region. Moreover, 
as Iraq’s federal income derived mainly from oil, the KRG had financial incentives to 
maintain the constant flow of oil located in northern Iraq. Finally, the landlocked 
Kurdistan Region depends on Ankara as its gate to oil markets in Europe; however, 
Ankara made it clear on various occasions that it would not allow the KRG to 
unilaterally export its oil through Turkey’s territory. The KRG has been aware of that, 
which in fact undermines the idea that it was motivated purely by the search of 
immediate revenues. As I argue here, KRG’s unilateralism aimed primarily to 
demonstrate to the international community Kurdish control over oil reserves in its 
territory, and subsequently its domestic sovereignty. By exhibiting control over its oil 
reserves, the KRG sought to signal the international community that even without 
legal sovereignty, the KRG could function as an economically viable entity. Though 
independence probably did stand in the background of the KRG’s actions, it was not 
the search for immediate secession that motivated its unilateral policy. One may argue 
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that for the Kurdish leadership, control over natural resources in Kurdistan came to be 
associated with sovereignty.
107
 
The fact that oil has been central to the Kurdish strife with Baghdad should not 
come as a surprise, given the fact that oil has stood at the core of Iraqi statehood, and 
that some of the most important oil reserves in Iraq are actually located in the 
Kurdistan Region or in for the contested territories in Kikuk, Diyala and Ninawa.
108
 
Certainly, the Kurdish leadership has gone through great efforts to demonstrate its 
entitlement and ability to extract oil from reserves in its territory. That short-term 
financial gains have been secondary to the effort to secure domestic sovereignty could 
already be noted in 1992, when the Kurdish leadership tried to establish some 
skeleton of a Kurdish national oil corporation (KurdOil), without even having the 
means to extract oil, and under an international embargo.
109
  
The first signs of Kurdish unilateralism emerged shortly after the reunification 
of the KRG. While the KA initially took part in the negotiations in Baghdad over the 
national Hydrocarbon legislation, these negotiations soon reached an impasse. At least 
one of the reasons for stagnation was the KRG’s support for the use of Production 
Sharing Agreement (PSA) while the other members of the coalition objected to such 
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form of contraction.
110
 Frustrated by this stagnation,
111
 the KP passed in June 2007 the 
first draft of an autonomous Petroleum Law,
112 
which eventually turned into the 
Hydrocarbon Law passed in the KP in 2009.
113
 Based on this legislation, which 
accepted PSA as an acceptable (if not preferable) form of contraction, the KRG now 
claimed rights to sign contracts independently with international oil corporations for 
the extraction and export of oil from reserves in the Kurdistan Region. And indeed, 
shortly after signing the draft legislation the KRG declared that it was now capable of 
exporting crude oil in commercial quantities. It soon signed a PSA with several small 
and medium-size foreign companies to start oil extraction.
114
 While initially the KRG 
expressed its commitment to sharing its income from oil with the central government, 
six months after the Hydrocarbon Bill was passed the President of the Region, Mas’ud 
Barzani, declared during a visit to the European Parliament that the KRG would keep 
for itself revenues from the extracted oil, since ‘they [Baghdad] often use it against us 
[the Kurds]’.115 On the same event, Barzani called on the EU to “help Kurdistan ‘on 
how we can establish a successful administration, a good health and education system, 
and to have an independent judicial system and proper governance’,” and urged 
European companies to invest in the KRG.
116
 
This Kurdish unilateralism entailed immediate hostility and suspicion not only 
from Baghdad’s side, but also from Ankara. In Iraq, the KRG’s “insistence on a 
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decentralized oil regulation system… has helped awaken the sleeping giant of Iraqi 
nationalism.”117 Iraq’s Minister of Oil at the time, Huassian al-Shahristani, described 
Kurdish oil exports as ‘illegal and illegitimate’,118 while members of other parties and 
non-governmental organisations urged the government to fight this move.
119
 In 
reaction to these claims, the KRG’s Natural Resources Minister, Dr. Ashti Hawrami, 
justified this move by stating that ‘We do not want to be hobbled by the political 
paralysis in Baghdad’.120  He also invoked articles 112 and 115 in the Iraqi 
constitution, interpreting them as allowing regional governments in oil-producing 
governorates to ‘administer and supervise the extraction process’ and meant that 
‘local oilfield managers are answerable to the local authorities’.121 
Ankara as well objected to Kurdish unilateralism. Not only was Turkey 
deterred by anything that smelled of Kurdish separatism, but it also had independent 
agreements with Baghdad with regard to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. Syria and Iran 
as well have been hostile toward Kurdish independent oil exports.
122
 Shortly after the 
KP passed the law, Turkey’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister Hilmi Güler 
travelled to Iraq and met with Sahristani, in order to ratify the signing of the 
cooperation agreement between the two countries, and especially a proposed pipeline 
to carry oil from Iraq to Western Europe through Turkey.
123 
It was also reported that 
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Turkey was considering a military operation in case the KRG was to execute any of 
the contracts it signed.
124
 Even if such reports were exaggerated, they still reflected 
Ankara’s hostility toward Kurdish unilateralism. True, Turkish energy corporations, 
such as Genel Enerji, also signed contracts with the KRG, thus benefiting from its 
conduct. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that most Turkish activism in the 
Kurdistan Region was done in coordination with Baghdad. As I elaborate in the next 
section, the KRG was prepared for such reaction, trying to soften it by demonstrating 
Ankara the benefits of access to oil. However, at least during the period following the 
passing of the Hydrocarbon Law in the region, Ankara remained stern in its hostility 
to Kurdish independent action. Facing uncertainties and instability, no major oil firm 
responded positively to the KRG’s step, and all of the initial production and 
exploration contracts were with smaller risk-taking firms.
125
 
Thus, an explanation that gives more attention to the KRG’s pursuit of 
international legitimacy and desire to consolidate and demonstrate its domestic 
sovereignty can better serve us in understanding the KRG’s oil policy. By passing 
regional laws and signing contracts with international oil corporations the KRG risked 
(to a certain extent) some of its immediate sources of income, but gained an 
opportunity to demonstrate to the international community its sovereignty as well as 
its economic viability. 
Of course, assuming that the KRG was not interested in oil revenues would be 
naïve. Rather, the argument here is that the KRG was actually willing to risk some of 
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its short-term income under the assumption that demonstrating would help it to 
consolidate its sovereignty and, in the long-term, serve it in attaining more 
international legitimacy for its currently contested status. To put it simply, one should 
not hesitate relating to the Kurdish leadership some long-term planning in its strategy. 
Embracing this has in fact some implications not only for our understanding of the 
KRG, but also for the resolution of the conflict between the KRG and Baghdad. If 
indeed contestation over oil is not merely a competition over financial gains, but is 
actually associated with the desire for sovereignty and the perception of statehood, 
then a revision of current allocation of oil income within the existing framework is 
probably not a viable solution,
126
 since it does not settle the KRG’s contested status 
and does not respond to the Kurdish aspiration to maintain and even expand their 
autonomy.  
In a retrospect, the KRG’s constant effort to legitimise its de facto autonomy 
from Baghdad by constantly presenting its domestic sovereignty during the second 
decade of its existence did not go unnoticed, as several observers acknowledged the 
KRG’s success in maintaining stability and relative prosperity in Kurdistan. Already 
in 2005 Leezenberg noted that “The relative peace and prosperity of present-day Iraqi 
Kurdistan are unprecedented.”127 Dennis Chapman, working closely with the 
autonomous Kurdish security forces, stated that “Where other parties and militias in 
the Middle East have adopted the radical models of Marxism or militant Islam and 
often moved into the orbit of rogue regimes, the KDP and PUK and their forces have 
moderated themselves, remaining consistently secular… [and] openly seeking alliance 
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with the United States and the West instead.”128 A symbolic aspect of increased 
international legitimacy was the willingness of governments to establish consulates in 
Erbil. While the opening of foreign consulates in provincial town in itself is not an 
exceptional step, it was the first time in Iraq’s history that consulates were actually 
established in the Kurdistan Region. The first states to establish consulates in Erbil 
were Germany, France, Russia, and Iran. They were soon joined by the US, UK and 
Sweden. The establishment of consulates had a functional aspect, as now more 
foreigners were arriving to the Kurdistan Region as contractors, tourists and 
volunteers. And yet, the idea of establishing such representations in the Kurdistan 
Region was almost unheard of during the 1990s, although foreign nationals were 
already active in the region during that period. That the setting up of consulates was a 
sort of “vote of confidence” in the KRG is exemplified in the US Congress Resolution 
873 of 2009 to launch a consulate in Erbil. According to the resolution, entitled 
Establishing a United States Consulate in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: “[T]he 
establishment of a United States Consulate in the Kurdistan Region will demonstrate a 
United States commitment to maintaining and building upon the success and stability 
of this prosperous and democratic Iraqi region.”129 In order to regulate these relations, 
the KRG also reformed its own foreign service and re-established the Department of 
Foreign Relations as a ministerial department, headed by the Western-educated Falah 
Mustafa Bakir. 
The KRG’s greatest success in this regard was the establishment of a Turkish 
consulate in Erbil in 2010. This event marked a peak in a prolonged campaign, in 
which the KRG tried to legitimise its existence not only through demonstrating its 
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economic viability and progressive nature, but also its potential contribution to 
regional stability and to countering Turkey’s concerns about regional instability and 
the threat of PKK terrorism. Focusing on the constantly changing nature of relations 
between Turkey and the KRG, it provides us with a clearer example for the manner in 
which the KRG’s emphasis on stability and economic viability, including its control 
over oil reserves in the Kurdistan Region, came into play. And since Turkey can be 
described as one of the most important veto-states with regard to the future status of 
the Kurdistan Region, it makes some sense to conclude this chapter by providing an 
analysis of Ankara-KRG relations. 
 
5.8 THE KRG AND TURKEY POST-2003: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON 
LEGITIMATION 
Relations between Ankara and Erbil deserve special attention.
130
 As one of the 
region’s most economically developed and militarily powerful countries, Turkey has 
also been the main veto-power with regard to any change in the status of the 
Kurdistan Region. Nevertheless, Turkey’s approach to the idea of Kurdish autonomy 
witnessed some noteworthy vicissitudes since 2003. While initially the AKP 
government was alarmed by developments in the Kurdistan Region and in Iraq, it 
soon changed its policies and embraced a new attitude to the idea of Kurdish 
autonomy. Capturing this transformation in his thorough analysis of Erbil-Ankara 
relations in the years 2003-2004, Robert Olson argues that whereas during the 1990s 
relations between Turkey and the Kurdistan Region could be described as state-to-
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region relations, since 2003 they turned into State-to-government(s) relations.
131
 This 
change was a product of the wider developments in Iraq and in the region, most 
notably the almost total collapse of Iraqi central governance, but also of Kurdish well-
designed effort to secure Turkish legitimacy for the existence of Kurdish de facto 
statehood. 
As noted earlier, during the late 1990s Ankara became more receptive to the 
idea of an autonomous Kurdistan Region, maybe under the assumption that the Kurds 
could not unify their region again in the aftermath of civil war. The invasion of Iraq in 
2003 and the new role taken by the Kurds in Baghdad revived Turkish fears about the 
prospect of Kurdish statehood in the Kurdistan Region. In the immediate aftermath of 
the invasion, consequently, the AKP government witnessed all of its “red lines” in the 
region being crossed one-by-one. The Kurdish parties were now gaining 
unprecedented political power in Iraq through the IGC. The Peshmerga became the 
most formidable and best organised fighting force in the country, enhancing the status 
of the Kurds as the only able allies of the coalition troops. Kirkuk, seen as the 
cornerstone of a future Kurdish state in Ankara’s eyes, was now going through an 
evident process of Kurdification under indirect control of the Kurdish parties.
132
 And 
the Kurdish autonomy now became a legal entity with an even wider autonomy. 
Alarmed by these developments, Ankara now tried to find new ways to 
maintain influence in Iraq and halt the expansion of Kurdish autonomy. The 2005 
elections in the Kurdistan Region entailed a somewhat Pavlovian response from 
Ankara, with the spokesman of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declaring that 
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the election of Barzani for regional presidency ‘does not carry much meaning’.133 To 
this the KRG Mission in Europe responded that 
The statement issued by Namik Tan, Turkey's Foreign Affiairs [sic] Ministry 
spokeman [sic], on 15 June is short-sighted, outdated and politically and 
diplomatically inappropriate… This is indeed surprising since the inauguration 
of President Barzani was attended by the president of Iraq and other dignitaries 
from the federal government, representatives of the US and UK -- both allies of 
Turkey… during the inauguration ceremony, President Barzani said: “We 
respect all neighboring countries and extend a hand of friendship to them. We 
will also work to establish best relations based on mutual respect and 
friendship”… President Barzani clearly expressed that the Kurdistan 
Government will not play a destabilising role in the region.
134
 
Soon Ankara began taking a more active line of action in order to neutralise 
Kurdish autonomy, namely direct intervention in the region. Turkish military 
incursions as part of the “hot pursuits” after PKK insurgents had already taken place 
during the 1990s, with the KRG’s consent, but the first post-war (consensual) Turkish 
presence was that of the unarmed observers sent from Ankara to Kirkuk in the 
aftermath of the fall of the city in 2003. In other cases such intervention took more 
sinister forms, such as assassination attempts on Kurdish officials. In one case, which 
came to be known as the 4th of July incident, an American marine force discovered a 
unit of the Turkish Special Forces on their way to assassinate the Kurdish mayor of 
Kirkuk, ‘Abdul Rahman Mustafa. The Turkish soldiers were detained and their heads 
were covered in bags, which brought back images of the Guantanamo Bay detainees 
and caused uproar among the Turkish public.
135
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Another tactic used by Ankara to put Kurdish autonomy in check was to 
amplify its role as the protector of the Turkic-speaking Turkoman minority in 
northern Iraq. Turkey had shown an interest in the fate of the Turkomans already 
during the 1990s, but this interest increased dramatically during the period of the 
invasion, probably mobilised by Turkey to justify its intervention in Iraq.
136
 A paper 
published by a leading a Turkish think-tank reflects clearly the main-stream thinking 
about the Turkoman community in Iraq. Referring to the Turkomans as “Constituting 
one of the three major entities of the modern Iraqi State,”137 the paper stresses the 
utility of the Turkomans in Turkey’s effort to gain some leverage in Iraq, especially in 
case of the emergence of “an autonomous, federal or independent Kurdish rule in 
Northern Iraq.”138 The ITF became one of Turkey’s main proxies for putting pressure 
on the Iraqi government and the KRG. Yet, Turkey’s support of the ITF fell short of 
drawing it into a direct conflict with the coalition forces as well as the Kurdish 
militias. 
Turkey’s ambivalence toward the Turkoman question was demonstrated in the 
case of the Tal ‘Afar raid (also known as Operation Black Typhoon), which took place 
in September 2004. The raid on the predominantly Turkoman town in the Ninawa 
governorate, north-west of the Kurdistan Region, was conducted by American forces 
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backed by Peshmerga forces in order to clean the city of al-Qa’eda nests. Among the 
casualties of the battle were many of the town’s Turkoman residents.139 On top of 
that, a Kurd from the town’s Kurdish minority was nominated by the CPA as its 
mayor.
140
 Ankara was gravely concerned with these developments and Turkish 
officials intensified their pressure on the American forces to show restraint and 
protect the lives of unarmed civilians in the town, and especially members of the 
Turkoman community.
141
 Ankara was painfully aware of the Kurdish participation, as 
revealed in Turkish media outlets from the period.
142
 Turkish officials initially refused 
to acknowledge Kurdish participation, and communicated directly only with 
American representatives. On the other hand, Ankara did not take any major punitive 
measure against the Kurdish parties. More importantly, the Tal ‘Afar events made the 
AKP government realise that the KRG actually runs the affairs in the Kurdistan 
Region. Interviewed by journalists about the developments in northern Iraq, Foreign 
Minister Gül urged what he defined as Iraq’s ‘influential circles’ to stop the killing of 
‘ethnic Turks’.143 This vague statement, put in the context of events in Tal-‘Afar, 
could easily be understood as directed to the leaders of the KRG, or to the Kurdish 
representatives in Baghdad. 
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The presence of the PKK on the border between the Kurdistan Region and 
Turkey served as another incentive for the latter to deal with the KRG. Already during 
the 1990s the KRG proved its willingness to limit the PKK’s ability to launch attacks 
from the KRG’s controlled territory and this commitment was exhibited again 
following the US-led invasion of Iraq. As reported by the Turkish PM’s office, in 
August 2006 Kurdish PM Nechirvan Barzani met with Murat Karayılan, Öcalan’s 
successor as the PKK leader, in which he condemned the PKK’s cross-border attacks 
and warned him that “he would not allow such actions.”144 Relating to a possible 
Turkish raid on the PKK, Talabani stated in November 2007 that ‘the operation will 
be limited in scale and will not affect relations with the Kurds of Turkey’.145 During 
2008 Kurdish leaders became even more blatant in their critique of the PKK, with 
Talabani openly criticising the PKK as being responsible for Turkish incursions into 
Iraq,
146
 Barzani condemning PKK attacks in a meeting with John Negroponte,
147
 the 
American Deputy Secretary of State, and both leaders condemning the PKK’s cross-
border operations jointly during this year.
148
 In another joint statement, Barzani and 
Talabani declared that ‘We recognise Turkey’s right to defend itself against terror. We 
are familiar with Turkey’s sensitivities. We will not remain quiet but will not declare 
war’.149 And after a visit by President Gül to Iraq, Talabani told journalists that ‘This 
is our advice: either the PKK abandons the armed struggle, or it must leave our 
country… Terror affects all of us negatively’.150 That these statements were recorded 
and published by the Turkish PM’s official news agency reflects at least some 
acceptance in Ankara of their viability.  
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The KRG from its side often made sure to demonstrate to Turkey that any 
effective action could only be taken in coordination with the Kurdish authorities. Ayın 
Tarihi records various statements made by Kurdish leaders which can be interpreted 
as explicitly hostile to Turkish intervention in the region. In 2006, Talabani, as the 
President of Iraq, protested after a meeting with Barzani against joint Iranian-Turkish 
operations in the Kurdistan Region, maintaining that ‘the [Iraqi] government rejected 
the understanding between the Ba’th regime and Turkey regarding cross-border 
operations’.151 In 2007 Barzani was quoted by Ayın Tarihi, threatening that “If 
Turkey intervenes in Kirkuk, we as well will intervene in Diyarbakir and revolutionise 
[Turkey’s] 30 million Kurds”.152 And in another instance, the Iraqi Minister of 
Interior, “speaking on behalf of the KRG” (according to Ankara), referred to Turkey’s 
air attacks against the PKK as a ‘violation of Iraq’s territory’.153 Nonetheless, in spite 
of their militant content, such statements should be seen more as a way for the KRG 
to bargain its stand vis-à-vis Ankara, rather than genuine threats. The KRG did not 
have the ability to prevent Turkish incursions into its territory, but it could utilise 
them to secure its autonomous existence. And despite its relative weakness vis-à-vis 
Turkey, the KRG often proved capable of limiting Turkish actions within the region. 
As a KRG official described to researcher Michael Knights, although Turkish soldiers 
are located within the region, with the KRG’s approval, they were blocked on 
different occasions by the Peshmerga from taking action against the PKK forces in the 
region.
154
 After all, at the end of the day the KRG too had an interest in removing 
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PKK elements from the region, but without being viewed as coming against the 
Kurdish cause in Anatolia.
155
 
The PKK, nevertheless, was not the only factor affecting relations between 
Erbil and Ankara. The economic opportunities that the KRG could offer Turkish 
contractors and investors, as well as Turkish government-owned corporations, have 
also enabled transformations in Kurdish-Turkish relations. According to some 
accounts, about 500 Turkish corporations have been active in Erbil and 
Sulaymaniyah, constituting around half of the foreign companies in the region and 
enjoying revenues of billions of dollars.
156
 The border-town of Zakho, up until 2003 a 
desolated post on the Iraqi (KRG)-Turkish border and a centre of smuggling, now 
became a gate for flourishing legal (in addition to continuing illegal) economic 
activity. As “the Other Iraq” campaign, as well as the KRG’s unilateralism with 
regard to oil, reveal, the KRG had already recognised the power of economic interests 
in securing its legitimacy, and Turkish firms had been encouraged to take part in the 
Kurdish economic boom in the region. Already prior to the passing of the KRG’s 
independent Hydrocarbon Law in the KP, the Kurdish leadership was trying to 
persuade Turkish authorities about the potential benefits of such a step. In March 
2007 for example, Hawrami argued that ‘It is in Turkey’s interest to be in direct 
contact with us. It is a “first come first served” situation… There are 20-25 billion 
barrels of oil reserves in Kurdistan. It is more than we need.’ Hence he added, ‘it is in 
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Turkey’s interest as well to establish relations with us.’157 Shortly after the passing of 
the draft law, Barzani and Hawrami found it necessary to publicly deny Kurdish 
support of PKK guerrillas in the Kurdistan Region.
158
 As Natali described it, the 
Kurdish leadership invited the Turkish government to “invade economically and not 
militarily.”159 Though Ankara remained consistent in denying the KRG the right to 
independently export Kurdish oil through its territory, its willingness to trade with 
KRG and indeed the rapidly increasing volume of trade between both governments 
may serve as an indication of Ankara’s willingness to reconsider its stand on the 
matter as well, in case stagnation in Iraqi oil export continues. Henri Barkey has noted 
that Ankara as well came to view the KRG as a stabilising factor within Iraq. The 
Kurdish fierce fighting against Islamist groups in northern-Iraq and its objection to 
implementing the Shari’a law in Iraq, a demand often advocated by Shiite and Sunni 
parties in Baghdad, have led Ankara to see the Kurds as a reliable actor within Iraq.
160
 
 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
The second decade of Kurdish de facto autonomy from Baghdad witnessed a further 
consolidation of Kurdish sovereignty over the Kurdish provinces. The Kurdish 
administrations were gradually reunified; the status of the Kurdistan Region as an 
entity within federal Iraq provided the Kurds with new avenues for interaction with 
the international community, as did international aid that increased following the 
overthrow of the Ba’th regime; and the new reality in Baghdad provided the Kurds 
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with new political powers, with Kurdish politicians often playing the role of lobbyists 
for the Kurdish cause. Against this background, the KRG was able to continue its 
efforts to legitimise its existence, a task which remained a central foreign policy aim, 
since increasing signs of Kurdish independence now irritated its neighbours, 
particularly Ankara. 
The collapse of the Iraqi state and its descent into a near civil war and 
sectarian violence served the Kurds well in their efforts to emphasise their 
achievements in terms of maintaining regional security and stability and reforming 
their political system. The discourse of the “democratic experience” from the 1990s 
turned into the “other Iraq” and the emphasis on democratisation of the political 
system was supplemented by Kurdish efforts to prove that their authorities are capable 
of maintaining local security as well as contributing to a regional one. Oil reserves in 
the region served the KRG in exhibiting its potential economic viability. The need to 
continue and rely on these factors in their interaction with the international 
community can explain why the Kurdish leadership was often willing to take certain 
decisions that did not settle well with its short-term interests, such as the willingness 
to go for conflict in Baghdad and risk its income that was flowing from the Iraqi 
government. The main contribution of this chapter to this work, in addition to further 
demonstrating the importance of the pursuit of international legitimacy, has been to 
point out the changing nature of this pursuit amid the development of the KRG, and 
its impact on other aspects of Kurdish foreign policy. It also supported the argument 
raised in chapter 2 with regard to the importance of legislation as a mechanism of 
national liberation in de facto states. The following chapter complements this one, by 
showing how the pursuit of international legitimacy relying on domestic sovereignty 
could actually pave the way for further political reforms. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL 
LEGITIMACY AND THE PROCESS OF STATE-BUILDING: 
EXPLAINING DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE 
KRG 
The domestic sphere of de facto states and its development against the background of 
non-recognition and limited legitimacy is an important element in this study. The 
argument carried in this research is that the pursuit of legitimacy at the international 
level, which is based to a great extent on the actor’s domestic sovereignty, may pave 
the way to further developments at the domestic level. This depends on the manner in 
which de facto states formulate their pursuit of legitimacy, the domestic structure of 
the de facto state, and its exposure to and interaction with the international 
community. In the case of the KRG, as in some other cases of de facto statehood, the 
pursuit of international legitimacy relied to a great extent on successful state-building, 
democratisation and liberalisation of the political, social and economic systems. And 
indeed, various observers have witnessed some progress in the KRG, at least in terms 
of a political transition toward a more representative political system in the region. As 
this chapter demonstrates, this transition is to a large extent the result of transnational 
advocacy which relied on coalitions of external and local actors, all taking part in the 
constitution of the KRG and utilising the KRG’s pursuit of international legitimacy in 
advocating their principles and values. 
In this sense, this chapter supplements the previous chapters. Whilst those 
focused mainly on the KRG’s emergence as a de facto state and its foreign policy and 
interaction with the international community, this chapter elaborates more on the 
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impact of this interaction on the KRG’s domestic developments in the fields of 
democratisation and liberalisation of the political system. Special focus is given to the 
subject of the struggle with regard to women’s rights and the transnational struggle 
against gender-based violence in the region. This is because this subject reveals how 
transnational networks committed to a certain principle managed to utilise the KRG’s 
need for legitimacy, its constant commitment to reform and the importance of 
emerging global norms for advocating shifts in certain areas. 
 
6.1 THE CONTEXT OF DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATION: THE KRG’S 
DOMESTIC STRUCTURE AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF 
INTERACTION AND INTERVENTION DURING THE FIRST TWO 
DECADES OF ITS FORMATION 
Internationally-held ideas and norms played an important part in the KRG’s 
development and interaction. Understanding their impact requires us to take two 
factors into account when examining the KRG. The first is that of interaction between 
the KRG and the international community. The second factor is the KRG’s domestic 
structure, namely the nature of Kurdish governance and the relations between the 
KRG and the Kurdish population. Interaction is essential because it is through 
interaction that new ideas have been conveyed to the KRG. Such ideas have 
percolated through the KRG’s domestic structure which has determined the level of 
influence certain ideas may have on the Kurdish leadership. 
Notwithstanding the double embargo, the KRG interacted with other actors 
throughout its existence, such as NGOs, aid-relief organisations and UN agencies. 
Members of the diaspora have served this process of interaction by mitigating 
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between the KRG and external actors, but also by exposing the Kurdish population to 
external actors. The previous chapter indicated that the legalisation of the KRG’s 
autonomy in the new Iraqi constitution expanded the scope of interaction by allowing 
new actors to join the process of state-building in the Kurdistan Region and by 
making it easier for the Kurdish leadership to travel and meet with new actors. The 
activity of NGOs and aid-relief agencies in the region has been relatively consistent 
and rather influential. While prior to 2003 those organisations had refrained from 
assisting the KRG in capacity-building, this changed with the overthrow of the Ba’th 
regime. International aid to the region then entered a new stage, which Denise Natali 
has defined as that of the democracy mission. During this period, foreign assistance 
transformed from the “traditional delivery of goods” into “capacity building and long-
term development.” Enjoying more domestic legitimacy following its reunification 
and agreements with Baghdad, the KRG was now encouraged by the providers of aid 
to introduce ideas about governance and the roles of the state into the region, mainly 
through the education system and school curriculum. As Natali describes the new 
reality, “External aid programs reinforced existing civil society-building efforts such 
as training workshops for youth, human rights campaigns, and technical assistance 
based on anticorruption, violence against women, and civic education.”1 In addition to 
the Kurdification of the school curricula, “Democracy mission norms – human rights, 
religious freedom, and gender equality – were incorporated into the academic 
curricula, while English was adopted as a second language in all schools.”2 
Natali’s review of international aid to the Kurdistan Region is somewhat rigid, 
as demonstrated earlier in this volume. Capacity building efforts, including 
endeavours to democratise the KRG, took place already during what she defines as 
                                                          
1
 Denise Natali, The Kurdish Quasi State, 76. 
2
 Ibid, 89. 
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the aid relief phase. Already in the early 1990s NGOs had tried to shape the emerging 
democratic experiment, as election monitors and as advisors to the KRG.
3
 
Furthermore, Natali does not devote sufficient attention to the causal link between 
international aid and domestic political change, focusing more on the changing nature 
of aid. Natali has been, however, one of the first to realise and examine the impact of 
international aid and interaction between the KRG and aid-providers on the evolution 
of the political, social and economic system in the region. Based on Natali’s review, 
several conclusions can be drawn: 
 First, international aid served to expose the Kurdish leadership and people to 
international society, mainly by amplifying the Kurdish plight internationally, 
but also by conveying international norms and practices of good statehood into 
the KRG. 
 Second, the activities of international aid agencies somewhat legitimised the 
KRG, both domestically and internationally, by working directly with Kurdish 
authorities. 
 Finally, the initial aid relief operations in the KRG also served to legitimise 
further intervention in the KRG: Their commitment to assisting the KRG 
shaped international NGOs’ image as an ally of the Kurdish people. Hence, 
one may assume that when such organisations began advocating reforms in the 
KRG and assessing its commitment to the standards they set, the Kurdish 
leadership, in contrast to other regimes, could not reject such intervention as a 
foreign illegitimate intervention or tag transnational actors as “foreign agents.” 
Though initially reluctant to intervene in the process of capacity-building in 
Iraq, UNAMI gradually came to play an increasingly important part in the 
                                                          
3
 See pages 143-144. 
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reconstruction of the country. In addition to infrastructure, UNAMI also took upon 
itself to reconstruct the Iraqi political system. It did so by reflecting to the government 
in Baghdad and the KRG the standards of good statehood, as viewed by the UN 
agencies. It did so through monitoring political processes in both administrations, 
direct interaction with officials in both administrations and through its Human Rights 
Report (HRR), a series of reports released in the period between 2005 and 2010 in 
changing frequency, detailing the progress of each administration in certain fields of 
governance. Initially the HRR were short and focused primarily on elections, 
detention of prisoners, military operations, the rule of law and reconstruction 
activities, with all other subjects falling under the category of overall situation of 
human rights.
4
 Starting from 2006, however, the reports became more detailed, 
paying attention to the situation of women, children, minorities, religious freedom, 
freedom of expression and media, kidnappings and more, all under distinct categories. 
Thus, the HRR detailed the standards that constituted good governance. In addition, 
the report contributed further to the KRG’s sense of autonomy, whereas early reports 
referred to Iraq in general without relating directly to the KRG
5
. Later reports came to 
devote specific attention to the KRG, with each section often distinguishing between 
the performances of the two administrations in the reviewed areas. Both governments 
also replied separately to such reports, defending their positions and reporting on their 
progress in the different categories.
6
 
                                                          
4
 See for example UNAMI, HRR, May 1-June 30, 2005. All UNAMI documents are available on: 
<http://www.uniraq.org/docsmaps/undocuments.asp> 
5
 In fact, the KRG was mentioned as a distinct entity for the first time only in the April 2006 report, 
referred to once as the Kurdish Regional Government. See UNAMI, HRR, March 1-30 April 2006, 8.  
6
 See annex to UNAMI, HRR, July 1-December 31, 2008. That the HRR reports were taken seriously 
by the KRG, or at least perceived as a factor that can potentially shape international public opinion, is 
evident in the KRG’s reactions to the reports, its denial of negative references to the KRG and its 
reliance on details casting the KRG in a positive light as a source of legitimacy. Such deliberation often 
took place in the KRG’s publications in English. See for instance Ako Muhammed, “KRG Criticizes 
UNAMI Report,” The Globe, January 9, 2010.  
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The diaspora was earlier described as a pivotal element in the reconstruction 
of the region. Recent studies have established the role of diaspora communities as 
transnational actors, a notion which has been embraced enthusiastically by students of 
the Kurdish diaspora.
7
 Members of the large Kurdish diaspora communities in major 
European capitals have not only been exposed to Western ideas about governance, but 
have also developed national identity through their activism.
8
 The establishment of 
the KRG in 1992 was celebrated across Kurdish diaspora communities in the West, 
regardless of their country of origin. As Khalid Khayati observed “For many 
diasporan Kurds, the Kurdish autonomous region is the only “liberated” part of 
Kurdistan, whose interaction with the Kurdish diaspora in the West gives expression 
to the practice of transborder citizenship, as manifested in considerable transnational 
exchanges, including diasporan Kurds’ support for democracy and reform in Iraqi 
Kurdistan.”9 After decades of lobbying for the Kurdish cause in their respective 
countries, diaspora Kurds now had an opportunity to participate in the state-building 
process taking part in their homeland. Returnees from the Kurdish diaspora had been 
playing a significant role in the Kurdish administration and political process during 
the early 1990s. In addition, members of the Kurdish diaspora had become one of the 
pillars of civil society activism in the Kurdistan Region. During the civil war and its 
atrocities, this enthusiasm somewhat waned, but with the overthrow of the Ba’th 
                                                                                                                                                                      
<http://www.kurdishglobe.net/display-article.html?id=A185EE5B25B1057F0CB8C766A3234210> 
(January 9, 2011). 
7
 Diane E. King, “When Worlds Collide: The Kurdish Diaspora from the Inside Out” (PhD diss., 
Washington State University, 2000); Khalid Khayati, “From Victim Diaspora to Transborder 
Citizenship” (PhD diss., Linköping University 2008); Ann-Catrin Emanelsson, “Diaspora Global 
politics: Kurdish transnational Networks and Accommodation of Nationalism” (PhD diss., Go  teborg 
University, 2005). 
8
 See the above; see also Fiona Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou, “Remapping the Boundaries of 
‘State’ and ‘National Identity’,” European Journal of International Relations 13, 4 (2007), 489-526. 
9
 Khayati, op. cit., 106. 
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regime, it was revived.
10
 Now, members of the diaspora gained a chance to carry the 
ideas that they had absorbed in the West about government and society. Often highly 
educated, members of the diaspora have been considered valued assets for the KRG, 
and their ideas have enjoyed some prestige. Moreover, Diane King tells us, Kurdish 
society has been receptive to Kurdish returnees and members of the diaspora and their 
ideas, giving them an important place in society.
11
 All of these factors have given the 
Kurdish returnees leverage to influence decision-making processes in the Kurdistan 
Region. 
Based on the model of transnational intervention and domestic structures 
formulated by Risse-Kappen and Checkel, we could also approach the second factor, 
that of the KRG’s domestic structure. As reviewed in chapter 2 of this research, both 
Risse-Kappen and Checkel have observed that government centralisation determines 
the manner in which ideas from the global level are transferred into a certain 
environment and implemented by the government.
12
 Gaining access to a centralised 
government is a difficult task, since such a government may be disengaged from its 
society. Yet, when an actor does manage to gain access to a centralised government 
and present its ideas, there is a higher chance that such ideas would be implemented. 
Building coalitions with local actors, such as local NGOs and individuals, is an 
essential element in the success of transnational activism. Here comes into importance 
the concept of transnational advocacy networks (TANs), as used and defined for 
example by Keck and Sikkink. The strength of such coalitions lies in the connections 
                                                          
10
 Ann-Catrin Emanuelsson, “Shall We Return, Stay or Circulate: Political Changes in Kurdistan and 
Transnational Dynamics in Kurdish Refugee Families in Sweden,” Journal of Migration and Refugee 
Issues 4, 3 (2008): 134. 
11
 King, “Back from the ‘Outside’: Returnees and Diasporic Imagining in Iraqi Kurdistan”, IJMS 10, 2 
(2008), 208-222. 
12
 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Introduction,” in Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (New York and 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jeffrey Checkel, Ideas and International Political 
Change (New Haven: Yale University Press). 
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built between external and domestic actors, with the external actors often using their 
position to amplify the domestic outcry and grievances of domestic actors and to 
lobby for their cause, while domestic actors provide the external actors with some 
basic infrastructure for activism.
13
 
Much like other de facto states, KRG can be defined as a state-dominated 
domestic structure, based on the criteria set by Risse-Kappen.
14
 Since its formation, 
the KRG has been a relatively centralised government, with policies dictated mainly 
by the politburos of the KDP and the PUK; the government has been the main 
employer in the region and the main engine of growth;
15
 and at least until the second 
half of the 2000s, the security forces, namely the Peshmerga and the Asayish/Parastin 
have often been immune to criticism.
16
 On the other hand, since 2003 the KRG has 
faced an increasingly vibrant civil society, inspired by developments in the Kurdistan 
Region and the diaspora. Media, NGOs and even domestic political and social 
movements, concerned with certain socio-political factors, have all managed to 
channel their societal demands to the government. This, together with the KRG’s 
openness to international intervention, out of sheer necessity mitigated the KRG’s 
centralisation to some extent. 
Taking into account both of these factors, then, is necessary if we seek to 
understand the success of transnational advocacy networks in taking part in the 
formation of the KRG, and resultantly the Kurdish willingness to take certain actions 
                                                          
13
 See page 19. 
14
 See definition in page 76 of this thesis. 
15
 One observer noted that about 1.1 (out of approximately 4) million people in the region are employed 
by the KRG. See Fawzi al-Atroushi, “Hawla katili il-nisaa wa al-ihtilal al-idari fi Kurdistan al-‘Iraq,” 
[about the killing of women and the administrative occupation of Kurdistan] KRG, July 7, 2007. 
<http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=14&smap=01010400&rnr=84&anr=18908> (June 23, 
2011). Even if this number is inflated it still marks the power of the government as an important 
employee. See also Natali, The Kurdish Quasi State 41-42, 114. 
16
 Amnesty International, Hope and Fear: Human Rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 9-10. 
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and conduct certain reforms. The following sections demonstrate the manner in which 
these factors have facilitated political and social reforms in the region. 
 
6.2 THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY, 
TRANSNATIONALISM AND POLITICAL REFORMS IN THE KRG  
As revealed throughout the last chapters, successful election campaigns in the region 
served as a key element in the KRG’s interaction with the international community. If 
the 1992 elections marked the beginning of the “democratic experiment” in the 
Kurdistan Region, the 2005 election campaign marked the launch of the “other Iraq” 
campaign. In these elections, which took place on the 30
th
 of January, simultaneously 
with the Iraqi parliamentary elections, the PUK and the KDP ran together as the 
Kurdistani Alliance, which won about 89.55 percent of the votes. In 2009, however, 
the KA faced the emergence of parliamentary opposition in the form of the Gorran 
(Change) List, which won about 25 percent of the parliamentary seats in the elections 
which took place on the 25
th
 of July 2009. The excessive focus on parliamentary 
elections, successful as they may be, has been highly criticised by outside observers, 
who have pointed out that the elections did not lead to positive developments in other 
areas.
17
 More importantly, in both cases the election campaigns had some undesirable 
results. Whilst in 1992 the elections and the ensuing political system resulted in the 
eventual collapse of the KRG,
18
 in 2005 the KA was condemned for the unification of 
both parties and for the fact that the new government now faced no real opposition. 
                                                          
17
 See for example David Ghanim, Iraq’s Dysfunctional Democracy (London: Praeger Publishers, 
2011), especially the chapter “Elections and Illusive Democracy,” 117-134. 
18
 As suggested by Gareth Stansfield in “Governing Kurdistan: the Strengths of Division,” See an 
earlier discussion on page 168. 
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Although the critique regarding the overemphasis of elections at the expense 
of other essential elements of democratisation is rather accurate, they did have an 
immense impact on the region. Not only being a precedent in the region, the elections 
also served as another platform for transnational actors to take part in the formation of 
the KRG and to convey their ideas about good governance into the region. Reverting 
once again to the historical elections of 1992, the Electoral Reform Society went 
beyond its role as election monitors. As the ERS’s chairman and one of the chief 
monitors in the elections process, Michael Meadowcroft gained direct access to the 
Kurdish leadership. This allowed him to try and shape the Kurdish leadership’s 
perceptions of the political system. In one example, Meadowcroft tried to influence 
the KRG to abandon the allocation of seats to minority groups, viewing it as a 
dangerous and divisive political mechanism. As he contended, 
It is not my place to comment on the politics of having reserved seats [for 
Christians] but I draw attention to the possibility of looking again at this 
provision both in regard to the potential dangers of having religious identity 
noted on Ids and also so that minority leaders can assess whether they may have 
more influence – and in a healthier way politically – by using their links with 
major parties to make arrangements... to secure more representation than the 
five reserved seats.
19
 
In the preparations for the 1995 elections, which the ERS was due to supervise and 
monitor as well, Meadowcroft also advised the KRG to lower the 7 percent threshold 
for entering the parliament, observing that “In any case, whatever system is used, the 
threshold level needs to be considered. In 1992 it was 7%, which excluded all but the 
                                                          
19
 Meadowcroft and Martin Lunn, “Elections for Iraqi Kurdish National Assembly and Leader of the 
Kurdistan Liberation Movement: Monitoring Report,” (London: ERS, May 19, 1992), 6 [emphasis in 
the origin]. 
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two main parties.”20 While the KRG did not give up the allocation of seats for 
minorities, it did follow Meadowcroft’s advice and reduced the entry threshold to 
parliament. 
Later election campaigns provided the KRG further opportunities to interact 
with other NGOs and transnational actors which carried with them new ideas, through 
the participation of others as election monitors. Each campaign entailed the 
participation of a long list of election monitors, which included democracy promotion 
INGOs, together with Western-based Kurdish diaspora organisations. The latter had 
been trained and funded by larger democracy-promotion INGOs such as USAID, the 
International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI).
21
 
One monitoring mission in the 2009 elections was sent by the Unrepresented Nations 
and Peoples Organisation (UNPO), an NGO aiming to promote self-determination for 
its members, but also human rights and good governance among its members (which 
also included the KDP and the PUK). The UNPO sent its monitors following 
complaints on irregularities in the 2005 elections in the region, and especially the 
prevention of Christians and other minorities from participation in these elections. 
Reviewing 36 polling stations in the regional parliamentary and presidential elections 
in 2009, the mission commented that “Good practice was noted in a number of polling 
centers. The sharing of experience at all levels of the electoral process should be 
encouraged in the post-election period to highlight problem areas and spread good 
practice.”22 But in addition to condoning the KRG for that, the UNOP report also 
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 Meadowcroft, “Iraqi Kurdistan – Elections,” September 9, 1994, MEADOWCROFT/4/12/1, 
A:\Kurd94-1. 
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 United States Government Accountability Office, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 
2005 Elections,” Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-05-932R September 7, 2005; see also 
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July 20, 2007.  
22
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condemned the KA for leaving propaganda material outside polling stations and urged 
it to facilitate the voting of women in the region. 
Because the election campaigns served the Kurdish leadership to attract 
international attention to the region, they also allowed opposition movements to 
counter the KRG’s decision-making even outside the parliament. One interesting 
example is that of the Kurdistan Referendum Movement (KRM). Emerging initially 
among members of diaspora communities across Western Europe, the KRM 
advocated the secession of the Kurdistan Region from Iraq and the foundation of an 
independent Kurdish state in the Kurdistan Region. Following the pattern of Kurdish 
activism in the diaspora, KRM launched its activism by petitioning the UN Secretary 
General Kofi Anan about the Kurdish right for independent statehood. Soon, 
nonetheless, the movement’s activism began shifting toward the Kurdistan Region 
itself, where it began to gather wider public support. In a bold step, the KRM ceased 
the 2005 elections as an opportunity to publicly pressure the KRG, and its members 
conducted a referendum outside polling stations, in which voters were asked to vote 
for or against Kurdish independence. About 98.8 percent of the participants voted for 
secession. The KRG rejected the results of the referendum and launched an effort to 
co-opt the KRM’s activists. Such actions by the KRG were condemned by two 
observers as a disregard of Kurdish public opinion and as an undemocratic step.
23
 
Although such a statement is not entirely incorrect, the referendum marked one of the 
first instances in which the Kurdish public channelled its grievances in a non-violent 
manner to the Kurdish leadership. Though the KRG did reject the referendum, its 
leadership found itself forced to face the public and justify its unpopular policies.    
                                                                                                                                                                      
<http://www.unpo.org/images/unpo%20election%20observation%20report%20(kurdistan,%20july%20
2009).pdf> (June 6, 2011). 
23
 Azad Berwari and Thomas Ambrosio, “The Kurdistan Referendum Movement: Political Opportunity 
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Elections also served as a platform for the local NGOs to interact with 
emerging transnational actors, thus establishing TANs that further allowed those 
NGOs to advocate reforms in the political system. One way has been for local NGOs 
to utilise funding and training provided by INGOs to inform the Kurdish public about 
public rights and participation in political life. The Kurdistan Institute for Elections 
(KIE), financially supported and trained by American NGOs such as the NDI, IRI and 
the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), for instance, organised pre-election 
seminars in which “The scope of the discussions reached to that range of talking about 
violations of human rights by the political power, lack of social equality and equity, 
lack of services, lack of individual freedom and other public problems in the 
society.”24 In 2009 KIE together with Kurdistan-based Democracy and Human Rights 
Development Centre and Women’s Legal Assistance, the German WADI Foundation 
(acronym in German for Association for Crisis Assistance and Development 
Cooperation) and the American Civil Society Initiatives joined together and 
formulated a draft law of organising rallies and demonstrations in the Kurdistan 
Region. As the KIE explains the idea behind the draft code 
We presently hear about public rallies in different places without having any 
regulations or appropriate laws to protect the participants and ensure their 
safety. Regarding the promotion of people's awareness about their rights and 
obligations towards arranging rallies and in order to engage ourselves in 
advocating the rights and freedom of the people as well as making equivalences 
between the rights of organizing rallies and the public safety systems, we 
determined to formulate this draft code.
25
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 Kurdish Institute for Elections, “Citizens and Electoral Enlightenment Campaign,” October 10, 2009. 
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Even if modest, the bill, which was eventually passed by the parliament on November 
3, 2010 after being submitted by 23 members of the KP, meant the first instance of 
legal regulation of public protest in the Kurdistan Region since its establishment. In 
another case, an intensive and prolonged advocacy by the Aynda (Future) Centre for 
Youth Issues (FCYI), funded and trained by the Washington-based IRI, eventually led 
the KRG to amend its regional Election Law, lowering the minimum age of candidacy 
in the Kurdish elections from 30 to 25. As stated in a report about the campaign 
(which came to be known as Campaign 25) 
After almost two years of public awareness campaigns and government 
outreach, Aynda succeeded in lobbying the KRG to lower the candidacy age in 
advance of the KR’s July 2009 parliamentary elections. Following that success, 
Aynda helped train young candidates running for parliament in that election, 
and in large part due to the Center’s efforts, today four percent of the Kurdish 
Region’s parliament is under the age of 30. These youth representatives would 
not hold their seats without the efforts of the Aynda Center.
26
 
  The increased social activism in the Kurdistan Region with regard to the 
elections, motivated, inspired and funded by transnational intervention, eventually had 
its mark on the political system in the region, with the emergence of a new opposition 
bloc in the KP. In July 2009, Gorran List won 23.5 percent of the seats in 
parliament,
27
 thus challenging the major parties’ hegemony of the political process in 
the region.
28
 The blow was particularly severe from the PUK’s perspective, as 
Gorran’s founder, Nawshriwan Mustafa, was a former PUK Peshmerga commander 
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and Talabani’s deputy in the party, who had retired a few years earlier, accusing both 
Talabani and the Barzani family of authoritarianism, corruption and inability to run 
the affairs of the region. Most of the members of the party were former PUK members 
and the party’s main support came from Sulaymaniyah, Talabani’s stronghold. The 
KA remained in power, with Barham Salih of the PUK now replacing Nechirvan 
Barzani as the regional PM. Yet, the old Kurdish elite now came under a greater 
domestic check by a vocal opposition party with its own media outlets and public base 
of support. 
Grudgingly forced to accept this new reality, the KA-led KRG found it again 
an opportunity to capitalise on the success of the electoral process as an example to 
the Kurdish commitment to democratisation. Qubad Talabani, the KRG’s 
representative to Washington (and Jalal Talabani’s son) stated in front of an audience 
of policy-makers and academics at the Washington-based Middle East Institute that 
We were challenged by some to achieve the ‘gold standard’ in elections. We 
accepted that challenge – and we delivered. We have achieved much in our 
experiment in democratic self governance – and of course there is much more to 
achieve. And we intend to achieve it… Now, there will be an even more vibrant 
opposition within the Kurdistan parliament…We all expect vigorous debate and 
there certainly will be new dynamics within the KRG and throughout Iraqi 
Kurdistan.
29
 
Shortly after, and days before his appointment as the PM of the Kurdistan Region, 
Barham Salih boasted in an interview to the London-based pan-Arab daily al-Sharq 
al-Awsat that 
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The recent elections constitute a turning point in the Kurdistani democratic 
experiment in terms of the details of the electoral competition and the programs 
and the various views of the competing lists, including the Kurdistani List… 
The Kurdistani List’s point of view is focused on maintaining the gains and 
correcting the failures in the field of administrative corruption… Regardless of 
our expectations, 70 percent of the votes to Mr. Mas’ud Barzani as president 
and about 59 percent of the votes in support of the Kurdistani List are an 
exceptional success in any genuine democracy, in light of the heated 
competition which took place in Kurdistan. We are proud in the success of the 
electoral process and the democratic process which led to this democratic 
atmosphere in the competition between the different lists, and we are proud of 
our victory in this competition.”30 
And in another interview on the subject, Ja’far Ibrahim, the KRG’s representative in 
Dubai maintained that 
The political mentality of those in power in the Kurdistan Region enabled the 
region and all the refugees, who used to stay in London and Europe, to live a 
free and proud life in the Kurdistan Region. This mentality transformed [life in] 
the Kurdistan Region from its most base point [sic] into a type of life that can be 
matched with lives in developed societies. The Kurdistan Region has turned into 
a democratic experiment through this mentality.
31
 
Thus, the KRG integrated local developments in their interaction with the 
international community in a conscious effort to further legitimise the Kurdish de 
facto state. By so doing, the Kurdish leadership paved the way for further reforms, 
sustaining the cycle of interaction, transnational intervention, implementation and 
further interaction. 
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In other instances, the democratic transition in the region also allowed TANs 
to struggle for freedom of expression in the region. Whilst during periods of key 
transformations, such as the early 1990s and the post-2003 period, independent media 
outlets flourished and enabled criticism of the KRG and of important political figures, 
other periods actually witnessed official efforts to silence critique and thwart 
journalist freedom in the region. The Kurdish parties did so through controlling major 
media outlets in the region, persecution of journalists in regional courts for 
defamation, and even physical harassment of journalists. Freedom House described 
the ambivalence in this area in a 2008 report, noting that 
Broadcast media in the Kurdish north are dominated by the two main political 
parties, but independent print outlets and internet sites have arisen in recent 
years. Independent journalists are able to criticize powerful interests with more 
freedom than in the rest of Iraq, but those who offend local officials and top 
party leaders or expose high-level corruption are increasingly subject to physical 
attacks, arbitrary detention, and legal harassment.
32
 
This report, therefore, indicates that some process had taken place against 
government efforts to limit it. The sources of progress could be traced back to 
transnational activism and the impact of wider democracy promotion initiatives in the 
region. Relying on their greater access to technology and information, Kurdish youth 
and young professionals in Europe began establishing communication networks 
dealing with political and social realities in the Kurdistan Region. Unlike locally 
based journalists, members of the diaspora were spared from physical or legal 
persecution. Therefore, one subject that was heavily covered in the transnational 
Kurdish media was that of persecution and harassment of journalists in the Kurdistan 
Region, which was considered to be detrimental to the nascent democratic transition 
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in the region. When the Austrian-Kurdish activist and journalist Kamal Sa’id Qadir 
was arrested in 2005 in the Kurdistan Region, a major uproar among Kurdish writers 
in Europe attracted the attention of international media. Qadir was arrested for 
defaming the Barzani family and especially Mustafa Barzani, which he described as a 
KGB agent.
33
 Initially Qadir was sentenced to 30 years in prison in a quick trial; yet 
following international pressure by diaspora activists in direct contact with the KRG, 
NGOs such as Amnesty International (AI) and the Austrian government, Qadir was 
released from prison.
34
 Masrur Barzani, head of the Asayish and President Barzani’s 
son, justified the KRG’s actions in the case of Qadir by arguing that although freedom 
of media is essential, individuals in the region have often abused this right for 
defamation and slander.
35
 But the debate about Qadir’s arrest was soon integrated in 
the discourse about the KRG’s position and prospects, with critiques of the KRG and 
of the Barzani family’s hold of the region using it to doubt the KRG’s democratic 
nature and subsequently the necessity of the US to protect it.
36
 
Not only diaspora media took part in shaping this field of freedom of 
expression – UNAMI as well played an important part in the introduction of new 
norms of freedom of expression into Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. Already in 2006 
UNAMI introduced a section on freedom of expression in its reports, following the 
violence against journalists in Baghdad.
37
 But it was in 2007, simultaneously with the 
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greater attention given by UNAMI to the KRG, that it also began dedicating more 
attention to the subject in its reports.
38
 UNAMI was soon joined by Amnesty 
International and Reporters without Borders (RWB) in its campaign for freedom of 
expression in Iraq.
39
 The combined advocacy carried some tangible results with 
regard to promoting freedom of expression in the Kurdistan Region. In 2007 the KP 
issued Law No. 24, Press Law, which was amended again on September 22 that year, 
giving what Freedom House defined as “unprecedented freedoms” to journalists and 
eliminating imprisonment penalties for defamation. According to Freedom House 
reports, the law was implemented rather successfully in many of the cases reviewed, 
eventually leading to a “numerical improvement” in its 2009 annual report.40 Violence 
against journalists in the region, and particularly journalists critical of the security 
forces, did not cease to exist,
41
 but in spite of the troubles and critique against the 
government, an RWB report indicated in 2010 that “The status of press freedom is 
better there than in neighbouring countries and provinces, mainly because of 
Kurdistan’s adoption, in 2007, of a protective Law of Journalism. The Kurdish 
intelligentsia is dynamic, and the number of its media outlets has exploded in the last 
few years.”42 In short, then, at least during the second decade of de facto statehood, 
the KRG was experiencing further liberalisation in the field of freedom of expression. 
This liberalisation was the product of transnational intervention, which percolated into 
the KRG through its own pursuit of international legitimacy and its aspiration to 
bolster its leadership’s constant reference to its democratic experiment. 
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The previous paragraphs have demonstrated how the KRG’s pursuit of 
international legitimacy, based on claims to practical or earned sovereignty, has 
facilitated transnational intervention, which in turn contributed to further positive 
developments in the region. The following section builds upon this review to provide 
an analysis into the manner in which women’s rights TANs came to utilise the KRG’s 
pursuit of international legitimacy to advocate government action against violence 
against women. By so doing, the chapter provides a detailed example of the 
mechanisms employed by TANs, by shedding new light on a socio-political subject 
which does not often get to be analysed in studies of the KRG. 
 
6.3 THE TRANSNATIONAL STRUGGLE AGAINST VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN IN THE KURDISTAN REGION: PURSUIT OF LEGITIMACY AND 
NEW OPPORTUNITIES 
Committing to the democratisation of the Kurdish political system has been a less 
controversial task for the Kurdish elites, partly because such measures were 
reconciled with public demands. In contrast, the issue of women’s rights necessitated 
greater government intervention in the private sphere of its population. It therefore 
carried the risk of direct confrontation between the KRG and the more conservative 
elements of Kurdish society, among them important allies of the KRG. Therefore, 
even though amid the Kurdish leadership there have been individuals who genuinely 
believed in gendered equality and the need to promote women’s rights, the KRG’s 
urgent need to secure popular support has often led it to marginalise the subject. In 
fact, for most of the first decade of its existence, the KRG treated public discussions 
around the subject of violence against women as something of a taboo. The Kurdish 
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leadership by no means opposed the gendered equality issue and did try to portray 
itself as striving to integrate women into public life. The most common feature of this 
was their constant emphasis on women’s participation in the fighting against Iraqi 
repression as Peshmergas.
43
 Nonetheless, any effort to extend this equality to the 
private sphere encountered male Kurdish antagonism. During the second decade of its 
existence, in the post-invasion era and especially after reunification, some important 
changes took place in the KRG’s approach to the subject. These changes included a 
greater willingness to publicly discuss the former taboos about violence against 
women, and new legislation and government action against violators of this new 
legislation. As in the above examples, this was also the product of transnational 
activism utilising the KRG’s need for international legitimacy. 
The starting point for understanding this process lies in the institutionalisation 
of the struggle against gendered violence as an international norm which governments 
are expected to adopt. During the 1980s the subject of violence against women 
became integrated in the wider debate within international society about human rights. 
Issues such as FGM, domestic violence and wartime sexual violence now became part 
of the agenda of women’s rights networks.44 This process was further exacerbated 
during the 1990s, with the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights and the 
1995 Beijing Fourth Conference on Women. These two major conventions provided 
women’s rights advocacy networks opportunities to interact with other human rights-
related advocacy networks and learn and implement their strategies and tactics. The 
Beijing Conference was particularly significant because during the Conference, 
participant governments came to incorporate language suggested by NGOs directly, or 
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at least consulted with NGOs to shape their positions on the issue. Although the final 
document of the Beijing Conference was merely a policy statement with no legal 
binding power, many activists heralded this document for “raising the awareness of 
governments and holding them accountable for their practices.”45 Hence, women’s 
rights networks were successful in generating a discursive change at both national and 
global levels, “as reflected in the positions governments took condemning violence 
against women at the UN conferences at Nairobi, Vienna, and Beijing.”46 
Further progress was documented in 2001, when the United Nations Security 
Council issued its Resolution 55/66, entitled “Working towards the Elimination of 
Crimes against Women Committed in the Name of Honour.” The Resolution 
explicitly stated that “States have an obligation to exercise due diligence to prevent, 
investigate and punish the perpetrators of such crimes and to provide protection to the 
victims, and that the failure to do so constitutes a human rights violation.”47 The 
Resolution also called upon states to “implement their relevant obligations under 
international human rights law and to implement specific international 
commitments… To intensify efforts to prevent and eliminate crimes against women 
committed in the name of honour… [and] establish, strengthen or facilitate, where 
possible, support services to respond to the needs of actual and potential victims…”48 
The perceptive shift was also introduced into the process of state recognition, 
as embodied in the first instance of formulation of standards of recognition to an 
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aspiring an aspiring state since the early 1990s, namely the 2003 Standards for 
Kosovo. While paying attention to the issue of minority rights, property rights and 
freedom of movement, the documents referring to the recognition of the post-Soviet 
and post-Yugoslav republics in the early 1990s did not mention specifically the issue 
of women’s rights or violence against women.49 Yet, these issues were an integral part 
of the Standards of Kosovo programme. Thus, under the article concerning 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, for example, the Kosovar authorities are 
expected to include representatives of all communities, as well as a “significant 
proportion of women.”50 Elsewhere, under the article relating to “Equal Access to 
Justice,” the document states that there must be an “effective action to eliminate 
violence against women and children, trafficking and other forms of exploitation, 
including preventative education and provision of legal and social services to 
victims.”51 
In Iraq, the 1980s witnessed a regression in the Ba’th regime’s progressive 
attitude toward women’s rights. Facing an economic crisis, and subsequent challenges 
to his legitimacy, President Saddam Hussein tried to gain domestic support by 
revoking policies and legislation that aimed to integrate women in education and the 
national workforce. This dire situation was felt even more strongly among Kurdish 
women due to the genocidal policies of the Ba’th regime and the Anfal campaign 
which resulted in an increase in the number of widows who could not support their 
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families.
52
 The establishment of the KRG was a sign of hope for women in the region. 
After all, women had played an important role in the Kurdish national liberation 
struggle leading to the foundation of the KRG, whether as Peshmergas, political 
activists and leaders (e.g. Leyla Zana in Turkey), or even by supporting the Kurdish 
fighters. The opportunity to take part in the constitution of their new national project 
attracted women from everywhere in the region and many of them overcame great 
difficulties, such as distance from home, or even illiteracy, to take part in the 1992 
elections.
53
 
The fledgling feminist movement in the region emerged, according to one 
contemporary observer, with the election of six women to the parliament and with the 
4000-strong Kurdish Women’s Organisation which was established in 1991.54 The 
initial focus of women’s rights advocacy in the region was on the subject of political 
representation, integration of women into the workforce and financial support for 
widows who had lost their husbands during the Anfal campaign and could not support 
themselves, although there was also some protest against the legality of the 
widespread practice of polygamy in the region.
55
 Nevertheless, the subject of 
domestic violence gradually came to the fore of Kurdish women’s rights activism. 
This was not coincidental; during the immediate period following the withdrawal of 
the Ba’th administration from the region, the Kurdistan Region experienced a sharp 
increase in the number of cases of gendered violence. The first wave of violence was 
actually perpetrated by Peshmerga forces, which targeted women that were suspected 
of “shaming” Kurdish honour by serving as prostitutes for Ba’th officials, although 
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this definition also included women who were raped by the Iraqi security forces.
56
 
The Kurdish authorities eventually put an end to this phenomenon, but at this stage 
domestic violence had become prevalent in the region, which witnessed a surge in the 
number of crimes committed by fathers, brothers and husbands against their 
daughters, sisters and wives respectively, for shaming the family, usually for having 
some form of extramarital relationship. 
Amid the KRG’s reluctance to counter the problem, women’s rights activists 
began taking independent action. In 1993, the Kurdish Communist Party-affiliated 
Independent Women’s Organisation (IWO) established the first shelter for women at 
risk in the Kurdistan Region. In addition, the IWO joined other women’s 
organisations in demanding the KRG to abolish the practice of polygamy; revoke the 
Iraqi Personal Status Law, which allowed polygamy and de facto legitimised honour 
killings and which was still enacted in the region, and in general to introduce gender-
egalitarian legislation into the region.
57
 Almost from the start, the IWO was aware of 
the need to build contacts with other women’s rights organisations around the globe. 
Consequently, activists began to do all they could in order “collect petitions and 
mobilize international women and human rights groups in support of Kurdish 
women.”58 As one IWO activist recalls, 
The most immediate task of the IWO was to prevent ‘honour killings’, by 
documenting and exposing such crimes in Kurdistan and abroad, and by 
insisting that the perpetrators be brought to justice. The other primary task was 
to raise people’s awareness and to campaign for the repeal or amendment of 
laws that discriminate against women… In the future IWO, which from 1997 
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assumed the name ‘Committee in defence of Iraqi Women’s Rights’ outside 
Kurdistan, hopes to address contraception, health and education by visiting 
women in schools, as well as open more shelters to protect women. To do all 
this, the organisation needs support from the international community.
59
 
Based on this, one can argue that the foundations for women’s rights transnational 
activism were actually laid during this period of the mid-1990s, when Kurdish local 
activists discovered the power of international community in generating domestic 
change. This is an indication that the Kurdish public, notwithstanding the double 
embargo, was not isolated from the international community and was aware of global 
socio-political developments. 
The civil war which emerged in 1994 inflicted great suffering upon women, 
who often fell victim to sexual violence during the fighting. For this reason, women 
also stood at the core of efforts to stop the war.
60
 The Kurdish diaspora had an 
important part in maintaining this link: living in Western Europe and North America, 
members of the diaspora were fully exposed to global developments and were free to 
move around the globe for interaction purposes. For instance, the only Kurdish 
representatives to the 1995 Beijing Conference came from the diaspora. Bari 
Karadaghi, the executive of the California-based Kurdish Human Rights Organisation 
who attended the conference told in an interview to the KDP’s party organ Khabat 
that 
only five Kurdish women participated in the conference, which is a small 
number considering its [the conference] massive size and the number of 
participating missions. This is due to two reasons: first, the Chinese government 
set obstacles to popular missions, particularly those of persecuted people… and 
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second, Kurdistan is divided [between Turkey, Iraq, etc.] and the governments 
that divide our nation do not allow Kurdistani women to participate in such 
conferences and congresses, unless it serves their purpose, which Kurdish 
women reject… In fact, the forum for the popular women’s organisations in 
China [i.e. the conference] serves a model for women everywhere and is 
particularly influential, considering the participation of missions from all over 
the world.
61
 
This privileged position of living in the diaspora and being able to fully communicate 
with international society also allowed diaspora activists to be freer in their critique of 
the Kurdish leadership. Replying to a question about the actions required by the 
government with regard to women’s rights and whether the demands by women 
contradict the Kurdish traditions and practices, Karadaghi commented that 
When we call for the elimination of injustice and the illegal conduct against 
women it does not mean a rebellion against religion and morality. We demand 
that the parliament and the government formulate laws that would protect the 
rights of women and give them a decent role in building society… setting limits 
to polygamy … [as well as] the protection of women from dpa e par forced 
marriage.
62
 
Recognising as well the potential impact of the diaspora community, the IWO 
established a branch in London which was operated almost entirely by members of the 
Kurdish community in the city. In February 2000 it was the London branch which 
petitioned the UN Secretary General, Kofi Anan, to support the IWO’s efforts to 
convince the Kurdish leadership to revoke the Iraqi Personal Status Law in the region. 
The younger generation of Kurds in the diaspora was particularly appalled by the 
issue of violence against women, mainly because the practice became more 
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widespread among their own communities, thus tainting the image of the Kurds in 
their new homes.
63
 
The occupation of Iraq and the overthrow of the Ba’th regime led to an 
increased interest in the fate of women’s rights, as part of the general interest in 
human rights and democratisation in the country. The occupation authorities and their 
Iraqi predecessors put women’s rights and their integration in the political system and 
public sphere at the centre of their agenda. This policy has been criticised from a 
feminist perspective on several grounds: first, it has been argued that the focus on 
women’s rights and democratisation emerged only after the coalition forces failed to 
prove the existence of weapons of mass destruction or links between the Ba’th regime 
and al-Qa’eda;64 second, positioning women at the centre of what Al-Ali and Pratt 
refer to as an imperialist project, drew a backlash, as nationalist and religious forces in 
Iraq positioned women at the centre of their anti-imperialist agenda, often targeting 
women’s organisations as collaborators with the occupation; finally, the occupation 
authorities and the Iraqi government have been accused of sacrificing women’s rights 
for the sake of alliance-making as part of the war on terror campaign. The lives of 
Iraqi women, according to Al-Ali and Pratt, have worsened since 2003.
65
 
This description of post-war reality is not inaccurate; one cannot refute the 
suffering of Iraqi women or the failure of the CPA and its predecessors to deliver at 
least some of its commitments to protect the human rights of Iraqi citizens. On the 
other hand, the occupation also meant that the subject of women’s rights, women’s 
place in society and state obligation to protect women’s rights suddenly came once 
again into the limelight, in all forms of public and political discourse. This was even 
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truer for the Kurdistan Region, where the democracy mission was particularly active. 
This also meant more opportunities for interested actors to have a closer look into 
social, political and economic affairs in the Kurdistan Region and to expose 
unpleasant socio-political realities. One such reality was the scale of the phenomenon 
of FGM in some parts of the region. In 2005, the German WADI Foundation 
published the results of a study conducted by its volunteers in the Germian region (a 
district of the Sulaymaniyah governorate, eastern of Kirkuk) between 2002 and 2004. 
This was the first study of its kind not only in the Kurdistan Region, but in the Middle 
East as a whole and it disclosed that about 60 percent of the women in certain parts of 
the region were circumcised. WADI volunteers argued that their long presence in the 
region and the frequent medical help they served to its women enabled them to 
conduct such a study, since it provided them with access to a large number of women 
who were more than willing to openly discuss the subject.
66
 WADI’s study became an 
important tool in the hands of local activists, and was immediately integrated in their 
campaign for government action on the subject of FGM. 
Facing the prevalence of domestic violence and the incompetence of the 
KRG’s in countering the problem, women’s rights organisations embraced more 
vigorously the common TAN’s strategy of data gathering, its delivery to public 
attention, and shaming the KRG. In one example, a local NGO dedicated to women’s 
rights advocacy named Asuda, self-described as “the only non-affiliated [i.e. non-
partisan] NGO working on women's issues,”67 used the funds granted to it by INGOs 
to establish Research and Awareness departments. The latter department aimed to 
“promote the consciousness of society with regard to the consequences of violence 
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against women,” by building networks with local institutions (media, academy, etc.,), 
while the former aimed to conduct academic studies on the women’s situation in 
society and especially “carrying out scientific researches on subjects of violence 
against women.”68 This was in addition to building more shelters for women at risk 
across the region, which made Asuda the largest operator of such shelters in the 
Kurdistan Region. Furthermore, Asuda was quick to exploit the new public spheres 
opened for Kurdish individuals and organisations and used its funding to participate in 
major conferences as the KRG’s representative. This has allowed it to interact with 
various women’s rights and human rights NGOs, such as AI for example. Other 
NGOs have tried to directly influence the legislative process, taking advantage of the 
renewal of the process after reunification. In this manner, the Khatuzin Centre of 
Social Action, another NGO dedicated to the promotion of women’s rights, used the 
summer 2005 meeting of the Constitutional Committee, a group of parliamentarians 
assembled to write the new Kurdish constitution based on the regional laws 
formulated in 1992, to submit a bill which called for the banning of FGM, polygamy 
and “the giving of women as brides to reconcile families in conflict.” The bill was 
partially based on the African Union’s 2003 Rights of Women in Africa and the UN’s 
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
although the petition did not include the sections about homosexuality and abortion 
appearing in the latter two.
69
 The meeting of the Constitutional Committee and the 
process of reformulating the constitution were not random – they represented yet 
another stage in the underpinning of Kurdish autonomy from Iraq. By contributing to 
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this process, Khatuzin, as well as the subject of women’s rights, basically became a 
part of reconstructing the Kurdish de facto state in the aftermath of 2003. 
Members of the diaspora were particularly valuable for building networks for 
local NGOs, but also in putting pressure on the KRG to take action against violence 
toward women. After the murder of a Swedish woman of Kurdish origin by her father 
in 2004, the Swedish government agreed, following pressures from local Kurdish 
activists, to host in Stockholm an international conference on the subject of honour 
killings with participants from 200 states. Although initiated following a domestic 
event, the organisers of the conference made it clear that its conclusions and findings 
apply to all governments, including that of the KRG. The hosts of the conference, 
Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds and Gender Equality Minister Jens Orback, stated 
that “these dialogues are effective we can see, for example, through the fact that they 
have helped countries with which Sweden has taken up this question at a high level, to 
amend their legislation with relation to honour murders, (or) such as in the case of the 
autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan…70 
An important tactic used by advocators of women’s equality and the struggle 
against violence toward women has been to associate the subject with democratisation 
and modernisation. One can assume that this has been done, consciously or 
unconsciously, because the KRG has been keen to be associated with both these 
terms, as revealed throughout this volume. One such example is a book in the Arabic 
language published by Tahir Hasso Zebari, a social scientist from Salahuddin 
University. In the book, entitled The Role of Kurdish Women in Political 
Participation, Zebari argues that if the twentieth century was the century of people’s 
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liberation, then the 21st century is the century of women’s liberation. Already in the 
introduction Zebari stresses that women’s rights were established in the postwar 
period as an integral part of the wider claim for human rights, including all forms of 
violence and discrimination against women. The 1995 Beijing Conference and other 
similar conventions served as forums to prove this claim.
71
 Trying to establish the 
importance of this research, Zebari argues that 
[From] a practical consideration, the importance of this study stems from its 
dealing with a vital issue in the Kurdish society, which represents an important 
element in the characteristics of the democratic transition which the [Kurdish] 
society is going through… our political position requires the promotion of our 
possibilities and achievements within the framework of changing the status of 
women. And this framework [in turn] falls within the framework of real political 
development.
72
 
In another instance, Zebari argues in the book that 
at a time when the subject of democracy occupies a central position in the 
Kurdish renaissance which began in the early 1990s, and particularly with the 
establishment of the Kurdistani parliament and the Kurdish government in 1992, 
the importance of the question of the Kurdish woman constitutes the backbone 
of this program. [This is] in light of the organic connection between the 
democratic transformation and women’s liberation on the one hand, and the 
role of women in the general Kurdish question (liberation, development, and 
unity) on the other hand… [on] the basis of that, the liberation of women and 
their participation in the productive political process, on an equal basis with 
men, constitutes a fundamental principle in a true democratic transition.
73
 
An article published by Fawzi Atroushi, a veteran Kurdish publicist and the 
Deputy Minister of Culture in Baghdad since 2005, serves as one more example. 
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Published on the KRG’s official website in Arabic, the article criticises the KRG’s 
incompetence in countering the phenomenon of ‘suicide’ among women, i.e. the 
disguise of honour-killings as suicide, which has been on the increase since the 
criminalisation of honour killings 
there is a ‘masculine’ conspiracy, which has nothing to do with manhood, which 
stands behind these false claims. It involves the victim’s husband or relative as 
well as elements in the medico-legal [profession] and the judiciary system that 
try to cover the incidents of intentional killing and the sexual, mental and social 
crimes that the Kurdistani women are subjected to, in light of the laziness and 
incompetence of the Union of Jurists in Kurdistan…74 
He warns of hasty treatment of the problem and the danger of approaching it only 
in order to satisfy international public opinion: 
[Treatment of the subject] should happen willingly and gradually, through hard 
and prolonged endeavours from all concerning sides, in collaboration with 
working teams and competent advisors, so that the subject would not turn into 
temporary bubbles and a temporary reflection of internal and external voices 
that condemn this serious and frightening phenomenon, or an effort to appease 
the worries of European civil society organisations which have put Iraqi 
Kurdistan under scrutiny and have issued negative reports which do not portray 
the KRG well.
75
 
This statement, coming from a long-time supporter of the Kurdish cause and 
advocator of reforms within the Kurdish system, reveals that the Kurdish 
leadership has been aware of international scrutiny of its actions, trying to please 
its sponsors and potential supporters. It also reveals that such awareness could 
serve those promoting further changes. There are various examples of other 
Kurdish writers who have brought the issue of women’s rights and violence against 
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women to the fore. In contrast to Zebari and Atroushi, however, many of the 
authors preferred not to refer specifically to the KRG’s conduct, but rather to 
criticise the conduct of surrounding governments, particularly the Iraqi,
76
 and also 
the Saudi, for instance.
77
 This was probably done as a defence mechanism, but may 
have also meant to enable the Kurdish public and government to disassociate 
themselves from the rest of Iraq. 
Another example reflects the manner in which members of the diaspora as 
well have used this tactic of associating women’s rights and the struggle against 
violence toward women with democratisation and development. In 2007, several 
diaspora-based activists were involved in preparing a comprehensive report on the 
subject of HBV in both the Kurdistan Region and the UK. The report, hosted by the 
British Bristol and Roehampton universities but funded directly by the KRG, fulfilled 
two of the main aims of the advocacy movement: it brought the subject of honour-
based violence further to the attention of international public opinion, and it allowed 
the authors to advise the KRG, while associating its recommendations with the 
discourse of good governance.
78
 Already at the opening of the report, which was 
published in both English and Kurdish, the researchers associated the report with UN 
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General Assembly Resolution 57/179, entitled Working towards the elimination of 
crimes against women committed in the name of honour.
79
 The report made a clear 
association between modernisation and the protection of women’s rights by arguing 
that “Modernization is now bringing economic, social and cultural changes, both 
negative and positive, to Iraqi Kurdistan, and initiatives to change harmful cultural 
practices are part of this modernization and democratization effort, to which this 
research is committed.”80 It adds that “An important underlying issue is the need for 
wide-ranging addressing of gender-equality, and the development of a gender equality 
scheme, as a strong government modernizing commitment.”81 This was, then, yet 
another example for the manner in which advocators of certain ideas used “higher” 
values in order to persuade governments to embrace certain policies. 
The continuous transnational activism in Iraq in general, and the KRG in 
particular, eventually instigated UNAMI, the most symbolic presence of the 
international community in the country, to take part as well in the campaign to prompt 
both Erbil and Baghdad to take action on the matter. At the outset, UNAMI avoided 
from taking part in the campaign against domestic violence. The HRR volume 
covering the first two months of 2006, for example, referred to the subject of violence 
against women in only one sentence, as part of its coverage of the impact of sectarian 
and political violence on civilian life: “Women and children are also increasingly 
affected by the current security situation in Iraq.”82 But amid continuous public 
outcry, the agency became more involved in the campaign, enabling local and 
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international activists to put pressure on the local authorities. This change was also 
echoed in the HRR, now dedicating substantial sections to violence against women. In 
2009 UNAMI joined Asuda in conducting research into HBV in the Sulaymaniyah 
governorate (the centre for Asuda’s activism). Here again, the report made a clear 
association between the subject of protecting women in relation both to  
democratisation and development. Moreover, it linked the subject directly with 
statehood; in addition to drawing attention to the 1995 Beijing Conference, the 
UNAMI/Asuda report also underlined the UN General Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/55/66, working towards the elimination of crimes committed in the name of 
honour, according to which “states have an obligation to prevent, investigate and 
punish perpetrators.”83 In fact, the report included a whole section regarding “States’ 
Obligation to Prevent and Protect under International Law,” which relies on UN 
documents on the subject of state obligations to counter gendered-violence.
84
 The 
report encourages the KRG to work closely with NGOs and other non-state actors: 
It is further recognized that it is important to utilize expertise from actors in 
other countries with Kurdish populations and the wider Middle East, including 
local actors who have been successful in working with at-risk women, in order 
to formulate and implement best practice based on examples from areas where 
honor related violence is a recognized problem. It is strongly recommended that 
the government support collaboration with NGOs and governmental actors from 
outside the Iraqi Kurdistan Region with experience on these issues to formulate 
education and awareness campaigns, legal strategies and protection services.
85
 
The report did encourage the KRG to work closely with Baghdad on the subject in 
order to “amend national penal laws that justify honor-related motives in murder and 
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work to bring not only regional measures, but also policies and practices into 
compliance with international standards.”86 Nonetheless, the explicit reference to 
states’ obligations, in a report aimed to attract the attention of the Kurdish leadership, 
underscores at least some conscious effort to affect the KRG by referring to its higher 
aspirations. 
The KRG’s reaction to the campaign toward the end of the decade reveals the 
direct and important impact activists and networks have had on some dimensions of 
the KRG’s socio-political agenda. As noted earlier, publicly discussing the subject of 
domestic violence was treated almost as taboo by the KRG, both because it did not 
want to alienate its conservative supporters, but also because it was aware, already 
from its inception, of the importance of Western public opinion and the negative 
implications of gendered violence on the Kurdish image. The KRG’s early desire to 
please public opinion can be inferred from the fact that the KRG willingly embraced 
the subject of women’s parliamentary representation. Women were holding 
ministerial positions within the KRG already during the 1990s. Moreover, the Kurdish 
parties were the only ones to nominate women for ministerial positions in post-2003 
Baghdad. In addition, the KRG has always tried to be ahead of Baghdad with regard 
to women’s representation in politics: when the Iraqi parliament set a 25 percent quota 
on women’s representation in parliament, the KP increased the minimum quota in the 
region to 30 percent. With regard to women’s parliamentary representation, one may 
argue that it was easier for the Kurdish leadership to embrace such representation, 
because both the regional and federal parliaments were in fact powerless. Indeed, both 
the KDP and the PUK’s politburos had no female representatives. Nevertheless, the 
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KRG’s willingness to integrate women into politics indicates at least an understanding 
of international expectations about the role of women in domestic politics. 
The increasing role of diaspora activists in the promotion of change in the 
Kurdistan Region, their association with local activists and their capability of 
amplifying the Kurdish women’s distress at the international level were essential for 
the women’s rights network in persuading the KRG to begin discussing the subject of 
domestic and gendered violence, and even to take action in the area. Interestingly 
enough, it was under the divided administration in the post-civil war era that women’s 
rights networks had their first major achievement.
87
 In April 2000, the Sulaymaniyah-
based KRG issued a resolution that criminalised honour killings and restricted 
polygamy. Decree No. 59 gave the courts discretion to ignore Articles 130 and 132 of 
the Iraqi Penal Code, making it clear that “[t]he killing or abuse of women with the 
pretext of cleansing the shame is not considered to be a mitigating excuse.” The Erbil-
based KDP administration was soon to follow, issuing a similar resolution, Law No. 
14 which stated: “The perpetration of a crime with respect to women under the pretext 
of honorable motives shall not be considered an extenuating legal excuse for the 
purposes of applying the rules of articles 128, 130 and 131 of the Penal Code, number 
11, 1969, amended.”88 More interesting is the process that had led to this action: the 
campaign was launched by independent women’s organisations in the region, in a 
somewhat clandestine manner. Not only conservative and religious elements objected 
to such demands, but also the party-affiliated women’s organisations. The latter had 
traditionally preferred to follow the party line, blaming such practices as FGM and 
honour killings on local “traditions” or Islamic customs, rather than the incompetence 
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of the Kurdish leadership.
89
 As soon as the subject infiltrated discourse in the 
diaspora, and was amplified by activists in Western Europe, the party-affiliated 
women’s organisations rushed to follow the independent activists and lobbied the 
government to take action on the matter.
90
 It was then eventually embraced by the 
male-dominated Kurdish leadership. The legislation carried a mixed success. One 
report indicates a decrease in the number of honour-killings during the period 
following the legislation.
91
 On the other hand, during the same period there was an 
increase in the number of cases of suicide among women. Some have pointed out that 
such suicides were instigated by those women’s families who, facing the risk of 
penalties for HBV, moved to different tactics of persecution, either disguising 
murders as cases of suicide, or convincing those women to commit suicide.
92
 Though 
this estimation is probably rather accurate, it is also an indication of the fact that KRG 
legislation indeed prevailed in the region and was taken seriously by its residents. 
In spite of this initial step, the Kurdish leadership still resented any 
independent effort to document and bring to the fore issues of domestic and gendered 
violence and discrimination. This involved the harassment of independent women’s 
shelters and organisations, as well as of individuals involved in data gathering. For 
instance, the Kurdish authorities initially tried to hinder data collection for the 2005 
WADI report, hauling the surveyors and accusing them of ‘publicizing the country's 
secrets’, according to the testimony of Assi Frooz Aziz, coordinator of WADI's 
Germian medical team.
93
 This was evidence that the Kurdish leadership became 
“embarrassed” by the reality in the Kurdistan Region, fearing for its reputation as the 
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main authority in the region, which meant another significant achievement for the 
women’s rights TAN. 
During the second decade of de facto statehood, nevertheless, the KRG 
became even more willing to bring the subject of gendered violence to public debate. 
One of the first signs of this shift was the KRG’s toleration of publications, and even 
critique, on such subject matter, even in its own official publications, such as its 
official website, one of its central propaganda tools.
94
 In 2007 the KRG took a further 
step by conducting its own official investigation into the subject of violence against 
women in the Sulaymaniyah governorate, with violence referring to honour killings 
and attempted killings, cases of suicide, forced marriage, prevention of education and 
defamation. According to the report, whose findings were published on the KRG’s 
website in Arabic, 1108 women were subjected to various forms of violence and 
oppression, including murder or attempted murder. The report also stated that whereas 
289 women committed suicide in 2005, this number had risen to 533 in 2007, which 
also constituted 88 percent of violence victims, vis-à-vis 22 percent of cases of death 
in 2005.
95
 The fact that it was the Human Rights Ministry in charge of such a study 
may indicate that the KRG internalised the idea that the subject of women’s rights 
was part of the wider subject of human rights (in contrast to an internal security 
matter, for instance). The study itself served to promote the debate in the KRG about 
women’s rights. One columnist, for example, argued on the KRG website that 
Societies now view these [honour killings] through laws and legislation which 
help to protect… human rights… If we want to elevate the Kurdistan Region 
                                                          
94
 E.g. Kakei, “al-Mara wa al-Nizam al-‘Alami al-Jadid;” Atroushi, “Hawla Katli al-Nisaa wa al-Ihtilal 
al-Idari fi Kurdistan al-‘Iraq;” 
95
 “Sultat Iqlim Kurdistan Tuhawilu Tahjim ‘Amaliyyat al-Katl al-Murtabata bima Yu’raf bi Ghasl al-
Ghar” [the Kurdistan Region authorities try to estimate honour-based killings of women], KRG, July 4, 
2007. <http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?rnr=81&lngnr=14&smap=01010100&anr=18840> (June 
19, 2011) 
280 
 
and turn it into a model for the governments and states of the region, then we 
should push and demand our government in the region, and first and foremost 
President Barzani, to legislate laws to protect women with immediate effect, 
otherwise the number of these crimes will increase... 
Today, if one is interested in, and follows, the issue in the Kurdistan Region, 
one expects efficient solutions from the government and an end to such abuses 
of women’s rights… Then we could say that the region is a part of the Middle 
East that has a civilised view of, and protects, the rights of the other half of the 
population… [The new legislation means that] the Kurdistan Region will walk 
the path of advanced and prosperous societies and keep pace with progress… So 
that people and the world look at Kurdistan with respect and great reverence…96 
FGM was not covered in this report, but in 2009 the Human Rights Ministry 
conducted a research into this subject as well, focusing on the region of 
Chamchamal.
97
 In addition, it was the KRG that funded the 2007 investigation into 
HBV in the Kurdistan Region and the UK.
98
 This served as another sign for the 
KRG’s openness on the subject, but also served it in presenting itself as a progressive 
government. These steps led to the establishment of the Honour Killing Monitoring 
Commission in 2007 by PM Nechirvan Barzani, which aimed to monitor the 
implementation of legislation with regard to violence against women.
99
 Directories 
were also established in Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, to monitor implementation 
of government policies on the subject in each region. Pakhshan Zangan, then an MP 
for the Communist Party and a women’s rights activist, argued that “Their existence is 
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a message to men that the government is beginning to pay attention to women’s 
issues. At the same time, it gives women more confidence when they see that the 
government is serious in defending their rights”.100 
Such actions paved the way for further legislation and action by the KRG. In 
2007 the KRG confirmed the status of the law against honour-killings, by excluding 
convicted honour-based murderers from a general amnesty given to other convicts in 
the region.
101
 In the same year, the KRG passed, for the first time in its history, a bill 
prohibiting FGM and setting prison sentences against perpetrators.
102
 And in 2008, 
following an intensive advocacy by the women’s rights network, the KP reformed the 
Personal Status Law, No. 188, in the region. The new reform prohibited forced and 
early marriage; it did not prohibit polygamy entirely, but now set further restrictions 
on the practice. Under the new conditions, a man was allowed to marry only two 
women, rather than four, as allowed by Shari’a (and the Iraqi) Law.103 This was 
presented as a compromise by the KRG, relying on the narrow gap between 
supporters and objectors to the legislation.
104
 Additionally, in 2008 the KRG’s 
Ministry for Social Affairs initiated the first government-sponsored centre to counter 
violence against women, referred to also as the Centre for Monitoring Violence 
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against Women. The establishment of the centre was justified by the “increase in the 
rates of suicide among women and the spread of the phenomenon of violence against 
women, whether for honour-related or other socially-related reasons.”105 This centre 
was followed by the establishment of two more centres, run by the Ministry for Social 
Affairs. 
Much like in other cases of reforms and social, political and economic 
progress, the KRG incorporated this new reality into its campaign to legitimise its 
existence and aims. The image of a Kurdish leadership willing to internalise actions 
that stand in contrast to “tradition” and the conservative population’s demands, much 
like its commitment to democratisation, has been a key element in the construction of 
an image of a government keen on becoming part of international society. The various 
publications and op-eds reviewed in this chapter in English and Arabic may suggest 
that the KRG related some benefit to actually publicising the internal debates on the 
subject.
106
 In this manner, the Kurdish Globe, the KRG’s semi-official pan-Kurdish 
newspaper in the English language, published several articles about the KRG’s 
commitment to women’s rights. In one example, the Globe stated that 
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is creating a mechanism to ensure 
the Region's laws to protect women from violence are implemented at all 
levels…. This will ensure that crime prevention and data-collection 
departments, the police and the judiciary cooperate more closely and apply the 
law correctly and effectively to protect women… Following the commission's 
meeting, Prime Minister Barzani said, “The changes agreed today will further 
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strengthen the rule of law in the Kurdistan Region when it comes to prosecuting 
those who commit crimes against women. It is essential that our courts 
investigate and prosecute crimes against women in the most efficient way 
possible.”107 
And in a report about Nechirvan Barzani’s meeting with representatives of AI and 
discussion about the AI’s report on violence against women, it was argued that 
‘Nechirvan Barzani highly evaluates the Amnesty International report, which 
says that the KRG efforts have worked in reducing the phenomenon,’ read the 
statement. It then quoted PM Barzani: ‘From this side, we must make Kurdistan 
a perfect example for all of Iraq and end that phenomenon. We must attempt to 
totally end violence here’.108 
Maybe one more example of the KRG’s effort to stress its pledge to meet the 
standards of international society was the fact that amendments to the Iraqi Personal 
Status Law in 2008 were among the very few laws that the KRG has published in 
English, in addition to Kurdish and Arabic, the two others being the Kurdistan Region 
Investment Law and the Kurdistan Region Oil and Gas Law. If we accept that natural 
resources have become a symbol of sovereignty, as argued earlier in this research, and 
that the Oil and Gas Law is a marker of this sovereignty, then we also can accept the 
idea that publishing the amendments became another part of the KRG’s efforts to 
prove its sovereignty. 
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6.4 CONCLUSION 
The above chapter reviewed the manner in which the KRG’s interaction with the 
international community, revolving to a great extent around the KRG’s earned 
sovereignty, has also shaped the domestic processes of democratisation and 
liberalisation. By underlining the continuous interaction between the KRG and the 
international community, the above paragraphs demonstrated the link between de 
facto statehood, the pursuit of international legitimacy and transformations inspired by 
internationally-held norms about governance. TANs committed to the promotion of 
certain ideas have served as pivotal elements in the process as mediators in the 
interaction between the KRG and the international community, allies of domestic 
activists, and protestors and major instigators of domestic change. 
Many have dismissed the progress made by the KRG with regard to 
countering violence against women, suggesting that measures toward democratisation 
and liberalisation have been taken primarily in order to appease international public 
opinion or satisfy donor states’ demands. Such a hypothesis, also advocated by 
Kurdish critiques of the KRG, is not entirely untrue. However, this can only serve to 
explain Kurdish motivation in taking certain measures. It completely fails to trace the 
sources of such assumptions, the process which led the KRG to assume that exhibiting 
certain characteristics might serve its interests (i.e. survival and legitimation) and the 
processes and mechanisms which led to the implementation of at least some of the 
KRG’s commitments in practice. Undoubtedly, the KRG’s success in meeting all of 
its commitments has been rather limited. But it has taken place nonetheless and 
therefore requires scholarly attention. Trajectories of domestic developments, set 
during the KRG’s first two decades of existence, will determine future developments 
in the Kurdistan Region. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
The investigation of the Kurdish struggle for national liberation, and especially since 
its 1991 transformation into a de facto state as presented in this thesis, carries some 
important insights into the development and evolution of this movement and the 
autonomous entity it established. Based on this case study, this research provides a 
new explanation of the policy-making processes and strategies of de facto states, 
namely entities with domestic and Westphalian but no legal sovereignty. This 
explanation has taken into account the contested sovereignty of de facto states, their 
resultant pursuit of international legitimacy, and their ensuing interaction with the 
international community and various transnational actors. 
Between 1958 and 1991 the Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq 
represented a compact ethnic minority concentrated in the country’s northern 
provinces. Suffering what they viewed as government persecution and cultural 
oppression, the Kurdish liberation movement was mostly preoccupied with guerrilla 
warfare against the Iraqi security forces, with the aim of securing the (often vaguely-
defined) Kurdish right to self-determination. The government in Baghdad, in turn, 
employed multiple methods to counter Kurdish demands, through forced assimilation, 
deprivation of the Kurdish population from resources, ethnic cleansing and genocide. 
In 1991, nevertheless, the movement went through an abrupt, but momentous 
transition; following the end of the Gulf War, the Kurdistan Region gained political 
and administrative autonomy from Baghdad. Put in terms of sovereignty, the region 
secured, for the first time in its history, some form of Westphalian sovereignty, in the 
sense that potential invaders were now prevented from challenging the authority of 
the regional leadership. But to maintain this Westphalian sovereignty, the Kurdish 
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leadership came to understand that it should establish domestic sovereignty – based 
on international understanding of this concept. The Kurdish parties maintained their 
control over the affairs of the region, but this transition necessitated a process of 
adjustment and learning. Moreover, this transition dramatically changed interaction 
between the Kurdish national liberation movement and Baghdad, as well as 
neighbouring countries and the international community. 
As the region’s neighbours perceived the Kurdish leadership’s actions (rather 
justly) as undermining Iraq’s territorial integrity, it now had to legitimise its existence 
and to justify its autonomy from Baghdad. While prior to 1991 the Kurdish leadership 
rationalised its war against Baghdad mainly by referring to past injustices, the 
Kurdish right for self-determination and its oppression by Baghdad, it now came to 
rely on its ability to run its affairs independently and successfully. This necessitated 
the Kurdish leadership to try and understand what it means to be a new state and what 
constitutes domestic sovereignty. Such understanding was inspired by the changing 
normative environment of the post-Cold War era. In this environment, the legitimacy 
of new or aspiring states has come to rely, at least theoretically, on their ability to 
secure domestic legitimacy, maintain their stability, democratise and liberalise their 
political, economic and social system and contribute to regional security. Inspired by 
global normative changes, one of the first measures taken by the Kurdish leadership 
was to go through historical elections in 1992. Its success in doing so became a 
central tenet in the KRG’s interaction with the international community, and the 
Kurdish leadership came to relate to its existence as a ‘democratic experiment’. The 
civil war which erupted in the mid-1990s interrupted the development of the KRG as 
a de facto state and its interaction with the international community. Toward the late 
1990s, after the end of the civil war and the division of the administration, both 
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processes were renewed. The 2003 war in Iraq, however, drove the KRG to once 
again renew and enhance both of these processes. Particularly essential to this process 
was the reunification of the KRG in 2005, its new status as an autonomous region 
within federal Iraq, but also the rapid collapse of the Iraqi state. These factors meant 
that the KRG gained even more autonomy than it had had during the first decade of de 
facto statehood. Justifying this autonomy now came to rely not only on 
democratisation, but on the KRG’s ability to maintain domestic security, economic 
prosperity and viability, and its potential contribution to regional security. 
Consequently, the KRG’s foreign policy came to be oriented toward demonstrating 
such traits. 
In this fashion, the KRG followed the pattern of many other de facto states 
that emerged during the early 1990s after a period of fighting the states controlling 
their claimed territories. And much like other de facto states, the KRG found it 
necessary to reconsider its strategy in securing its sovereignty. Based on wider 
international processes, but also its understanding of its position in the state-system, 
the KRG’s discourse of earned sovereignty came to rely on internationally-held 
standards of recognition. One could justly argue, as so many have done, that 
statements made by the KRG did not always meet the reality in the region; corruption, 
nepotism and internal power struggles undermined the KRG’s portrayal of its 
economic and political achievements. However, as the last chapter demonstrates, the 
KRG’s foreign policy of demonstrating its earned sovereignty actually paved the way 
to further reforms in the KRG. It allowed transnational coalitions of external and 
domestic actors to utilise the KRG’s own foreign policy and discourse to exert 
pressure on it to take further changes in the same fields that served its legitimation 
efforts. NGOs, UN agencies and chiefly diaspora activists came to employ different 
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methods to do so: gathering and collecting data about KRG’s actions, shaming the 
latter by publishing such data at the international level, and linking their causes, 
whether they were further democratisation of the system, the promotion of freedom of 
expression or women’s rights, with international legitimacy. 
And indeed, one could say that toward the end of the second decade of de 
facto statehood, the KRG made significant socio-political progress, and reached an 
advanced stage of state-building – a progress at least partly correlating with its 
commitments to maintain a viable and secure autonomy within Iraq. In chapter 6 I 
demonstrate this by showing how political and social developments in the Kurdistan 
Region were driven by the KRG’s own commitments to ameliorate its system, which 
were in turn utilised by TANs. The case of KRG action against gendered violence 
during the second decade of its existence is a most powerful case: from something of 
a taboo in the region, the KRG gradually came to view the subject as one which might 
negatively affect its legitimation campaign, and therefore of top political priority. This 
change of attitude, gradual but still substantial, became a central tenet of the KRG’s 
fierce legitimation campaign. Such a change could not be explained solely based on 
domestic activism or international pressure. It is a product of a combination of 
circumstances, including the KRG’s status as a de facto state, the emergence of 
government protection of women’s rights as an international standard of good 
statehood, and the existence of keen advocators. 
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7.1 THE KRG AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGITIMACY AS A FACTOR IN DE 
FACTO STATES’ POLICY-MAKING PROCESSES  
As noted in chapter 2 of this thesis, the idea that legitimacy is a key to understanding 
the foreign policy-making of de facto states has gained increasing popularity in recent 
studies of the phenomenon.
1
 This study followed suit, setting the pursuit of 
international legitimacy as a key in understanding the evolution of de facto states and 
their policies. It has gone, however, a step beyond existing studies by suggesting that 
the pursuit of legitimacy cannot in itself explain changes in the conduct of de facto 
states. Rather, the pursuit of legitimacy serves as an engine for a process of 
interaction, learning, and transition, which are essential components of changes in the 
behaviour of actors. This research, therefore, has sought to reconstruct the process of 
the pursuit of legitimacy and reveal its components: the key agents of change, namely 
TANs, as well as their mechanisms, i.e. the use of the de facto state’s need for 
legitimacy, lack of sufficient administrative and political knowledge, and international 
normative shifts. 
The circular model of interaction-implementation-legitimation presented in 
chapter 2 aimed to simplify this argument.
2
 The KRG serves as an excellent example 
to support this model. In 1991 it came to interact with the international community as 
a de facto state aspiring to maintain its recently earned autonomy. Based on its early 
learning, it came to rely on the democratisation of its system as the foundation for its 
earned sovereignty. This in turn allowed advocacy networks composed of various 
actors, e.g. NGOs, diaspora activists and UN agencies, to press the KRG to take 
further action to meet its commitments about democratisation of the system. When the 
                                                          
1
 See primary discussion in Bartmann, “Political Realities and Legal Anomalies,” 15-16; more recently 
Caspersen, Unrecognized States. 
2
 See page 85. 
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KRG implemented, or at least claimed to implement the policies advocated by the 
TANs, it also came to integrate them into its foreign-policy, namely its deliberation 
about its status as a de facto state. 
De facto states have become increasingly important for understanding regional 
geopolitics, and decisions taken in such states have implications far greater than their 
real size. But they have also become important because they reflect developments in 
international society and its standards. A better understanding of their behaviour and 
development is therefore essential. The conclusions of this research could better serve 
this, especially if implemented in other case studies. While this research has chosen to 
focus on a single case, that of the KRG, a multiple-case study analysis based on the 
model presented here, could form the basis of future research. While the single case 
study method employed in this research was necessary for its focus on such complex 
issues as identity, interaction and advocacy, a multiple, large-N case study could 
provide some new insights about the role of de facto states in international politics. 
 
7.2 THE DE FACTO STATE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND IR 
THEORY 
The study of the KRG in particular, and of de facto states in general, further 
contributes to our understanding of international politics and IR theory. It sheds more 
light on the importance of international legitimacy to the relations between actors, and 
on the behaviour of actors. It also underlines the importance of interaction and 
learning to these processes, as it serves to explain more deeply the manner in which 
ideas are transferred at the international level and eventually internalised at the 
domestic level. This study, therefore, joins a long list of studies that have aimed to 
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deconstruct international politics and states and understand the origins of actions, 
processes, and changes. The de facto state has some unique characteristics that 
distinguish it from other actors in international politics, but it is still a product of 
international society, having norms with regard to relations between different 
communities at the global level, and desired forms of organisation for different 
communities. 
Though international legitimacy is a key concept in this research, it 
nonetheless diverges from the common tendency among students of international 
legitimacy to examine it as a product of great powers negotiations, constructed mainly 
at the structural level and is then imported by interested actors.
3
 Focusing on the KRG 
and on de facto states in general entails putting the limelight on actors that seek this 
legitimacy and the manner in which they engage with the concept, internalise it and 
use it. The pursuit of international legitimacy, this research argues, is a form of 
communicative action, a source of debate and deliberation about the nature of 
international society, its standards and membership in this society. Hence, even if less 
influential at the international level, the manner in which de facto states and 
secessionist movements engage with the concept of international legitimacy and the 
ways in which they force different members of international society to debate about 
the subject, are all bound to have some influence on future transformations of the 
concept, either in terms of its essence, or even in terms of the impact it might have on 
international politics. After all, the case of Kosovo did set a precedent that has been 
used by other aspiring states, and the developments in the KRG have driven actors, 
even if still limited in number, to urge leading members of international society to 
                                                          
3
 See for example Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005); Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002). 
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reconsider their uncompromising support in the principle of territorial integrity. 
Whether changes will take place in the KRG’s status or not, its actions will have an 
impact on how we view international legitimacy. 
The de facto state is a notable, though by no means the only, actor that face 
chronic crises of legitimacy. Various recognised states face continuous contestation of 
their right to take certain actions, or even their right to exist by another member of the 
international community. Although several scholars have already demonstrated the 
importance of legitimacy to the survival of actors, very few have examined how 
actors that face legitimacy crises deal with this situation, and even less have actually 
tried to back their study with a thorough empirical examination. This research fills all 
of these cavities by focusing on an actor that has experienced an extreme and 
prolonged situation of delegitimation, whether for its existence, actions, or 
aspirations. But its findings could serve students of other cases; researchers should 
only bear in mind when approaching the subject of legitimacy that several factors 
should be taken into account in their examination: the level of the crisis of legitimacy 
(namely the impact that delegitimation has on the actor’s survival prospects and 
subsequently its urgency in trying to secure international legitimacy), the level of 
interaction between the actor and the international community, and the nature of the 
international society to which the actor aspires to belong. 
 
7.3 FURTHER STUDY OF THE KRG: THE CONCEPT OF DE FACTO 
STATEHOOD AS A PLATFORM FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The study of the KRG and of its transformation from being an insurgency movement 
lacking any territorial base into the government of a de facto state is significant for 
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any future study of the Kurdish question in Iraq. The study of the KRG itself is not an 
easy one, particularly since the consolidation of the KRG is still a process in the 
making. 
Still facing a vague future at the time of this study, the Kurdistan Region is 
bound to go through dramatic changes in the future to come. Understanding these 
changes could not be accomplished without taking into account the process that the 
KRG has undergone during the first two decades of its existence. Although this thesis 
has shied away from dealing directly with policy-relevant questions and advice, it 
does not discourage others from doing so. On the contrary, the tools provided in this 
research could serve for such purposes. First and foremost, this study presents a 
rigorous examination of the KRG, its interaction with the international community, 
aspirations and identity, the dilemmas it faced and the actions that it chose to take in 
its troubled two decades of existence. This study also stresses the irrelevance of the 
concept minority in relation to the Kurds in northern Iraq, and therefore the 
framework of state-minority relations, which still characterises some studies of the 
subject. Moreover, this thesis has underlined the transnational nature of the KRG as a 
project of state-building. Even if not the first to note the transnational aspect of the 
Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq,
4
 this is probably one of the few studies 
that link between this transnational dimension, the process of state-building and the 
connection between those and the shifts in international society. Additionally, this 
research prompts students of the KRG to pay greater attention to the diaspora as a key 
element in the development and the process of state-building in the Kurdistan Region. 
                                                          
4
 See for example Martin van Bruinessen, “Transnational Aspects of the Kurdish Question,” Working 
Paer, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute (Florence: EUI, 
2000); Denise Natali as well gives a great attention to the issue of transnationalism in her analysis of 
development in the Kurdistan Region, although she does not define it as such, in The Kurdish Quasi 
State. 
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Again, this is not the first study to point out the increasing involvement of the Kurdish 
diaspora in the region, but it has gone beyond most existing studies in its effort to 
understand diaspora activism not only in the context of the region, but also in the 
context of transnational activism in Kurdistan, as a conveyer of ideas into the region. 
Not only IR scholars and political scientists, but also sociologists and 
anthropologists could use this study as a platform for future research. Due to space 
constraints, the study could only focus on specific aspects of domestic socio-political 
developments inspired by transnational activism, the pursuit of legitimacy and global 
normative shifts. However, the possibilities for investigation into the KRG based on 
the tools provided in this research vary widely. Education, health and even the 
financial system in the region could be studied through the understanding that 
interaction and learning shape domestic institutions. All of these aspects of the 
Kurdish de facto state in northern Iraq have been targets of international intervention 
and aid; and in many cases, and this applies particularly to education, these 
institutions have been central to the process of state-building and state-formation. 
Throughout this study I have been careful to stress not only that the Kurdish 
reforms are far from being complete, but also that they are by no means irreversible. 
Dramatic changes within the KRG and changes of regional and international 
circumstances may drive the Kurdish leadership to reconsider its priorities and 
commitments. These factors, nonetheless, should not render this study and its findings 
irrelevant; such potential shifts still indicate that the pursuit of international 
legitimacy remains a key in understanding de facto states. Chapter 2 of this research 
demonstrates that in some cases, when de facto states have felt that the international 
community and its legitimacy had become irrelevant, their leaderships came to limit 
their interaction and withdraw from some of their commitments. Such a scenario is 
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also possible in the Kurdistan Region, as its leadership may find other means to 
maintain its autonomy.
5
 Students of the Kurdish question should therefore take such 
developments into account when examining the Kurdish question in Iraq, and remain 
attentive to the manner in which the Kurdish leadership views its status and its option 
for maintaining its autonomy. On an optimistic note, one may assume that the Kurdish 
public in both the Kurdistan Region and in the diaspora, after enjoying the ability to 
have a say in the formation and development of the region, might resist government 
attempts to revert to more restrictive forms of governance. 
Since its formation, the KRG has existed in something of a limbo (some would 
say out of the choice of its leadership). It has faced many questions about its present 
and future, whether as a part of a federal Iraq, or as an independent Kurdish state. 
This process may have been a traumatic one for the Kurdish people, who still face so 
many uncertainties, probably exacerbated by their tragic past; but it is also a process 
that carries with it some significant implications for the future of the Kurdish people 
in Iraq. The fact that this process of state-formation has taken place under conditions 
of great uncertainty prompted the Kurdish leadership to view the process itself as a 
path toward determining the future prospects of the Kurdish entity. This has provided 
this research with an invaluable opportunity to come up with new conclusions about 
international politics, IR theory and the Kurdish question in northern Iraq. 
Yet the findings of this research also raise new questions. The KRG in 
particular and de facto states in general are complex objects of analysis, primarily 
because they are in the midst of a transition – a transition which might never be 
completed. While the need to focus on the key hypotheses of this research have 
prevented me from directly dealing with these questions, my findings and the 
                                                          
5
 Based on Caspersen, Unrecognized States. 
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theoretical framework I have developed in this research provide a platform for 
addressing the questions that have emerged out of this study. 
Perhaps the biggest question that remains is about the future of the KRG and 
the prospects of its progress on the continuum of national liberation, namely the 
KRG’s secession from Iraq and its transition into a fully recognised state. As stressed 
throughout this thesis, the KRG never declared independence from the rest of Iraq, 
nor did its leadership ever make any explicit statement about its desire to secede. In 
fact, in most of their public statements, the leaders of the KRG expressed their 
commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity.6 On the other hand, the Kurdish leadership 
has made many statements which can be interpreted as implicit declarations of its real 
intentions. As demonstrated consistently in this research, the Kurdish leaders have 
made sure to stress in any discussion about federalism, the voluntary nature of the 
Iraqi union, and the Kurdish right to secede. Especially at times when tension between 
Erbil and Baghdad has risen, as happened in 2008 for example, the Kurdish leadership 
became even more vocal in stressing the voluntary nature of the Iraqi union, thus 
implicitly threatening revisions.
7
 A review of the Kurdish discourse during the 1990s, 
and even more so in the post-2003 era, reveals that the idea of statehood and the belief 
that the nation-state is the political embodiment of nationalism, as well as the way to 
protect the safety and cohesion of the Kurdish people, remains extremely powerful in 
the minds of Kurdish nationalists, activists and politicians alike.
8
 
More than words, the KRG’s actions reflect the impact that the idea of 
statehood has had on Kurdish political thought and the KRG’s conduct. Throughout 
                                                          
6
 As noted earlier in this research, this does not disqualify the KRG from being defined as a de facto 
state .See page 60. 
7
 And especially Mas’ud Barzani, who, in contrast to the PUK leader and the President of Iraq Jalal 
Talabani, has been based in the region itself. 
8
 See for instance the Kurdistan Referendum movement, established by members of the diaspora. 
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the first decades of its existence, the formation of the KRG and its consolidation of power 
were all inspired by the state and its institutions. In other words, the KRG was building up a 
state, without expecting legal and diplomatic recognition. True, the Kurdistan Region was 
reintegrated into Iraq in 2003 and the KRG gained formal recognition as an institution 
within federal Iraq – but it was during this period that efforts toward securing the 
KRG’s autonomy were actually intensified. The Kurdish insistence on independent 
legislation in various fields, whether in terms of energy, domestic security, or social 
affairs, all reflected the KRG’s desire to consolidate and demonstrate Kurdish 
sovereignty. By 2010 it could be said that the KRG had achieved the highest level of 
autonomy it could have achieved without fully seceding from Iraq. 
The reason for the Kurdish ambiguity with regard to sovereignty is the 
consequence not of commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity, but rather Turkish 
objection to any such move. Indeed, Turkey has become the main veto-actor with 
regard to any change in the status of the Kurdistan Region, as part of its role as the 
keeper of the status quo in regional affairs. Hence, whether or not the KRG is to 
become an independent state depends, to a great extent, on Ankara’s willingness to 
accept such a change to the status quo. And although Ankara proved to be far more 
receptive to the idea of Kurdish autonomy than had been predicted by observers 
during the 1990s, there is still a major gap between such shift in policy and Turkish 
willingness to accept the idea of a Kurdish state.   
To some extent, the question of whether the Kurdistan Region will become a 
fully recognised state or not is less relevant to this study, which examines the 
development of de facto states, rather than the question of recognition. This question 
nevertheless is an interesting one, constantly attracting the attention of analysts of 
Iraqi and regional geopolitics. Of course, predicting the future of regional 
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developments is almost an impossible mission – but the insights provided in this 
research can help us to assess the prospects of change, or at least understand their 
sources. 
This leads to another question mark, now surrounding the prospects of 
international recognition of the KRG, or any other de facto state: will the international 
community ever be willing to revise its adherence to territorial integrity, and 
recognise aspiring states based on their earned sovereignty, and especially such ones 
that respond to international standards of good governance? And should the 
international community even revise its current commitment to territorial integrity? 
Again, this research has avoided answering this question, primarily because focusing 
on this question would risk diverting attention again to the structure, namely the 
international community and its representative institutions, at the expense of the agent 
itself, namely the KRG and other de facto states. Nevertheless, this research has the 
potential to contribute to the ongoing debate in academic and policy-making circles 
about the nature of recognition, the right of entities to be recognised states and the 
obligation of other states to recognise entities that succeed in meeting the standards of 
statehood.
9
 
With regard to the first question, empirical evidence so far indicates that the 
international community, in most cases, has proven intransigent in its objection to 
unilateral secession, regardless of the circumstances and whether justification for such 
action is based on remedial claims, or on earned sovereignty. The case of Kosovo 
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 Among the notable scholars taking part in this debate, there are those who argue for democracy and 
other international standards to serve as the foundation of recognition, and those who object to this 
notion. In the first group we could find Allen Buchanan, “Recognitional Legitimacy and the State 
System,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 28, 1 (Winter, 1999), 46-78; and Diane Orentlichter, 
“International Responses to Separatist Claims,” in Secession and Self-Determination, ed. Stephen 
Macedo and Allen Buchanan (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 20-49; and in the second 
one could find Donald Horowitz, “A Right to Secede?” in Secession and Self-Determination, ed. 
Macedo and Buchanan, 50-76. 
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indeed constituted a precedent, in the sense that it was the only occasion in which a 
unilaterally secessionist entity was recognised by other states, based on its alleged 
(and in reality partial) success in meeting the international standards of legitimacy, as 
formulated by members of the international community. But even in Kosovo’s case, 
the main considerations behind this contested recognition were, as James Ker-Lindsay 
demonstrates, related to political expediency; in the sense that most members of the 
international community that chose to recognise Kosovo, viewed independence as 
necessary to prevent potential outbursts of violence in the Balkans and other parts of 
Europe.
10
 
The KRG provides a more convenient case for the international community, as 
the Kurdish leadership never declared independence or even its explicit desire to 
secede from Iraq. But the often hostile international community’s reactions to any 
step taken by the KRG which might be interpreted as secessionist indicate that the 
prospects of recognition are rather low. Nonetheless, if the question of Kurdish 
independence in northern Iraq becomes a reality, it is possible that the KRG’s success 
in proving earned sovereignty, as well as its commitment to at least some standards of 
good governance, will probably play an important role in the decision of states on 
whether to recognise such a move. As shown in chapter 5 of this research, Kurdish 
claims of earned sovereignty often served as grounds for some acts that can be 
considered as legitimising the KRG’s authority in the Kurdistan Region. 
Answering the second question would require me to make a judgement about 
the nature of international community and its mechanisms of recognition. I have 
avoided making this judgement throughout my research, and here is probably not the 
                                                          
10
 Ker-Lindsay, “From Autonomy to Independence: the Evolution of International Thinking on 
Kosovo: 1998-2005,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 112 (2009), 141-156. 
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right place to make such an assessment. Still, the case of de facto states and the KRG 
should raise the following questions: can recognition based on earned sovereignty, 
and especially on values such as democratisation and the protection of human rights, 
promote such values and establish their status as sources of state legitimacy? Can 
such recognition, based on the actions of de facto states and their prospects of 
integrating into their regional level, further contribute to regional stability, or might it 
in reality entail deterioration of stability and security? 
The case of the KRG and other de facto states reveals that conditioning 
recognition with certain norms can in fact enhance their status as criteria for 
recognition, at least by turning them into focal points of communicative action and 
argumentation. And while the KRG did experience a period of civil war that led to 
intervention by external powers, throughout most of the first two decades of its 
existence it served as some source of regional stability – as can be viewed by the 
increasing volume of cooperation between Erbil and Ankara. Various factors could 
negatively affect the course of the KRG’s development, and as stated repeatedly 
throughout this research, nothing about the status of the KRG, its actions or strategies 
is irreversible. But the processes it underwent between 1991 and 2010 necessarily left 
an important mark on the KRG, and its future developments will necessarily take 
place against them. 
At the time of writing, the Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq is still 
facing significant uncertainty about its future status, its aims and the strategies it 
should employ to protect its autonomy and indeed expand it. This research provides 
the necessary foundations for any future investigation of the KRG, and of de facto 
states in general. The potential for future research is vast, and it is this research’s 
greatest service to future scholarship if it not only answers many of the existing 
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questions about the Kurdish national liberation movement and international society, 
but also encourages researchers to come up with new questions. 
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